RICE v. STATE (2026)

Introduction

Marvin Rice (Rice) appeals the judgment denying his Rule 29.15 ¹ amended motion for post-conviction relief. Rice raises two points on appeal: trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to investigate the crime scene and present evidence that Rice had not stood over Victim 1 when he shot her, and (2) for not seeking a pharmacologist to testify on Rice's possible serotonin syndrome. Finding no error, we affirm the motion court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Rice is a six-year Army veteran, former police officer, and former deputy sheriff. While serving in the Army Rice was prescribed antidepressants for major depressive disorder. During his subsequent law enforcement career Rice was again treated for severe depression with a mix of different medications.

While serving as a deputy sheriff in Dent County Rice began an affair with Victim 1. He was then fired in 2009. In 2010, Victim 1 was incarcerated while pregnant with Rice's child, A.R., which she delivered while in prison. Rice took custody of A.R. shortly after birth.

On December 10, 2011, Victim 1 came to pick up A.R., now one year old, for her first unsupervised visit. Victim 1 was scheduled to return A.R. later that night, but some time after picking him up she decided she would not return him, and called to inform Rice of her intent to keep A.R. longer than previously agreed. Rice then armed himself with a gun and two loaded magazines and went looking for Victim 1, finding her at the home she shared with her six-year-old daughter, S.C. and Victim 2, her paramour. S.C. carried A.R. into the bedroom while Rice confronted Victim 1 from outside the front door. At some point, Rice broke through the door and entered the home, shooting Victim 2 twice, causing his death minutes later. Rice then went back towards the front door, but while still inside, shot Victim 1 three times—once in the chest and twice in the back— severing her spinal cord and paralyzing her. He then fired a fourth shot which hit the concrete outside and shattered up into Victim 1 as she lay on the ground. Victim 1 was later found dead, laying on her back with bullet fragments under her body.

After killing Victim 1, Rice then took A.R. and fled the scene, leading to a wild, high-speed chase culminating in a shootout with law enforcement inside a Jefferson City hotel. Rice was shot in the hand, arm, and lower back, then apprehended.

Rice was charged with two counts of murder in the first degree. At trial, the State argued Rice had shot Victim 1 the fourth time while “standing over” her, urging jurors to infer it was a “kill shot” necessarily preceded by deliberation. Sergeant S.M. testified the fourth shot could not have come from the hallway, but had “more of a straight down” angle. Dr. Carl Stacy, a forensic pathologist, testified the autopsy showed wounds consistent with the fourth bullet missing Victim 1 and hitting the concrete, shattering, and sending shrapnel and concrete shards into Victim 1's back. The State repeated this kill-shot theory throughout the trial, and emphasized it in closing argument. Trial counsel chose not to impeach either witness,² but did raise on cross examination the possibility the fourth shot had been fired from inside the house. Trial counsel called Dr. Jose Mathews, a forensic psychiatrist, to testify about Rice's mental state, history of depression, and treatment (including medications Rice was using and their possible interactions, like serotonin syndrome).

Rice was convicted of murder in the first degree for killing Victim 1 and murder in the second degree for killing Victim 2, facing a death sentence for the former. Rice appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri overturned his conviction for Count II and his death sentence for Count I.³ On resentencing for Count I, Rice received life without parole. Appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief.

The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2024. Trial counsel testified Rice's defense team had sufficient evidence to rebut the State's “kill shot” argument and thus had no need to further investigate the crime scene or hire an additional expert to testify. Rice then presented Dr. Steven Stoner, a pharmacist, as an example of a witness the defense could have called to testify about serotonin syndrome. Trial counsel further testified the defense had consulted with Dr. Mathews prior to trial and decided they had no need to call an additional expert to testify about serotonin syndrome because Dr. Mathews's testimony was sufficient.

The motion court denied Rice's motion. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of denial of a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018); Rule 29.15(k). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Claimed errors of law are reviewed de novo. Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Mo. banc 2024).

Discussion

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel and be eligible for post-conviction relief, Rice must satisfy the two-prong test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Anderson, 564 S.W.3d at 600. Rice must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that reasonably competent counsel would exercise in a similar situation and (2) the movant was prejudiced by that failure.” Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 286-87 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Failure to satisfy either prong eliminates the need to consider the other, and the ineffective-assistance claim fails. Beck v. State, 637 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

To prove deficiency, Rice must “overcome the strong presumption that [trial] counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013). Rice must show “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation omitted). “No matter how ill-fated it may appear in hindsight, a reasonable choice of trial strategy cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 900.

To show prejudice, Rice must demonstrate “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Cravens v. State, 50 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). But that duty “does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” McFadden v. State, 553 S.W.3d 289, 309 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotation omitted).

The selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim. Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 900. Ineffective assistance for failure to call a particular witness requires, inter alia, the testimony would have provided a viable defense. Porter v. State, 575 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). “A ‘viable defense’ is one which has a reasonable probability of outweighing the aggravating evidence and changing the outcome of the trial.” Id. (citing Deck v. State, 381 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Mo. banc 2012)).

Point One: Crime Scene Investigation/Forensic Expert

In Point One, Rice argues the motion court clearly erred by denying his Rule 29.15 motion because trial counsel failed to investigate the crime scene and present evidence to rebut the State's “kill shot” theory. We disagree because trial counsel's decision not to conduct further investigation, seek an additional forensic expert, or rebut the State's argument was reasonable trial strategy.

Analysis

Trial counsel testified on direct examination that the defense team did not visit the crime scene because “the evidence that [they] had available” was already sufficient to rebut the State's kill-shot theory. This was reasonable trial strategy. And in accordance with Cravens and McFadden, trial counsel had no need or duty to investigate the crime scene further or search for an additional expert who could testify on Rice's behalf. “It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy.” Perkins v. State, 722 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Russell v. State, 699 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024)).

Additionally, trial counsel was not required to hire an expert to testify the shot came from slightly farther away. Despite Rice's insistence, such testimony would not have provided a viable defense; neither this case as a whole nor the specific question of deliberation turned on whether the fourth shot was fired from directly above Victim 1 or from farther away.

While we need not address the second prong of the Strickland test, we further find Rice was not prejudiced by trial counsel's decision not to investigate the crime scene or find an additional expert to testify about the kill shot.

First, the State still could have argued Rice was “standing over” Victim 1 when he fired the kill shot as that term is narrative rather than legal. Victim 1 was laying on the ground, paralyzed, so Rice could have been described as “standing over” her even if Rice had shot her from farther away than the State had argued. Second, a determination that the final shot came from farther away does not preclude—or even significantly undermine—a finding that Rice had engaged in sufficient deliberation to satisfy the requirements of murder in the first degree.⁴ Even if Rice had not been directly above Victim 1, he still fired a fourth shot after the first three had paralyzed her, from which a reasonable juror could infer deliberation. This renders any suggestion Rice's proposed alternative would have affected the outcome of the trial implausible. Point One is denied.

Point Two: Pharmacologist

In Point Two, Rice argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with and hire a pharmacologist to provide additional expert testimony about the effects of serotonin syndrome and its potential to cause agitation and irritability. We disagree because trial counsel's decision not to seek and introduce such duplicative testimony was reasonable trial strategy.

Analysis

Rice argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek out a pharmacologist like Dr. Stoner to testify about serotonin syndrome at his trial.⁵ Beyond the fact that “selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim” as noted above, Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 900, trial counsel had already consulted with Dr. Mathews about serotonin syndrome and he testified on the issue at trial. Not only did trial counsel's consultation with Dr. Mathews render further investigation unnecessary, but the record indicates expert testimony from a pharmacologist (or pharmacist, like Dr. Stoner) would have been duplicative.

Dr. Mathews testified about, inter alia, Rice's current medications, the interactions between those medications, and the possible side-effects Rice may have experienced. Dr. Mathews did raise the possibility of serotonin syndrome, and even explained to the jury Rice had previously had difficulty controlling impulses and aggression from excess serotonin. On the other hand, Dr. Stoner, a pharmacist, could only have testified at trial about serotonin syndrome generally, describing the syndrome's symptoms and potential causes. In fact, Dr. Stoner stated he agreed with Dr. Mathews's description of serotonin syndrome. At most, a defense pharmacist could have said based on a list of Rice's prescribed medicines Rice may have suffered from serotonin syndrome, and serotonin syndrome may have made him irritable. In light of both Dr. Mathews's trial testimony and Dr. Stoner's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel's decision not to hire a pharmacologist or pharmacist was reasonable trial strategy.

Further, because such duplicative testimony would have added little—if anything—to Rice's defense, we fail to see how Rice could possibly have been prejudiced by the absence thereof. Rice's argument—he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to call a pharmacist because the jury might have found a pharmacologist or pharmacist more credible than a psychiatrist—is without merit and would require us to second-guess reasonable trial strategy. This court cannot find ineffective assistance on that basis. Point Two is denied.

Conclusion

Finding no error in the motion court's judgment, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2022).

2.   Though Rice asserts Sergeant S.M. “went unimpeached,” his amended motion did not claim a general failure to impeach Sergeant S.M. but a failure to investigate the crime scene and hire an expert to contradict the State's kill-shot argument.

3.   See State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53 (Mo. banc 2019).

4.   For purposes of murder in the first degree, deliberation requires “a cool reflection upon the victim's death for some amount of time, no matter how short.” State v. Scott, 676 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). “A mere instant is sufficient to qualify as deliberation.” Id. And, crucial here, “[t]he inference of deliberation is strengthened when there is evidence the defendant inflicted multiple wounds or repeated blows.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sokolic v. State, 660 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023)).

5.   We note Dr. Stoner is a pharmacist, not a pharmacologist. Rice seems to use the terms interchangeably, offering Dr. Stoner as an example of an expert whom trial counsel could have consulted with and called to testify.

Virginia W. Lay, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Philip M. Hess, Judge, concurs.