BATEMAN v. STATE (2026)

Introduction

Appellant Teraz Bateman (“Bateman”) appeals from the motion court's judgment denying his amended Rule 29.15 ¹ motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Bateman alleges a single point: the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel was ineffective for unreasonably inducing his unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary waiver of his constitutional right to testify. Because trial counsel's advice not to testify was reasonable trial strategy and Bateman's waiver was knowing and voluntary, the motion court's judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

It started on August 8, 2019, with a robbery gone wrong. R.H., his girlfriend (“B.L.”), and her brother (“decedent”) (collectively, “buyers”) met, E.P., to buy marijuana. Decedent brought a gun.

E.P. rode with C.M. and Bateman (“sellers”) in a car driven by Bateman's female friend. All three sellers were armed. E.P. exited his vehicle and entered buyers’ car to provide a marijuana sample. After briefly returning to his own vehicle, E.P. entered the back seat of buyers’ car, this time with Bateman. Decedent was seated between E.P. and Bateman, with his gun in his lap.

E.P. demanded money from R.H. and B.L. As the parties argued, C.M. approached and shoved an AK-style rifle through the rolled-down car window. In response, gunfire erupted. Decedent, C.M., and Bateman fired their guns. Decedent died at the scene.

The State charged Bateman with one count of second-degree felony murder, one count of first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. The case proceeded to jury trial on August 29, 2022. At the close of the State's case, and after conferring with trial counsel, the trial court conducted an on-the-record colloquy regarding Bateman's right to testify. Bateman informed the court, having been advised of his rights and as part of his trial strategy, he did not wish to testify. He further stated the decision was his own and made of his own free will.

Bateman did not testify at trial, and the defense presented no witnesses. After deliberation, the jury found Bateman guilty on all counts. On October 27, 2022, the trial court sentenced Bateman to life imprisonment on Count One and ten years’ imprisonment on each Count Two through Four.

After sentencing, the trial court then advised Bateman of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction rights and inquired as to the assistance he received from his trial counsel. Specifically, the Court asked Bateman whether he and trial counsel had discussed testifying. Bateman affirmed, adding it was his own decision not to testify. When asked if he had any complaints about his lawyer, Bateman stated he was not satisfied with trial counsel's services, expressing his belief counsel “didn't do his best” and “there was evidence in [his] paperwork to prove [his] innocence.”

Bateman appealed his convictions and sentences, which this Court affirmed in State v. Bateman, 678 S.W.3d 483 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). Bateman timely filed his amended Rule 29.15 motion, and the motion court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

Bateman and trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel detailed prior to trial, he had discussed with Bateman his right to testify, along with counsel's advice not to. Trial counsel testified Bateman gave police two prior inconsistent statements: 1) he did not remember what happened, and 2) he never shot anyone. Just before trial, Bateman advanced a new theory to trial counsel, arguing self-defense. Trial counsel felt this third conflicting version of events created credibility concerns. Trial counsel was also aware of Bateman's prior convictions as well as probationary status and felt testifying would hurt Bateman's case.

Additionally, trial counsel stated he had effectively cross-examined the State's witnesses, and placing Bateman on the stand would subject him to damaging cross-examination without advancing a viable defense. Trial counsel reiterated Bateman understood his right to testify, the decision was his, and further did not tell Bateman he could not testify. Bateman agreed with counsel's recommendations and chose not to testify.

For his part, Bateman testified trial counsel did not present his preferred theory. Instead, Bateman wanted to argue self-defense, but counsel presented the facts as a “drug deal gone bad.” Bateman stated he did not testify “[b]ecause [counsel] told [him] it's not good in [his] defense, and they told [him] [he] couldn't go for self-defense because [he] had felony murder.” Bateman acknowledged counsel did not prevent him from testifying and conceded the decision was his to make, even if he internally disagreed with counsel's recommendation.

On May 1, 2025, the motion court denied Bateman's Rule 29.15 motion, finding Bateman knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. The motion court further concluded Bateman failed to establish he suffered prejudice because a theory of self-defense could never defeat a charge of felony murder. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the [motion] court's action on the motion filed under this Rule 29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 29.15(k); Hurst v. State, 301 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010)). “Appellate courts presume the motion court's findings are correct and a judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Scott v. State, 719 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. banc 2025) (internal quotation omitted).

Discussion

In his point on appeal, Bateman asserts the motion court clearly erred in denying his amended Rule 29.15 motion because counsel was ineffective for unreasonably inducing his unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary waiver of his constitutional right to testify.

To obtain post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland ² test. Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018). Under Strickland, a movant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that (1) counsel's performance did not meet that of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that because of counsel's actions, movant was prejudiced. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). If a movant fails to establish either prong, then we need not consider the other, and the ineffective-assistance claim must fail. Washington v. State, 681 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

“A movant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.” Casey v. State, 711 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013)). “Additionally, a movant must discern specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Trial strategy decisions can only be ineffective if the decision was unreasonable. Id. “Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel stated he advised Bateman not to testify for strategic reasons, including concerns about credibility, potential impeachment, and the risks of cross-examination. Those concerns were grounded in the circumstances known to counsel at the time of trial. Bateman provided police with inconsistent statements: he did not remember what happened and he never shot anyone, in addition to his ultimate theory of self-defense. In light of evidence the sellers fled the scene and social media posts depicting Bateman flashing the decedent's gun, trial counsel anticipated this would be used on cross-examination to undermine any claim of self-defense. Trial counsel reasonably believed these shifting accounts would undermine Bateman's credibility if presented to a jury. Trial counsel further considered Bateman's prior convictions and probationary status would be available for impeachment and would further hurt his credibility.

Trial counsel felt he had effectively cross-examined the State's witnesses and did not want to subject Bateman to damaging cross-examination without advancing a viable defense. Given these circumstances, trial counsel concluded the risks of testifying outweighed any potential benefit which constitutes reasonable trial strategy.

Of note, Bateman's own testimony at the evidentiary hearing supports the motion court's findings. Bateman testified counsel did not prevent him from testifying and did nothing “[e]xcept to tell [him] that it wasn't good for [him] to testify.” Although Bateman stated he disagreed with counsel's recommendation “in [his] head,” he acknowledged he told counsel he agreed and “it was [his] choice alone” not to testify. His testimony merely reflects dissatisfaction with counsel's advice in hindsight rather than any interference with his right to testify.

Further, Bateman's knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to testify is supported by the trial court's on-the-record colloquy. “A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf at trial.” State v. Jones, 701 S.W.3d 716, 719 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (internal quotation omitted). To ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver, the trial court must engage in a colloquy with the defendant to make certain he understands what rights he is waiving and the consequences of doing so. State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015). “It has been repeatedly held that, when a criminal defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify, absent extraordinary circumstances, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not lie in defense counsel's decision not to call him as a witness.” Payne v. State, 509 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).

Here, the trial court conducted the following on-the-record colloquy regarding Bateman's right to testify:

Q: Do you also understand if you choose to testify, the prosecutor could ask about any prior convictions you might have?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And if you have prior convictions, the jury can consider these when determining whether or not to believe your testimony. Do you understand that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Do you understand that you cannot be forced to testify?

A: Yes, ma'am.

․

Q: Have you had a chance to speak with [counsel] about the pros and cons of whether or not to testify and tell your side of the story?

A: Yes, ma'am.

․

Q: Okay. Do you understand that the ultimate decision as to whether you testify is yours?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Do you understand that you have an absolute right to testify if you want to?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And even if your lawyer makes a recommendation, you don't have to follow your lawyer's recommendation. Do you understand that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

․

Q: And was this decision made as part of your trial strategy? Basically, was this decision something that you decided is best for your case?

A: Yeah, I decided.

The trial court conducted a thorough colloquy advising Bateman of his right to testify, that he could not be compelled to do so, and that he would be subject to cross-examination and impeachment if he testified. Bateman affirmed he understood these rights, confirmed he had discussed the matter with counsel, acknowledged the decision was his alone, and stated he was choosing not to testify of his own free will. He later reaffirmed his decision following sentencing. The record reflects Bateman's knowing and voluntary waiver of this right to testify, and trial counsel's advice and decision not to call him did not constitute ineffective assistance.

Prejudice

While we need not address the second prong of Strickland, we further find Bateman was not prejudiced by trial counsel's advice not to testify. A theory of self-defense does not defeat felony murder predicated on robbery. State v. Oates, 540 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Mo. banc 2018). Thus, even if Bateman had testified consistent with a self-defense theory, his testimony would not have provided a viable defense, and there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Washington, 681 S.W.3d at 356.

Further, any potential benefit from Bateman's testimony would have been subject to damaging impeachment. Had Bateman testified, he would have been subject to cross-examination for his prior inconsistent statements, criminal history, and the surrounding facts of the offense. His testimony would have carried little probative value and exposed him to substantial credibility attacks.

Counsel's advice regarding whether to testify “does not constitute a ground for post-conviction relief, absent exceptional circumstances.” Hickey v. State, 328 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Here, counsel's assessment falls within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Bateman has not demonstrated deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The motion court did not clearly err. Point denied.

Conclusion

Finding no error in the motion court's judgment, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2022).

2.   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Virginia W. Lay, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Philip M. Hess, Judge, concurs.