BEAVER v. AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

Introduction

Zachary (Beaver) and Angie Beaver (collectively, the Beavers) appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Respondent American Family Insurance Company, S.I. (American Family). The trial court determined American Family properly reduced the policy limits of the Beavers’ uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for two vehicles, based on two policy provisions: one that allowed a reduction in UM coverage where the insured receives workers’ compensation payments, and one allowing a reduction in UM coverage for a second vehicle to the mandatory minimum where the law requires coverage for multiple vehicles to be added, or “stacked.” Because we find the former violates public policy, but the latter is a permissible limitation on stacked coverage, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 6, 2023, Beaver was doing asphalt work in a closed roadway of a construction zone when he was struck by an uninsured motorist, causing multiple injuries. Beaver's employer opened an administrative claim for his work-related injuries. As of the date of the trial court's summary judgment, Beaver's employer's workers’ compensation insurer had paid over $500,000 for medical treatment.

The Beavers had a policy with American Family that insured two vehicles and included UM coverage of $250,000 per vehicle and $500,000 per accident, which was listed in the policy's declarations. This amount is referred to in the policy as “Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limits of liability.” The policy also contained a UM endorsement, which stated that the Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limit of liability includes not only coverage for bodily injury to the injured person, but, as relevant here, claims of loss of consortium as well.

The UM endorsement further contained a provision noting the UM policy limits of liability would be “reduced by: ․ a payment made or amount payable because of bodily injury under any workers’ compensation or disability benefits law, or any similar law.” However, the provision noted that “in no event shall the amount we pay to the insured person be reduced below the Missouri Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law minimum limit.”

Due to this workers’ compensation reduction provision, American Family notified the Beavers that, regarding the first covered vehicle, because Beaver's employer had made workers’ compensation payments in excess of the $250,000 UM coverage limit, the limit of liability would be reduced to $25,000, which is the statutory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, Section 379.203, RSMo. 2016.

Regarding the second covered vehicle, the UM endorsement contained a provision concerning UM coverage stacking. It contains the following language, in relevant part:

[T]he Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limits of liability ․ for a vehicle may not be added, combined, or stacked with the Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limits of liability ․ for any other vehicle ․.

THIS MEANS THAT NO STACKING, COMBINATION, OR AGGREGATION OF UNINSURED MOTORIST – BODILY INJURY COVERAGE IS ALLOWED UNDER THIS POLICY. ANY UNINSURED MOTORIST – BODILY INJURY COVERAGE THAT IS REQUIRED TO BE STACKED UNDER THE LAW WILL BE REDUCED TO THE MANDATORY MINIMUM LIMITS REQUIRED UNDER THE LAW.

Due to this anti-stacking and stacking reduction provision, American Family notified the Beavers that because Missouri does allow stacking of UM coverage for multiple vehicles, coverage for the second vehicle would also be reduced to the statutory mandatory minimum coverage of $25,000. Thus, American Family issued payment to the Beavers in the amount of $50,000, or $25,000 for each insured vehicle.

The Beavers filed suit seeking to recover the full limit of $500,000 of UM coverage in their policy, or $250,000 for each insured vehicle. They argued that both the workers’ compensation reduction provision and the stacking reduction provision were invalid. The basis of their damages claims included both bodily injury to Zachary Beaver and loss of consortium for Angie Beaver. Both the Beavers and American Family filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted American Family's motion. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, 732 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo. banc 2026) (citing Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020)). We apply the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper, considering whether the moving party established there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Rule 74.04(c)(6). We view the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id.

Analysis

The Beavers raise eight points on appeal. Their arguments include claims that the American Family policy violates Missouri law and public policy, is ambiguous, and is unconscionable as a contract of adhesion. The key provisions of the policy at issue are (1) the workers’ compensation reduction provision; and (2) the stacking reduction provision. Our discussion of the points on appeal is organized around each of these two provisions, in the most logical order.

The Workers’ Compensation Reduction Provision is Unambiguous

Though the Beavers’ primary argument is that the workers’ compensation reduction provision violates public policy, we address their arguments regarding ambiguity in the policy language first because, while we must construe an ambiguous policy against the insurer, “where insurance policies are unambiguous, they will be enforced as written absent a statute or public policy requiring coverage.” Rodriguez v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991); see also Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 47 n.3 (Mo. banc 2009) (declining to consider whether setoff provision violated public policy because policy language contained ambiguity, which was dispositive). In Point Three, the Beavers raise several potential ambiguities in the policy language here, which we address together. We find the policy provisions at issue here are unambiguous.

“An ambiguity exists where there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy.” Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687, 690 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007)). “If a contract promises something at one point and takes it away at another, there is an ambiguity.” Id. (quoting Seeck, 212 S.W.3d at 133) (internal alteration omitted).

Here, the UM endorsement provides the following language, on which American Family based its reduction in the limit of liability to $25,000 for the first covered vehicle:

6. The limits of liability under this endorsement will be reduced by: ․

d. a payment made or amount payable because of bodily injury under any workers[’] compensation or disability benefits law, or any similar law. ․

8. However, in no event shall the amount we pay to the insured person be reduced below the Missouri Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law minimum limit.

The effect of this language is that the amount of any workers’ compensation payments will be deducted from the UM limit of liability, but the limit of liability cannot fall below $25,000.

In the cases cited by the Beavers, the policies at issue purported both to reduce coverage and to grant the full amount of coverage, thus they were ambiguous. See Rice, 301 S.W.3d at 48 (policy expressly limited UM coverage to statutory minimum, yet purported to grant full coverage under all UM provisions that exceeded statutory minimum); see also Jones, 287 S.W.3d at 691 (underinsured motorist (UIM) policy expressly granted full limit of liability where it was less than difference between insured's total damages and amount paid by tortfeasor, yet later stated limit of liability would be reduced by any amount payable, meaning full limit of liability would never be paid). There are no similar conflicting provisions here.

The UM endorsement states that the limits of liability shown on the declarations page “apply, subject to the following[,]” and then an enumerated list of provisos follows, including paragraph 6's workers’ compensation reduction provision. This is distinct from a provision purporting to grant the full limit of liability without qualification, only to be followed by an exception. See Coffin v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 703 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (distinguishing policy at issue in Rice, noting UM provision began with “subject to the terms of this contract,” which expressly limited coverage based on terms of contract that followed, rather than purporting to grant coverage up to limits of liability as in Rice). The clear language of the UM endorsement here, when read with the declarations page, provides that the UM limit of liability is $250,000 per person, which will be reduced by the amount of any workers’ compensation payments, but no lower than the statutory minimum of $25,000.¹

The Beavers also argue that the UM endorsement's use of the words “reduced by” instead of “set off” creates an ambiguity in that it attempts to obscure the fact that the provision is a setoff provision. To an ordinary person of average understanding, “reduce” would be synonymous with “set off.” See Wasson v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 358 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“we look to plain meaning of words and phrases as it would have been understood by an ordinary person of average understanding when buying the policy”). In fact, “setoff” is a term of art, for which “reduction” is a helpful definition. See Setoff, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), available at Westlaw (“Setoff signifies the subtraction or taking away of one demand from another opposite or cross demand․”). We find no ambiguity here; the plain meaning of the words “reduced by” communicates clearly that the insurer will subtract the amount of workers’ compensation payments received from the limit of liability.²

Finally, the Beavers point to a handful of other unrelated portions of the policy, but we find none of these when read with the declarations page and UM endorsement render the UM provisions discussed above ambiguous.³ Point denied.

The Workers’ Compensation Reduction Provision Violates Public Policy

In Point One,⁴ the Beavers argue that the workers’ compensation reduction provision, which reduced the UM limit of liability for the first covered vehicle to $25,000, is void because it violates public policy as expressed in Missouri's insurance regulations. We agree.

Again, the relevant portion of the UM endorsement here provides that the UM limits of liability “will be reduced by ․ a payment made or amount payable because of bodily injury under any workers[’] compensation or disability benefits law, or any similar law ․” However, the policy further provides that “in no event shall the amount we pay to the insured person be reduced below the [statutory minimum,]” which is $25,000.

It is well-established law in Missouri that an insurer may not set off the required statutory minimum UM coverage of $25,000 by any workers’ compensation payments the insured receives. Cano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Mo. banc 1983) (citing Douthet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. banc 1977)). The policy language here complies in that it does not permit a reduction below the statutory minimum. The question presented is whether the same Missouri public policy that prohibits an insurer from setting off statutory minimum UM coverage by workers’ compensation payments also prohibits setoffs of amounts in excess of the statutory minimum, a question thus far unresolved by our Supreme Court.⁵ See Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 47 n.3 (Mo. banc 2009). As noted above, in Rice, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to consider the issue due to an ambiguity in the policy language, which was dispositive. Id.

Because we have found no ambiguity in the workers’ compensation reduction provision here, we must enforce it unless it is contrary to public policy. Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 382. Missouri's public policy is found in our state constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations. See Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Mo. banc 2010). The relevant expression of public policy here is an insurance regulation, 20 CSR 500-2.100, entitled “Minimum Standards for Automobile Policies”:

(G) Uninsured motor vehicle coverage, whether provided within the policy or separately by endorsement, shall not—

1. Permit medical payments or Workers’ Compensation payments set-off.

20 CSR 500-2.100(2)(G)(1). The Beavers argue this regulation clearly prohibits any setoff of their UM coverage due to the workers’ compensation payments Beaver received. Conversely, American Family argues that the title of the regulation, “Minimum Standards for Automobile Policies,” as well as the fact that it was enacted pursuant to Section 379.203’s minimum UM coverage mandate, signal that the regulation applies only to the statutory minimum coverage, but does not affect the parties’ ability to contract for a reduction of any excess coverage above the statutory minimum amount. No court has considered this portion of the regulation or taken it into account in any discussion of workers’ compensation setoffs of UM coverage.

However, many cases have discussed the enabling statute, Section 379.203, requiring all automobile insurance policies to provide UM coverage equal to the minimum required liability limits. The foundational case applying Section 379.203 in the context of a UM workers’ compensation set-off is Douthet v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 546 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. banc 1977). In Douthet, the insured had obtained a judgment for $2,500 in damages against her insurance carrier, and the insurance company sought to reduce the damage amount by $529.05, which was the amount the insured had received from a workers’ compensation carrier. Id. at 157. At the time, the statutory minimum UM coverage was $10,000 per person. Sections 379.203, 303.030 RSMo. 1969. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that it would violate the public policy expressed in Section 379.203’s minimum UM coverage mandate “to permit diminution of coverage by requiring credit for workmen's compensation payments.” Douthet, 546 S.W.2d at 159.

Additionally, in rejecting the insurer's argument that such an approach might result in a windfall to the insured, the court compared general tort liability cases, noting that it is not unusual for a person to receive additional payments for an injury from sources other than the tortfeasor, and such payments do not reduce the tortfeasor's liability. Id. (noting collateral source doctrine holds that tortfeasor has no right to benefit from payments from unconnected source such as hospitalization insurance). The Supreme Court of Missouri further observed that the insurer's argument for a workers’ compensation setoff would result in a windfall to the insurer, who would receive a reduction in coverage, even though the insurer does not create or pay for workers’ compensation payments. Id. at 159-60. The court concluded, “[i]n such a situation, if there is to be a windfall, it should go to the injured person rather than to [the] insurer.” Id. at 160.

The regulation at issue here, 20 CSR 500-2.100(2)(G)(1), was amended by the Division of Insurance in 1977, shortly following Douthet, to add the bold language below:

(2) Minimum automobile policy standards

(G) Uninsured motor vehicle coverage, whether provided within the policy or separately by endorsement, shall not:

1. permit medical payments or workmen's compensation payments set-off[.]

4 CSR 190-17.010, proposed amendment (1977).⁶ The amendment includes a statement of purpose, as follows:

PURPOSE: The purpose of this amendment is to incorporate into this regulation the Supreme Court Ruling in Douthet v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 546 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. banc 1977).

We find the plain language of this regulation prohibits any setoff of UM coverage due to workers’ compensation payments. Simply put, had the Division of Insurance felt Douthet’s application of Section 379.203 reflected a legislative intent to prohibit setoffs only of the statutory minimum UM coverage, then the regulation would have stated as much. Instead, the plain language of this regulation prohibits workers’ compensation setoffs without any qualification.

While American Family argues that the regulation can only apply to what is mandated by statute, we note that the Division of Insurance is empowered to “draft[ ] regulations which contain requirements for the terms which an insurer must include if it makes a particular type of coverage available, even though Missouri law does not mandate that the insurer must make that particular type of coverage available.” Magruder v. Shelter Ins. Co., 985 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (noting that 20 CSR 500-2.100(2)(C) and (D) regulate policy provisions for medical payment coverage and physical damage coverage, even though neither type of coverage is mandatory). UM coverage in excess of the amount required by statute is not mandatory, but the Division of Insurance is permitted to regulate its terms where an insurer does offer such coverage.

Moreover, our interpretation of the regulation as plainly written is consistent with Missouri public policy regarding workers’ compensation, which is to protect a worker's right to receive workers’ compensation. See Section 287.260 (noting workers’ compensation “shall not be assignable, shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, and execution, shall not be subject to setoff or counterclaim, or be in any way liable for any debt”). Similarly, it is generally the policy of Missouri that when an insurance company collects premiums from an insured, the insured should receive the coverage for which he or she paid those premiums. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Mo. banc 1976).

Finally, the Douthet court determined that if there is to be a windfall, it should go to the insured. 546 S.W.2d at 159. Rather than permitting an insurance company to avoid payment of coverage for which it has collected premiums, our courts prefer to allow an insured to receive the paid-for coverage, even if it overcompensates the insured. However, given that UM coverage includes payment for claims such as loss of consortium and pain and suffering, whereas workers’ compensation does not cover such claims,⁷ we do not believe the danger of double recovery is as probable as the insurance companies seem to fear. The Division of Insurance, given the regulation's very plain language, likewise seems to consider the danger of double recovery less of a threat than the danger of leaving an insured uncompensated for losses that the insured payed additional premiums to cover.⁸ Certainly here, Mrs. Beaver's loss of consortium claim is not simply theoretical, but she has thus far remained uncompensated for her damages.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the public policy expressed in Missouri's insurance regulations does not permit workers’ compensation setoff of UM coverage in any amount. We therefore find the workers’ compensation reduction provision here is void as contrary to public policy. We reverse the trial court's summary judgment approving American Family's reduction of the UM limit of liability for the first covered vehicle. Point granted.

The Stacking Reduction Provision is Valid

In the Beavers’ remaining points, we consider the insurance policy provisions as they relate to the second covered vehicle. In Points Seven and Eight, the Beavers argue, respectively, that the UM endorsement's stacking reduction provision, which reduced any required stacked coverage to $25,000 for the second covered vehicle, violates Missouri law and alternatively, is ambiguous. We address these arguments together, finding neither persuasive under current Missouri law.

The policy language at issue is as follows:

[T]he Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limits of liability ․ for a vehicle may not be added, combined, or stacked with the Uninsured Motorist – Bodily Injury limits of liability ․ for any other vehicle ․.

THIS MEANS THAT NO STACKING, COMBINATION, OR AGGREGATION OF UNINSURED MOTORIST – BODILY INJURY COVERAGE IS ALLOWED UNDER THIS POLICY. ANY UNINSURED MOTORIST – BODILY INJURY COVERAGE THAT IS REQUIRED TO BE STACKED UNDER THE LAW WILL BE REDUCED TO THE MANDATORY MINIMUM LIMITS REQUIRED UNDER THE LAW.

We note this language contains both an anti-stacking provision, prohibiting stacking of UM coverage, as well as a stacking reduction provision, providing that if the law requires stacking, the stacked limit of liability will be reduced to the state mandatory minimum. The Beavers argue these two provisions are contradictory and therefore ambiguous. The Beavers further argue that allowing a step-down of stacked coverage to the statutory minimum is against public policy.

“Missouri law is well-settled that where one provision of a policy appears to grant coverage and another to take it away, an ambiguity exists that will be resolved in favor of coverage.” Jones, 287 S.W.3d at 689. However, “[t]he mere presence of an exclusion does not render an insurance policy ambiguous.” Purk v. Farmers Ins. Co., 628 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). We read the policy as a whole, and where we can, we harmonize the policy provisions in a manner consistent with public policy. See id. at 723.

In Missouri, “public policy flowing from the statutory requirement for UM coverage in insurance policies allows insureds to stack UM coverage.” Purk v. Farmers Ins. Co., 628 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing Shepherd v. Am. States Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Mo. banc 1984)); see also Cameron Mut., 533 S.W.2d at 542 (discussing Galloway v. Farmers Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Mo. App. 1975) (“[p]ublic policy requires that coverage in the statutory amount under each of the policies stand undiminished by contractual limitation”)). It is therefore improper for insurance policies to include language prohibiting stacking of UM coverage. Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722 (citing Williams v. Silvola, 234 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).

Here, the anti-stacking provision and the stacking reduction provision are not inherently contradictory. The stacking reduction provision operates as an exception to the policy's general anti-stacking language. The exception operates when the law governing the insurance policy requires stacking, as in Missouri. While the anti-stacking language indeed violates Missouri law and public policy, the step-down language of the stacking reduction provision is unambiguous. Thus, while we may strike the anti-stacking language as void, we also must enforce the unambiguous stacking reduction provision unless it is against public policy. See id. (finding policy containing anti-stacking language along with owned-vehicle exclusion limiting stacking could be harmonized by invalidating anti-stacking provision and giving effect to the exclusion as written in manner that provides stacked coverage of statutory minimum UM benefits).

Our courts have upheld policy language similar to the stacking reduction provision here, finding the dual public policy concerns of protecting statutory minimum UM coverage and permitting stacking of UM policies are met even through policies that limit stacking to the statutory minimum UM coverage. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 730 S.W.3d 286 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (“[w]hile insurers are prevented from including policy language that prohibits stacking, insurers may include stacking limitations, consistent with the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law, by providing the minimum amount of coverage - $25,000 per person, per policy”); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (finding owned-vehicle exclusion that limited stacked UM coverage to statutory minimum did not violate public policy, noting requiring full UM coverage for each vehicle would “expand the scope of mandatory UM coverage far beyond the purpose of [Section 379.203]”); Copling v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., S.I., 612 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (owned-vehicle exclusion that limited stacked UM coverage to statutory minimum did not violate public policy).

American Family's policy here limited stacked UM coverage to the statutory minimum amount, and accordingly, American Family paid the Beavers $25,000 for their UM coverage on the second vehicle. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of American Family in this respect. Points Seven and Eight are denied.⁹

Conclusion

Because the policy's workers’ compensation reduction provision is invalid, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of American Family as it relates to UM coverage for the first vehicle. Because the stacking reduction provision is valid and enforceable, we affirm the trial court's judgment as it relates to UM coverage for the second vehicle. Because the parties agree the Beavers’ damages are in excess of the UM coverage limit of liability for the first vehicle, the Beavers are entitled to the full limits of liability, or $250,000 for the first vehicle. Adding $25,000 for the second vehicle, and subtracting $50,000 that American Family already paid to the Beavers, we direct the trial court to enter judgment for the Beavers in the amount of $225,000, and for all further proceedings as necessary, consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Beavers argue in Point Four that, following Rice, the policy ambiguities require offset from the Beavers’ total damages, rather than the limit of liability. Their argument is based on Rice’s analysis of Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687 (Mo. banc 2009), where the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a particular policy's limiting provision regarding UIM coverage was ambiguous, but could be reconciled with the rest of the policy by interpreting it to call for a setoff from the insured's total damages, rather than the limit of liability. Id. at 692-93. While that is a tempting middle-ground approach, it was merited in Jones due to a policy ambiguity that is not present here. The policy here plainly provides the workers’ compensation reduction will be taken from the UM limit of liability. Point Four is denied.

2.   The Beavers raise one additional argument based on language from the UM endorsement not at issue here. They argue paragraph 7 of the UM endorsement contains an “elements of loss” exclusion due to workers’ compensation payments that conflicts with paragraph 6's workers’ compensation reduction provision. Because American Family relied on paragraph 6 to reduce the UM limit of liability here, our discussion regarding ambiguity is limited to this provision. Any ambiguity in paragraph 7 would result in striking application of paragraph 7, which is unnecessary here given American Family did not utilize paragraph 7 in reducing UM coverage in the first place. To the extent both paragraphs purport to remove coverage in the event of workers’ compensation payments, our public policy analysis applies to both.

3.   The policy's general provisions regarding suits against American Family and American Family's recovery rights are not relevant to this case and do not conflict with the UM provisions. The declarations page's statement that underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage will be reduced by payment from other sources appears to be a response to cases like Ritchie v. Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. banc 2009), in which the Supreme Court of Missouri considered UIM policies that never contemplated full payment of the limit of liability, and insurers have responded by indicating as much on the declarations page. See Fanning v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co., 412 S.W.3d 360, 368 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). That is not the case with UM coverage in this policy, which does allow for paying the full limit of liability where workers’ compensation is not involved. As we have noted, the UM endorsement here indicated coverage was “subject to the following” qualifications, which adequately signaled limits on coverage under particular circumstances.

4.   The Beavers raise additional policy arguments in Points Two and Five. In Point Two, they argue allowing a setoff creates incongruency with the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law. In Point Five, they argue allowing a setoff defeats the reasonable expectations of the insured and provides only illusory coverage. Because Point One is dispositive, to the extent our discussion of that point does not address the Beavers’ arguments in Points Two and Five, they are denied as moot.

5.   The Western District of our Court has answered this question, finding a workers’ compensation exclusion of coverage exceeding the statutory minimum UM coverage did not violate public policy. Coffin v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 703 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

6.   The current regulation, 20 CSR 500-2.100, was previously codified at 4 CSR 190-17.010, and that version contains the 1977 amendment. The relevant language of the regulation has remained substantially the same since this 1977 amendment, only changing “workmen's compensation” to “Workers’ Compensation,” and moving to 20 CSR 500-2.100.

7.   Section 287.120.2 provides that an employee's workers’ compensation rights and remedies “shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee [and] the employee's spouse ․ at common law or otherwise.” The Workers’ Compensation Law provides for authorized medical treatment in Section 287.140, and wage replacement in Sections 287.170 and 287.190. However, there is no provision for non-economic damages such as pain and suffering or loss of consortium. See Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Mo. banc 2001) (“[l]oss of consortium is a derivative claim that arises out of the original injury to the spouse” and therefore falls under Section 287.120.2's exclusion).

8.   This is likely all the more at issue in workers’ compensation cases, where an insured may well have purchased additional insurance specifically due to working in a high-risk occupation. Beaver was a construction worker. While there is no evidence in the record regarding his motivation for purchasing additional insurance, it is plausible to infer his job might have been a compelling factor. Allowing workers’ compensation to eliminate his paid-for coverage is of significant impact in such a situation, something we believe the regulation at issue here is meant to address.

9.   The Beavers argued alternatively in Point Six that the policy was a contract of adhesion and again asserted the objective reasonable expectation doctrine, which holds that the objectively reasonable expectations of an insured will be honored even if the policy provisions negate those expectations. See Tegtmeyer v. Snellen, 791 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990). For the objective reasonable expectation doctrine to apply, the contract must be a contract of adhesion and the terms must be ambiguous. Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991). We have determined the policy here is unambiguous. Moreover, contract terms related to optional coverage, as was the excess UM coverage here, are not considered contracts of adhesion. Zemelman v. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 935 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (noting UIM coverage is optional; finding no contract of adhesion). Point denied.

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Presiding Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, Judge and Michael S. Wright, Judge, concur.