HAYES v. SAINT LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2026)

Introduction

Anthony Hayes (“Appellant”) appeals from the circuit court's judgment denying his appeal from the Saint Louis County Police Department's (“the Police Department's” or “the Department's”) denial of his application for a concealed carry permit.¹ We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In March 2025, Appellant filed an application for a concealed carry permit with the Police Department. Under section 571.101,² an applicant shall be issued a concealed carry permit in Missouri if he, inter alia, “[h]as not pled guilty to ․ or been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of any state or of the United States ․.” Section 571.101.2(3).

The Police Department issued Appellant a letter formally denying his application based upon a background check which revealed Appellant: (1) “plead[ed] guilty to felony SIS[³ ] in 1994 which was revoked in 1997 where [he] w[as] sentenced to confinement”; (2) “plead[ed] guilty to felony SIS in 2000”; and (3) had a “federal felony conviction in 2005.” (emphasis omitted). The letter also states that “state statute prevents issuance of [a concealed carry] permit if [a person] plead[s] guilty to [a] felony SIS.” (emphasis omitted). It is undisputed the Police Department's denial of Appellant's application for a concealed carry permit was based upon: two guilty pleas in Missouri in 2000 and 1994; and a federal felony conviction in 2005.⁴

Appellant, acting pro se, filed an appeal of the Department's decision denying his application for a concealed carry permit. The case was initially assigned to the Honorable Jason K. Lewis (“Judge Lewis”) in small claims court in the Circuit Court of Saint Louis County. Following a hearing, Judge Lewis issued a judgment denying Appellant's appeal and finding the Police Department denied Appellant's application with just cause.

Appellant filed an application for a trial de novo and the case was subsequently assigned to the Honorable Mondonna L. Ghasedi in the Circuit Court of Saint Louis County (“trial court”). At a September 2025 bench trial, Appellant admitted: (1) he had at least two felony convictions on his record; and (2) the denial of his application for a concealed carry permit was because he had been convicted of felonies. Despite these admissions, Appellant testified he believes he is entitled to a concealed carry permit even if he had been convicted of felonies because “nothing outweighs ․ [his] constitutional right to bear arms.”

Thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment denying Appellant's appeal and finding the Police Department denied Appellant's application for a concealed carry permit with just cause. This appeal followed.

Discussion

Appellant raises four points on appeal asserting the trial court erred in denying his appeal from the Police Department's denial of his application for a concealed carry permit. For ease of discussion, we first address Appellant's third point on appeal which argues the trial court's judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. We will then collectively address Appellant's first, second, and fourth points on appeal which argue various constitutional claims.

Standard of Review

On review of a court-tried case, we will affirm the trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. R.F. v. Owen, 596 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact and we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment. Stallsworth v. Sheriff of Jackson County, 491 S.W.3d 657, 658 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). However, we review questions of law de novo, without deference to the trial court. State v. Robinson, 707 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025); Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 223; Stallsworth, 491 S.W.3d at 658. Questions of law include, inter alia: (1) whether the trial court properly applied statutory requirements related to concealed carry permits; and (2) the constitutional validity of a state statute, i.e., section 571.101.2(3). Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 63; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 223; Stallsworth, 491 S.W.3d at 658-59; see also section 571.101.2(3).

Point Three: Appellant's Substantial-Evidence Claim on Appeal

In his third point on appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his appeal from the Police Department's denial of his application for a concealed carry permit because the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we find no merit to this claim.

This Court has previously concluded that section 571.101.2(3) is “clear and unambiguous,” by plainly disqualifying applicants from a concealed carry permit who, inter alia, have “pled guilty to ․ or been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of any state or of the United States ․.”⁵ See section 571.101.2(3); Lumetta v. Sheriff of St. Charles County, 413 S.W.3d 718, 720-21 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (discussing a former but substantively similar version of the relevant portions of section 571.101); see also Townsend v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, 602 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020); Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224; section 571.101.2(1)-(12).

In Missouri, crimes that are punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year are classified as felonies. See Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224 n.7; section 558.011.1(1)-(4).⁶ Similarly, federal crimes that are punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year are also classified as felonies. See Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265; 18 U.S.C. section 3559(a)(1)-(5).⁷ Accordingly, under section 571.101.2(3), an applicant who has pled guilty to or was convicted of a felony in Missouri or in the federal system is ineligible to receive a concealed carry permit. See Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224, 224 n.7; section 571.101.2(3); section 558.011.1(1)-(4); 18 U.S.C. section 3559(a)(1)-(5). Here, it is undisputed the Police Department denied Appellant's application for a concealed carry permit because Appellant had previously entered into two guilty pleas in Missouri in 2000 and 1994 and was convicted of a federal felony in 2005. At Appellant's bench trial, he admitted during his testimony that he had at least two felony convictions on his record.

Based on the undisputed record, Appellant's testimony, and the reasonable inferences therein, Appellant was denied a concealed carry permit under section 571.101.2(3) because he has pled guilty to and been convicted of at least two felonies that were punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of Missouri or of the United States. See section 571.101.2(3); Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224, 224 n.7; Lumetta, 413 S.W.3d at 720-21; section 558.011.1(1)-(4); 18 U.S.C. section 3559(a)(1)-(5). Therefore, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's judgment denying Appellant's appeal from the Police Department's denial of his application for a concealed carry permit. See Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 223; Stallsworth, 491 S.W.3d at 658; section 571.101.2(3); see also Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224, 224 n.7; Lumetta, 413 S.W.3d at 720-21; section 558.011.1(1)-(4); 18 U.S.C. section 3559(a)(1)-(5). Appellant's third point on appeal is denied.

Points One, Two, and Four: Appellant's Constitutional Claims on Appeal

In Appellant's first, second, and fourth points on appeal, he raises various constitutional claims. For the reasons discussed below, we find no merit to these claims.

Point One

In his first point on appeal, Appellant argues the Police Department was required to provide a historical analogue consistent with our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation to justify Appellant's ineligibility for a concealed carry permit under section 571.101.2(3).

Appellant relies on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) for the proposition which requires “the government [to] affirmatively prove that [a contested] firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition [of our Nation] that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19, 24; see also Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 65. Appellant is contesting the constitutionality of section 571.101.2(3) – a statute regulating firearm possession by denying concealed carry permits to applicants who have “pled guilty to ․ or been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of any state or of the United States ․” – as applied to him. See section 571.101.2(3). Therefore, Appellant argues the Police Department was required to provide the trial court with a historical analogue consistent with our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation to justify Appellant's ineligibility for a concealed carry permit under section 571.101.2(3). See id.; Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19, 24, 30; Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 64-65.

Appellant's argument is without merit for multiple reasons. While the Bruen decision places the burden on the government to justify a contested firearms regulation by providing evidence of a historical analogue consistent with our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation, Bruen also emphasizes “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ․” are presumptively lawful. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21, 38-39 (citation omitted); id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Moreover, since Bruen, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that regulations restricting the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful. See United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. –, 146 S.Ct. 1677, 1700 (2026) (Alito, J., concurring); United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024); see also Hemani, 608 U.S. –, 146 S.Ct. at 1692 n.6. Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court has held “that restrictions on the right of felons to possess [fire]arms has long been recognized as an exception to the right to bear arms[.]” State v. Clay, 481 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Mo. banc 2016).

As previously discussed in detail above within our analysis of Appellant's third point on appeal, Appellant is a felon. See supra. Accordingly, as applied to Appellant, section 571.101.2(3) functions as a regulation restricting the possession of firearms by felons and is presumptively lawful. See section 571.101.2(3); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21; id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 64-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224 (“[s]ection 571.101.2(3) plainly operates to disqualify an applicant with a previous guilty plea or conviction for a felony offense[ ] from being issued a concealed carry permit ․”); see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“shall-issue licensing regimes[,] [like the one at issue here,] are constitutionally permissible, subject of course to an as-applied challenge ․”).

Based on the foregoing, we find the Police Department was not required to provide a historical analogue consistent with our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation to justify Appellant's ineligibility for a concealed carry permit under section 571.101.2(3). See section 571.101.2(3); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19, 21, 24, 30; id. at 80, 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 64-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224. Appellant's first point on appeal is denied.

Point Two

In his second point on appeal, Appellant argues the Police Department failed to prove that he is excluded from “the people” for which the Second Amendment protects. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31-32.

The Second Amendment in relevant part provides: “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” United States Constitution, Amendment II. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted “the people” to consist of law-abiding citizens. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31-32; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625, 635 (2008);⁸ see also Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 65, 66. Accordingly, the right of law-abiding citizens to “keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31-33 (holding the Second Amendment presumptively guarantees law-abiding, adult citizens a right to bear arms in public for self-defense); United States Constitution, Amendment II; cf. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21 and id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (both holding “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”) (citations omitted).

However, individuals with felony convictions, like Appellant here, are not considered law-abiding citizens. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21; id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 2024); Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 66-67; see also Hemani, 608 U.S. –, 146 S.Ct. at 1700 (Alito, J., concurring); Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690-91, 699; McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. at 625-27. Therefore, the Department was not required to prove Appellant is excluded from “the people” under the Second Amendment. Appellant's second point on appeal is denied.

Point Four

In his fourth and final point on appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his appeal from the Police Department's denial of his application for a concealed carry permit because the decision violates Article I, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.

Article I, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution in relevant part states:

[ ] [T]he right of every citizen to keep and bear arms ․ in defense of his home, person, family and property ․ shall not be questioned. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable. ․ Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons ․.

Missouri Courts have previously held that Article I, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution does not prohibit regulations restricting the possession of firearms by both violent and non-violent felons. See Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 596-97 (Mo. banc 2018); Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 533, 536-38; Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 67; see also State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 812-14, 816 (Mo. banc 2015); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 895-97, 899 (Mo. banc 2015).

Again, as applied to Appellant, section 571.101.2(3) functions as a regulation restricting the possession of firearms by felons and is presumptively lawful. See section 571.101.2(3); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21; id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 64-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224; see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Therefore, the denial of Appellant's application for a concealed carry permit does not violate Article I, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. See section 571.101.2(3); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21; id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Robinson, 707 S.W.3d at 64-66; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224; see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Appellant's fourth point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant filed a motion to strike portions of the Police Department's appendix and respondent's brief (“Appellant's motion to strike”), which was taken with the case. Appellant's motion to strike alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the Department is attempting to submit documents in its appendix for the first time on appeal; and (2) the Department improperly references these documents in its respondent's brief. It is not necessary for this Court to consider any of these documents or portions of the Department's respondent's brief in reaching our disposition. See City of Springfield v. Thompson Sales Co., 71 S.W.3d 597, 602 n.1 (Mo. banc 2002). For this reason, we deny Appellant's motion to strike as moot. See id.

2.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references to section 571.101 are to RSMo 2016 because we apply the version of section 571.101 that was in effect at the time Appellant applied for a concealed carry permit. See Stallsworth v. Sheriff of Jackson County, 491 S.W.3d 657, 658 n.1, 659 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

3.   An “SIS,” i.e., a suspended imposition of sentence, defers the sentencing and the entry of a conviction on a person's record. Ekstam v. Director of Revenue, 614 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). “When an individual is on probation with an SIS, the court may revoke his probation and impose any sentence within the limit set by law for the offense.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

4.   We note that section 571.101.2(3) – the statute disqualifying Appellant from receiving a concealed carry permit based upon his prior guilty pleas and conviction – was not enacted until 2003. See Hill v. Boyer, 480 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Mo. banc 2016); see also section 571.101.2(3). Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively subject to two exceptions: (1) where there is clear legislative intent for a statute to operate retroactively; and (2) where the statute is solely procedural or remedial and does not affect substantive rights. See Jones by Williams v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, 966 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998). We find it clear the legislature intended for section 571.101.2(3) to apply to prior guilty pleas or convictions. See Lumetta v. Sheriff of St. Charles County, 413 S.W.3d 718, 720-21 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). Furthermore, we find section 571.101.2(3): (1) is solely procedural in nature; and (2) does not violate Missouri law prohibiting retrospective operation simply by “tak[ing] into account past conduct or past conditions ․.” See Hill, 480 S.W.3d at 315-16 (citation omitted). Moreover, Missouri Courts have been applying section 571.101.2(3) retroactively since its enactment. See Hill, 480 S.W.3d at 313, 315-16 (finding an applicant ineligible for a concealed carry permit based upon a guilty plea from 1973); Townsend v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, 602 S.W.3d 262, 264, 267 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (finding an applicant ineligible for a permit based upon two guilty pleas from 1999); Stallsworth, 491 S.W.3d at 660 (finding an applicant ineligible for a permit based upon a guilty plea from 1960); see also Lumetta, 413 S.W.3d at 719, 721 (discussing a former but a substantively similar version of the relevant portions of section 571.101, and finding an applicant ineligible for a permit based upon a guilty plea from 1986).

5.   This Court has previously acknowledged that other states may: (1) punish some crimes classified as felonies less severely than in Missouri or the federal system; or (2) punish some crimes classified as misdemeanors more severely than in Missouri or the federal system. See Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265-66, 266 n.7. This potential discrepancy is irrelevant here because the record before us shows: (1) it is undisputed the Police Department denied Appellant's application for a concealed carry permit because Appellant had previously entered into two guilty pleas in Missouri in 2000 and 1994 and was convicted of a federal felony in 2005; (2) Appellant admitted to having at least two felony convictions on his record; and (3) Missouri and the federal system classify crimes punishable by imprisonment for at term exceeding one year as felonies. See e.g., Townsend, 602 S.W.3d at 265; Owen, 596 S.W.3d at 224 n.7.

6.   Because we apply the version of section 558.011 that was in effect at the time Appellant entered into two guilty pleas in Missouri in 2000 and 1994, we refer to the versions of section 558.011 that are within RSMo 2000 and RSMo 1994, respectively. See Taylor v. State, 497 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). The sentencing classifications are the same in both versions: class A felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty years, or life; class B felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment not less than five years and not to exceed fifteen years; class C felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed seven years; and class D felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years. See section 558.011.1(1)-(4) RSMo 2000; section 558.011.1(1)-(4) RSMo 1994.

7.   All federal statutory references are to 18 U.S.C. section 3559(a) (2000) because we apply the version in effect at the time Appellant was convicted of a federal felony in 2005. See U.S. v. Castorani, 88 Fed.Appx. 552, 553 (4th Cir. 2004).

8.   Westlaw denotes, inter alia, an overruling risk for the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Heller, 554 U.S. 570. This overruling risk is only due to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, which abandoned Heller’s purported “means-end scrutiny” standard for challenges to firearm regulations and adopted the history-and-tradition standard. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17-19, 22-24; see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 689. Accordingly, the overruling risk for Heller is not relevant in this case.

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge

Lisa P. Page, Judge and Michael E. Gardner, Judge, concur.