LIFETIME PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LLC v. DKIS LLC RMSM LLC (2026)

Following a bench trial, Lifetime Property Investments, LLC appeals the trial court's judgment denying Lifetime's claims against RMSM, LLC, DKIS, LLC, and Rebecca Medlin for unlawful detainer, breach of contract, trespass, waste, and piercing the corporate veil. Lifetime has not sufficiently preserved or developed its arguments regarding the unlawful detainer claim against RMSM or the breach of contract, trespass, waste, and piercing the corporate veil claims. We affirm the judgment's denial of those claims. The only issue we can review is Lifetime's contention that the trial court misapplied the law by finding that Lifetime did not properly notify DKIS that its tenancy was terminated prior to bringing the unlawful detainer action. We agree that the trial court applied the wrong statute and that, under the applicable statute, Lifetime's notice of termination was sufficient. Therefore, we reverse the judgment's denial of the unlawful detainer claim against DKIS and, pursuant to Rule 84.14,¹ grant Lifetime the relief to which it was entitled.

Factual and Procedural Background

Pursuant to a written agreement, Lifetime leased commercial property to RMSM for a five-year fixed term, ending on March 1, 2022, at a monthly rent of $3,000. RMSM operated the Du Kum Inn restaurant on the premises until November 2019, when DKIS purchased RMSM and became its sole member. Beginning in January 2020, DKIS paid the rent each month and continued operating the restaurant.

Medlin and her husband are the sole members of DKIS. On November 7, 2021, Medlin texted Lifetime's owner asking her to put in writing their verbal agreement to a three-month extension of the lease. Lifetime's owner responded that she had just sent DKIS a letter “regarding wrapping up the current lease.” That letter, dated November 9, 2021, was not offered into evidence at trial. But the record does include a January 24, 2022 letter DKIS wrote to Lifetime acknowledging that the November 9 letter “purports to advise DKIS that its lease will expire at midnight on February 28, 2022.” DKIS reiterated its belief that Lifetime had previously agreed to an extension of the lease and offered to pre-pay rent through June 2022. On January 27, 2022, Lifetime sent another letter to DKIS to “serve as notice” under the written lease of the tenant's obligation to remove certain items from the property and return it in “white box” condition. Lifetime also indicated in the letter that the “periodic tenancy allowed by [the holdover provision of the written lease was] being terminated with thirty (30) days prior written notice by Lessor.” At trial, DKIS acknowledged receipt of the January 27 letter and agreed that it gave DKIS notice that it needed to vacate the premises on the date of termination in the written lease. But DKIS did not vacate.

On December 29, 2022, Lifetime filed a petition asserting five counts against RMSM, DKIS, and Medlin, alleging they were holding over possession of its property beyond the term of the lease. In the unlawful detainer count, Lifetime sought immediate possession and double rent as damages. Lifetime also averred that failure to return the property in “white box” condition breached the written lease and that damage to the premises constituted trespass and waste. Lifetime requested that the trial court pierce the corporate veil, disregard the corporate form of RMSM, and hold DKIS liable for RMSM's actions. Similarly, Lifetime asked that DKIS's corporate veil be pierced and its corporate form disregarded so as to hold Medlin personally liable for the actions of DKIS.

After Lifetime filed the petition, DKIS attempted to continue paying rent, but Lifetime returned the checks. DKIS vacated the premises at the end of June 2022.

Thereafter, the trial court held a bench trial on Lifetime's petition and entered judgment denying all of Lifetime's claims. As to RMSM, the trial court found that it occupied the property pursuant to the written lease but was not in possession after DKIS bought RMSM. The trial court concluded that RMSM had “committed no wrongful or fraudulent acts” and was not liable to Lifetime for any damages under any theory. Although the trial court determined that the written lease was never assigned to DKIS, it found DKIS had a “tenancy” with Lifetime. It concluded that Lifetime did not give proper notice to terminate that tenancy pursuant to section 534.050 ² and therefore could not maintain an unlawful detainer claim against DKIS. The trial court denied the unlawful detainer claim and the request for double rent but ordered DKIS to pay Lifetime $12,000, the amount DKIS admitted it owed in rent for March through June 2022. The trial court also concluded that Lifetime did not prove it had suffered any damages with respect to its contract, trespass, or waste claims. The trial court declined to pierce the corporate veil, finding that Medlin was not personally liable for DKIS's conduct. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

We review this court-tried case under the standards set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), and will only reverse the judgment if it has no substantial evidence to support it, is against the weight of the evidence, erroneously declares the law, or erroneously applies the law. Weeks v. City of St. Louis, 721 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Mo. banc 2025). “These are distinct claims, and each requires a distinct analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Discussion

In eight points on appeal, Lifetime attempts to challenge almost every aspect of the trial court's judgment. Its second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth points do not properly present any cognizable claims of error for our review and are denied. But Lifetime's third point, which relates to the denial of its unlawful detainer claim against DKIS, has merit. We agree that the trial court erroneously applied the wrong statute to Lifetime's notice of termination to DKIS. Our disposition of that point renders Lifetime's first point on appeal moot.

Unpreserved and Abandoned Claims of Error (Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Points on Appeal)

Because each Murphy v. Carron ground for reversal “is proved differently from the others and is subject to different principles and procedures of appellate review,” each of an appellant's points on appeal must proceed on one—and only one—of those grounds. Ebert v. Ebert, 627 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Lifetime's second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth points on appeal are either devoid of any cognizable legal reason for reversal under Murphy v. Carron or improperly contain multiple such reasons.

In each of these points relied on, Lifetime alleges that the trial court “erred as a matter of law” in making certain rulings. Without more, the phrase “erred as a matter of law” does not adequately articulate a legal reason for reversal under Murphy v. Carron because that phrase does not indicate whether Lifetime is claiming that the trial court erred in applying the law or in declaring the law. And even assuming Lifetime intended to raise one of these grounds, it does not identify what “law” the trial court allegedly misapplied or misstated. See U.S. Bank v. Lewis, 326 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (“[W]hile [the point] abstractly claims an erroneous declaration and application of the law by the trial court as one of its two stated legal reasons for error, it fails to state or identify any specific law so erroneously declared or applied.”); see also Rule 84.04(d)(4) (“Abstract statements of law, standing alone, do not comply with this rule.”). Nor does Lifetime direct this Court to any erroneous misapplication or misstatement by the trial court in the arguments following these points relied on. As such, Lifetime has not only failed to properly present these grounds for reversal in the points relied on, it has failed to develop these claims of error in its arguments. Therefore, Lifetime has abandoned the claims. See White v. R.L. Persons Constr., Inc., 503 S.W.3d 339, 343 n.6 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016); see also Pierson v. Laut, 113 S.W.3d 298, 300 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).

In its fifth, sixth, and eighth points relied on, in addition to claiming an error “as a matter of law,” Lifetime asserts that the trial court erred by making one or more rulings that were against the weight of the evidence, not supported by substantial evidence, or both. These points are multifarious. See Ebert, 627 S.W.3d at 580. And in the argument following these points, Lifetime fails to adhere to the analytical frameworks for such evidence-based challenges, as set out in Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010):

A not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge requires completion of three sequential steps: (1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment; (2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; and, (3) demonstrate why that favorable evidence, when considered along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, does not have probative force upon the proposition such that the trier of fact could not reasonably decide the existence of the proposition.

On the other hand, an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires completion of four sequential steps: (1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment (2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; (3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial court's credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and, (4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce belief in that proposition.

Other than identifying a challenged factual proposition, Lifetime fails to follow any of the remaining steps of either of the above frameworks. By not developing any argument in accord with Houston, Lifetime has abandoned all attempts at raising a not-supported-by-substantial-evidence or against-the-weight-of-the-evidence claim of error. See White, 503 S.W.3d at 343 n.6.

Because Lifetime did not properly set forth one and only one Murphy v. Carron ground for reversal, its second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth points have preserved nothing for review. See Ebert, 627 S.W.3d at 580. And even if it had, Lifetime has failed to properly develop any such claims of error in the argument portion of its brief. For these reasons, we deny these points, which disposes of Lifetime's attempts to challenge the trial court's factual findings, its denial of the unlawful detainer claim against RMSM, and its denial of the breach of contract, trespass, waste, and piercing the corporate veil claims.

Erroneous Application of Section 534.050 (Third Point on Appeal)

The trial court concluded that the unlawful detainer claim against DKIS failed because Lifetime “did not provide proper notice to DKIS to terminate DKIS's tenancy pursuant to [section] 534.050” in that it did not personally serve the notice or post a copy of it at the property. In its third point on appeal, Lifetime claims the trial court misapplied section 534.050 and argues that, under the applicable statute, section 441.060.3, its November 9, 2021 letter was sufficient notice to terminate DKIS's month-to-month tenancy.³ We agree.

Unlawful detainer is a limited statutory remedy, allowing a party to obtain immediate possession of real property. O'Connell v. Deering, 631 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021). The statutes governing an unlawful detainer action must be strictly construed. Id. at 655. Section 534.030.1 provides:

When any person willfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other possessions, after the termination of the time for which they were demised or let to the person, or the person under whom such person claims; or after a mortgage or deed of trust has been foreclosed and the person has received written notice of a foreclosure; or at least ten business days have elapsed after the date of the notice described in subsection 3 of this section; or when premises are occupied incident to the terms of employment and the employee holds over after the termination of such employment; or when any person wrongfully and without force, by disseisin, shall obtain and continue in possession of any lands, tenements or other possessions, and after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession of the premises by the person having the legal right to such possession, or the person's agent or attorney, shall refuse or neglect to vacate such possession, such person is guilty of an “unlawful detainer”.

Under this statute, there are four classes of persons who can be guilty of unlawful detainer: the holdover tenant class, the foreclosure class, the holdover employee class, and the wrongful possessor or “intruder” class. Brown as Tr. of George E. Heard Revocable Tr. v. Barnes, 641 S.W.3d 241, 245-46 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). It is well-settled that intruders are the only class entitled to a written demand for possession prior to an unlawful detainer action. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n. v. Wilson, 409 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); see also Brown, 641 S.W.3d at 246; Leve v. Delph, 710 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986); S. Side Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Schneider, 603 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Section 534.050 governs the manner in which demand for possession on intruders must be made:

The demand required by section 534.030 shall be made either by delivering a copy of such demand to the person in possession, or by leaving such copy with some person above the age of fifteen years, residing on or being in charge of the premises; or, if no such person be in the actual occupancy thereof, then by posting such copy on the premises.

By its express terms, the requirements of personal delivery and posting set out in section 534.050 apply only to the “demand required by section 534.030,” and the only “demand required by section 534.030” is the demand for possession that must be given to intruders.

At this stage of the litigation, the parties agree that DKIS was not an intruder and was not entitled to a demand for possession under section 534.030.1. Thus, the requirements in section 534.050 do not apply here, and the trial court misapplied the law by imposing them.

While no demand for possession satisfying section 534.050 is required before bringing an unlawful detainer action against a holdover tenant, the landlord must demonstrate that it has validly terminated the tenancy by giving the tenant the requisite notice of termination. See O'Connell, 631 S.W.3d at 653; see also Davidson v. Kenney, 971 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). The type of notice of termination to which a tenant is entitled depends on the type of tenancy it holds. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg., 409 S.W.3d at 498.

Here, the trial court found that the written lease between RMSM and Lifetime had not been assigned to DKIS. It is undisputed that without a written lease, DKIS is deemed to have been a month-to-month tenant entitled to one month's written notice of termination under section 441.060.3, which states:

Except as otherwise provided by law, all contracts or agreements for the leasing, renting or occupation of stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings in cities, towns or villages, and of stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings except when such leasing, renting or occupation is as tenant of real estate used or rented for agricultural purposes, other than garden purposes, not made in writing, signed by the parties thereto, or their agents, shall be held and taken to be tenancies from month to month, and all such tenancies may be terminated by either party thereto, or the party's agent, giving to the other party, or the party's agent, one month's notice, in writing, of the party's intention to terminate such tenancy.

The question, then, is whether Lifetime's November 9, 2021 letter—informing DKIS “that its lease [would] expire at midnight on February 28, 2022”—satisfied the notice provision of section 441.060.3. We conclude it did. The letter was in writing and gave DKIS over one month's notice of Lifetime's intention to terminate DKIS's tenancy, fulfilling the statutory requirement to validly terminate the month-to-month tenancy. See, e.g., Brown, 641 S.W.3d at 246-47 (finding landlord's letter directing tenant to “vacate and surrender all real property owned by the [landlord] within thirty-one days” sufficient notice to terminate unwritten month-to-month tenancy under section 441.060.3). DKIS acknowledged at oral argument that the November 9 letter provided more than one month's notice of Lifetime's intent to reclaim possession of its property from DKIS on February 28; it nonetheless argues that the letter was not adequate to terminate DKIS's month-to-month tenancy because it referred only to the termination date of the written lease. But there is no authority for the proposition that a notice of termination is ineffective under section 441.060.3 unless it expressly refers to the tenancy being terminated as a month-to-month tenancy. And nothing in the statutory language or relevant case law supports such a proposition.

Moreover, Lifetime's reference in the November 9 letter to termination of “the lease” does not render it ineffective. To be sure, the correspondence between DKIS and Lifetime indicates both were acting under the mistaken assumption that their landlord-tenant relationship was governed by RMSM's written lease. But DKIS's tenancy, as a matter of law, was actually month-to-month. See section 441.060.3. In any event, it is clear from the correspondence that DKIS was well-aware of Lifetime's intention to terminate whatever type of tenancy DKIS held.

Because Lifetime provided DKIS notice sufficient to terminate its tenancy, staying in possession of the premises past the termination date constituted unlawful detainer. The trial court erred in denying the unlawful detainer claim against DKIS. Likewise, the trial court erred in awarding Lifetime only $12,000 to cover the rent DKIS owed for the four months it held over past the termination date of February 28, 2022.⁴ It is undisputed that success on its unlawful detainer action entitles Lifetime to $24,000 in damages, representing double the rent for the four holdover months. See section 534.330.1.

Motion for Attorney Fees

Lifetime asks this Court to award it all of the attorney fees it has incurred in this litigation.⁵ It contends that, pursuant to a provision in the written lease agreement, RMSM, DKIS, and Medlin are “liable for reasonable attorney's fees as liquidated damages” because they held over “beyond the end of the lease” and because of “other breaches of the contract.” We disagree.

Lifetime characterizes the written lease as imposing liability on the tenant for all attorney fees as part of the damages sustained when a tenant holds over or breaches the lease. But the provision cited by Lifetime is not so broad.⁶ And even if it were, the provision would not apply here. There is no basis for an award of attorney fees against RMSM—the only defendant that was a party to the written lease—because, as the trial court correctly concluded, RMSM did not hold over past the termination date of the lease, did not commit any wrongful acts, and was not liable to Lifetime for any damages. As to the other defendants, DKIS and Medlin, the provisions of the written lease simply do not apply to them because they were not parties to the lease. The trial court properly found that the lease was never assigned to DKIS and that Medlin was not liable to Lifetime for any damages. Our conclusion that DKIS is liable for holding over is based on its unlawful detainer beyond the termination of its unwritten month-to-month tenancy, not the lease. As such, the attorney fee provision in the lease does not apply to DKIS.

Lifetime's motion for attorney fees is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment denying Lifetime's claim for unlawful detainer against DKIS and ordering DKIS to pay $12,000 is reversed. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, we enter judgment in favor of Lifetime on the unlawful detainer claim against DKIS in the amount of $24,000. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2026), unless otherwise noted.

2.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

3.   Like the other points discussed above, Lifetime's third point relied on asserts that the trial court “erred as a matter of law” and therefore does not sufficiently indicate which Murphy v. Carron ground is being raised. But the claim of error is “readily understandable” from the argument following this point relied on, and we have “discretion to decide the [issue] on the merits.” City of St. Louis v. State, 682 S.W.3d 387, 397 n.7 (Mo. banc 2024); see also Ebert, 627 S.W.3d at 585; Riead, Co-Tr. of John T. Riead, Jr. Revocable Tr. v. Riead, Co-Tr. of John T. Riead, Jr. Revocable Tr., 685 S.W.3d 532, 544 n.11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). We exercise that discretion here because we can address the merits of the claim without becoming an advocate for Lifetime. See Riead, 685 S.W.3d at 544 n.11.

4.   For this reason, Lifetime's first point on appeal—arguing that the trial court did not have authority to award the rent DKIS owed because it had not sought any such relief—is moot.

5.   Lifetime filed its motions for attorney fees pursuant to our Local Rule 400, which by its terms only allows a party to seek an “amount due for attorney's fees on appeal[.]” (emphasis added). Lifetime attempts to use this rule to recover its attorney fees incurred since the inception of the litigation.

6.   Essentially, the lease provides that, if the tenant defaults by failing to perform its obligations under the lease or becomes insolvent, the landlord may terminate the lease, remove the tenant, and relet the premises. The tenant is then obligated to pay “as liquidated damages, any deficiency between” the rent due under the lease and the amount of rent collected from the new tenant. The lease goes on to state: “In computing liquidated damages, there shall be added to the deficiency” any expenses the landlord incurred “in connection with reletting the demised premises, for reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable brokerage fees, and for keeping the premises in good order for reletting.”

MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge, concurs. Lisa P. Page, Judge, concurs.