IN RE: Violet M. STEINERT (2026)

Introduction

Diane Longsdon appeals from the circuit court's December 19, 2025 “judgment and order” granting the motion to revive an August 14, 2015 judgment obtained by the beneficiaries of the Violet Steinert trust against Longsdon for certain actions she took while serving as the trust's trustee in the 2010 to 2013 timeframe.¹

We are unable to reach the merits of the matter, however, because Longsdon's untimely appeal strips this court of jurisdiction. To reach this disposition, we have waded into a split of authority between the western and southern districts of this court. Compare Allen v. X & F Enterprise Corp., 698 S.W.3d 748, 756 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (holding that Rule 81.05(a) applies to a special order after final judgment, making the order final 30 days after entry), with Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney County Planning Commission, 660 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (holding that a special order after final judgment is final upon entry).

Ultimately, we side with the southern district's construction of the language in section 512.020(5) that grants this court jurisdiction over a “[f]inal judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment in the cause․” because we conclude that the court's December 19, 2025 judgment revival order is a special order after final judgment. (Emphasis added).² The rub here lies in the difference in terms of finality between a final judgment and a special order after final judgment — judgments become final at the earliest 30 days after entry while special orders after final judgment are final upon entry.

The circuit court entered its order reviving the judgment on December 19, 2025. Thirty-two days later, on January 20, 2026, Longsdon filed her notice of appeal. Because the order reviving the judgment constitutes a “special order after final judgment” under section 512.020(5), the order became final for purposes of appeal upon its entry which rendered Longsdon's notice of appeal untimely, stripped this court of its jurisdiction, and requires that we dismiss this appeal.

Background

The underlying case involved the Violet Steinert trust and the litigation that ensued her death in the fall of 2009. On October 12, 1994, Violet and her husband, Fred Steinert Sr., executed a living trust which distributed one-half of the trust corpus in equal shares to Fred Sr.’s two sons, Fran and Fred Jr., and one-half to Violet's nieces and nephews, Glen Hunter, Jr., Charles William Hunter, Olga Smail, Opal White, Nance Talley, and Ralph William Talley, in equal shares (the original beneficiaries). Some time after Fred Sr.’s death in 1998, Violet amended the trust by removing Fran and Fred Jr. as beneficiaries even though the trust prohibited unilateral amendments after the death of either grantor. The final amendment before Violet's death on October 11, 2009 added Mid-Rivers Christian Church, Diane Longsdon, and Paul Rotermund as new beneficiaries in the amounts of $220,000, $220,000, and $110,000, respectively. The church, Longsdon, and Rotermund received those amounts in late 2009 and early 2010.

On January 10, 2010, the Steinert brothers filed a petition in the probate court seeking the declaration that the 1994 original trust remained operative and that Ms. Steinert's unilateral amendments after her husband's death were a nullity. The petition also sought to remove the successor trustee Hattie Sutton and for an accounting of the trust's assets. Upon Sutton's death on February 9, 2010, Longsdon became successor-trustee, a role she occupied until the court, at the Steinerts’ request, named attorney John Maxwell the successor-trustee in September of 2013. In July 2013, the trial court, by way of summary judgment, declared that the 1994 version of the trust remained the operative document which necessarily rendered void the foregoing distributions. On June 4, 2014, the court entered judgment in favor of the trust and against Longsdon for the void distributions she received totaling $220,000 with statutory interest “until paid in full.”³ On August 1, 2014, this court dismissed the appeal of that judgment for Longsdon's failure to comply with one of our special operating rules.

On October 16, 2014, Maxwell moved for examination of Longsdon as a judgment debtor claiming that execution had issued and that Longsdon either had property subject to execution or she had conveyed or attempted to convey property to defraud, hinder, or delay the creditor. The hearing took place on January 23, 2015.⁴ Ultimately, no satisfaction of judgment occurred.

Then, on July 29, 2015, trustee Maxwell filed a motion in the same case requesting that the court do four things: (1) approve the assignment of the claims against Longsdon from him to the beneficiaries, (2) partially distribute the trust assets, (3) approve the final accounting of the trust, and (4) discharge Maxwell as the successor-trustee. On August 14, 2015, the court entered its order and judgment which assigned the trust's $220,000 judgment against Longsdon to the original beneficiaries, approved the final accounting, and discharged Maxwell as the successor-trustee. The court then declared the judgment final for purposes of appeal and Longsdon appealed. This court affirmed the August 14, 2015 judgment.

Nearly ten years later, on August 6, 2025, the beneficiaries of the trust – Fred Steinert, Jr.’s living trust, by and through Lynn Steinert, Fran Steinert, Glen Hunter, Charles Hunter, and Olga Smail – moved to revive the August 14, 2015 judgment since it remained unsatisfied and was set to expire on August 14, 2025. Longsdon disputed the timeliness of their motion, arguing that the June 4, 2014 judgment was the final judgment. On December 19, 2025, the court granted the motion to revive the judgment finding that the August 14, 2015 judgment constituted the final judgment since it disposed of all remaining issues in the case — it approved the final accounting, it assigned the successor trustee's claims to the proper beneficiaries, and it discharged Maxwell as the successor trustee — all issues the June 2014 judgment had not resolved.

Longsdon filed no authorized after-trial motion before filing her notice of appeal on January 20, 2026, 32 days after entry of the December 19, 2025 order reviving the judgment. This court entered an order noting the conflicting opinions as to when an order reviving a judgment becomes final and thus, when the notice of appeal is due. We directed Longsdon to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Longsdon's legal memorandum argued that we should rely on Allen v. X & F Enter. Corp., 698 S.W.3d 748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024), to determine the timeliness issue rather than on Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney County Planning Comm'n, 660 S.W.3d 482 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). This court ordered the jurisdictional issue taken with the case.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“Before reaching the merits of an appeal, this court must first determine whether the appeal was timely filed under the appropriate statutes and procedural rules.” J & M Securities, LLC v. Benner, 717 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). The right to appeal is purely statutory. Magellanic Seven, LLC v. Wentzville Church of God, 705 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (construing section 512.020(5)). “Accordingly, absent statutory authority, no right to appeal exists, and an appellate court has no authority to consider the merits of an appeal.” Id. (citing Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 769 n.7 (Mo. banc 2020)). If we do not have authority to consider the merits of an appeal, then we should dismiss the case. Id.

Discussion

Whether we have jurisdiction hinges on the nature of the December 19, 2025 order reviving the judgment against Longsdon. If it is in the nature of a “special order after final judgment” under section 512.020(5), then it was final for purposes of appeal upon its issuance and the Longsdon appeal is untimely. But if it is akin to a judgment, then Longsdon's appeal is timely and we have jurisdiction.

Longsdon urges us to follow the western district's opinion in Allen v. X & F Enterprise Corp., 698 S.W.3d 748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) which held that Rule 81.05(a)’s provision that a judgment becomes final 30 days after entry applies to a special order after final judgment. We decline to do so. Instead, we adopt the approach of the southern district in Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney County Planning Commission, 660 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023), which held that a “special order after final judgment” is final upon entry such that a notice of appeal is due in 10 days. This court recently addressed the issue in Chailland v. Speed & Specialties Autobody, LLC, No. ED 114213, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2575376, at *1 (Mo. App. E.D. Sept. 1, 2026), finding an appeal untimely because an order denying a motion to enter a satisfaction of judgment constituted a “special order after final judgment” under section 512.020(5). Although we do not rely on Chailland as authority for our holding since it is not yet final, our holding here is consistent with Chailland’s treatment of a special order after final judgment.

Section 512.020 governs the right to appeal in civil cases and permits an aggrieved party to appeal from any “[f]inal judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment in the cause[.]” Section 512.020(5) (emphasis added). The term “special order after final judgment in the cause,” contained in the current and former version of section 512.020, means an order in a special proceeding attacking or aiding enforcement of the previously-entered final judgment. Magellanic Seven, 705 S.W.3d at 625. Thus, a circuit court's order regarding revival of a judgment is appealable as a “special order after final judgment” pursuant to section 512.020(5). In re Estate of Lambur, 731 S.W.3d 512, 516–17 (Mo. App. S.D. 2026). See also Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Citibank v. Abright, 566 S.W.3d 594, 594 n.2 (Mo. banc 2019). The parties do not dispute that the order at issue here is a special order after final judgment.

If the law permits an appeal from a trial court, a party may appeal from a judgment, decree, or order by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court. Section 512.050; Rule 81.04(a). “No such appeal shall be effective unless the notice of appeal shall be filed not later than ten days after the judgment, decree, or order appealed from becomes final.” Section 512.050; Rule 81.04(a). Finality of judgments is governed by Rule 81.05(a)(1), which provides that a judgment becomes final in a civil case at the expiration of 30 days after its entry.

Rule 78.04 provides that any motion for new trial and any motion to amend the judgment or opinion shall be filed not later than thirty days after the entry of judgment.⁵ If a timely authorized after-trial motion is filed pursuant to Rule 78.04, paragraphs (2) and (3) of Rule 81.05(a) further affect the finality date. In this case, Longsdon filed no timely authorized after-trial motions. Thus, we need not consider the filing of an authorized after-trial motion on the timeliness question for filing an appeal. The question here is solely whether, in the absence of a timely, authorized after-trial motion, a special order after final judgment becomes final—and the corresponding 10-day period for appeal begins to run—immediately upon entry of the special order or 30 days after its entry pursuant to Rule 81.05(a).

“Judgments are a subset of orders generally.” Meadowfresh Solutions USA, LLC v. Maple Grove Farms, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Henderson v. Asel, 566 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Mo. banc 2019)). A “judgment” is defined as a legally enforceable judicial order that fully resolves at least one claim in a lawsuit, establishing all the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to that claim. Id.; Emerald Pointe, 660 S.W.3d at 486. “An appealable judgment resolves all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination.” Sanford v. CenturyTel of Mo., LLC, 490 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997)); Emerald Pointe, 660 S.W.3d at 486.

Conversely, a “special order after final judgment” within the meaning of section 512.020(5) refers to orders entered in special proceedings attacking or aiding enforcement of an existing judgment after that judgment has become final in the underlying action in which it was rendered. Magellanic Seven, 705 S.W.3d at 625; Emerald Pointe, 660 S.W.3d at 487. The term “special order after final judgment” contemplates that a judgment already became final and that one of the parties seeks either to enforce the judgment or attack its enforcement. Id. Manifestly, a motion to revive a judgment is in aid of a party's effort to enforce a judgment. See, e.g., Hanks v. Rees, 943 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997).

A special order after final judgment, then, is not a “judgment” in the sense that the purpose of the special order is not to fully resolve at least one claim in a lawsuit. See, e.g., Meadowfresh, 578 S.W.3d at 760 (a “judgment” fully resolves at least one claim in a lawsuit, establishing all rights and liabilities with respect to that claim). And a special order after final judgment is not a “final, appealable judgment” in the sense that the purpose of the special order is not to resolve all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination. See, e.g., id. at 762 (holding that appealable order is not a judgment because it does not fully resolve one claim or establish all rights and liabilities of parties with respect to that claim); Sanford, 490 S.W.3d at 719 (appealable judgment resolves all issues in a case); Magellanic Seven, 705 S.W.3d at 625 (“[B]ecause the trial court's nunc pro tunc order corrected a clerical error after the Original Judgment in the case was entered and became final, the order is not an appealable ‘[f]inal judgment in the case’ under section 512.020(5).”). The content, substance, and effect of an order determine its finality and appealability. Emerald Pointe, 660 S.W.3d at 489. Indeed, if the meaning of the terms “final judgment in the case” and “special order after final judgment in the cause” were identical, there would be no reason for section 512.020(5) to expressly identify both court actions as appealable. See, e.g., Wayne v. Washington Univ., 727 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (Court presumes legislature intended each word, clause, sentence, and provision of statute to have effect).

Our Supreme Court's decision in Sanford supports this distinction. There, the Court considered the applicability of Rule 81.05(a) to appealable interlocutory orders. Sanford, 490 S.W.3d at 718. The Court determined that the fact a statute makes an order immediately appealable does not make Rule 81.05(a)(1) applicable to the order. Id. In Sanford, the trial court's order denying arbitration became immediately appealable pursuant to section 435.440, and our Supreme Court held that the order became “final” under Rule 81.04(a) immediately upon entry. Id. The Court observed, “[t]he purpose of Rule 81.05(a)(1) is to delay the effective date of a judgment for 30 days so that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or amend its ruling before it becomes final and appealable.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact that a statute makes an interlocutory order appealable does not transform the order into a judgment or a dispositive order and does not make Rule 81.05(a)(1) applicable to the order. Id.

Our Supreme Court explicitly rejected CenturyTel's argument that because a statute made the order denying arbitration immediately appealable, it therefore was a “judgment” under Rule 81.05(a)(1) and so did not become final and appealable until 30 days after entry. Id. at 720. Sanford addressed an interlocutory order denying arbitration, appealable pursuant to section 435.440, rather than a special order after final judgment, appealable pursuant to section 512.020(5), as in the present case. Nevertheless, we deem the critical point to be that an appealable order—whether an interlocutory order prior to final judgment or a special order after final judgment—does not itself become a “judgment,” subject to the provisions of Rule 81.05(a)(1), merely because the order is immediately appealable according to statute. See id. (fact that statute makes interlocutory order appealable does not transform order into judgment such that Rule 81.05(a)(1) applies). The Sanford Court held that CenturyTel “was incorrect in believing that, under Rule 81.05(a)(1), the 10–day period to appeal did not begin to run until 30 days after the trial court entered its order.” Id. at 718.

We find additional support for the proposition that a special order after final judgment does not constitute a judgment in its own right in Magellanic Seven. In that case, this court determined that a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in a legal description was a special order after final judgment. Magellanic Seven, 705 S.W.3d at 624-25. As a result, unlike an amended judgment, the special order did not create a new judgment. Id. Instead, the correction related back to the time the trial court entered the original judgment. Id. “[T]he nunc pro tunc order corrected a clerical error in the Original Judgment, and it did not create a new judgment ․” Id. Thus, we find the provision of Rule 81.05(a)(1) extending the time when a judgment becomes final to 30 days after its entry does not serve to extend the date of finality of a special order after final judgment beyond the date of its entry.

We are aware that the western district of this court recently held that Rule 81.05(a) applies to special orders after final judgment, thus rendering the orders final 30 days after their entry and beginning the 10-day appeal period at that point. Allen, 698 S.W.3d at 756; All Star, 675 S.W.3d at 561. Both Allen and All Star reject the southern district's Emerald Pointe decision without discussing its facts or reasoning. Allen, 698 S.W.3d at 756; All Star, 675 S.W.3d at 561 (“We choose not to follow Emerald Pointe on this issue.”). The All Star court stated that “Emerald Pointe apparently holds that Rule 81.05(a) is inapplicable to delay the finality of a special order after final judgment while authorized after-trial motions are pending.” 675 S.W.3d at 561. However, the Emerald Pointe opinion does not mention Rule 81.05, nor was any authorized after-trial motion involved in the facts of that case following entry of the order from which the plaintiff appealed.

Allen followed All Star, which relied on the older cases of White River Development Co. v. Meco Systems, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992), and Breihan v. Breihan, 269 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). Allen, 698 S.W.3d at 756; All Star, 675 S.W.3d at 561. Each of these cases is distinguishable from our case because all involved the timeliness of the appeal of special orders after final judgment when a timely authorized after-trial motion had been filed. Allen, 698 S.W.3d at 756 (defendant filed motion to reconsider within 30 days after entry of special order after final judgment); All Star, 675 S.W.3d at 561 (“All Star filed a timely motion to amend the judgment ․”); Breihan, 269 S.W.3d at 41 (wife filed motion to set aside within 30 days after entry of special order); White River, 837 S.W.2d at 333 (defendant timely filed motion for new trial, or alternatively, to amend decree after entry of appealable special order pursuant to Rule 78.04).

Here, we need not consider the interplay of the Rule 78.04 deadline for filing an after-trial motion with the finality of the special order. Longsdon filed no authorized after-trial motion. The sole question is whether, given the absence of a timely, authorized after-trial motion, a special order after final judgment becomes final—and the corresponding 10-day period for appeal begins to run—immediately upon entry of the special order or 30 days after its entry pursuant to Rule 81.05(a).

All Star further maintains that “[b]ecause a special order after final judgment terminates what is deemed to be an independent proceeding, that order should be treated as a judgment subject to Rule 81.05(a)’s finality rules—just as Rule 81.05(a) applies to other ‘independent proceedings.’ ” All Star, 675 S.W.3d at 561. However, we find the analysis in Emerald Pointe more persuasive. A “special order after final judgment” contemplates that the judgment already became final, and one party seeks either to enforce the judgment or attack its enforcement. Emerald Pointe, 660 S.W.3d at 487. In addition, our position is informed by our Supreme Court's decisions in Sanford, 490 S.W.3d at 718 (explicitly rejecting contention that order becomes a “judgment” subject to Rule 81.05(a) simply because statute makes the order appealable) and Meadowfresh. 578 S.W.3d at 760 (holding appealable order is not a judgment because it does not fully resolve one claim or establish all rights and liabilities of parties with respect to that claim).

No timely, authorized after-trial motion was filed in this case. In such an instance, a special order after final judgment becomes final upon entry, and any appeal must be filed within ten days as required by Rule 81.04(a). Lambur, 731 S.W.3d at 517. Having filed no authorized after-trial motion, Longsdon's right to appeal the special order reviving the August 14, 2015 judgment expired, at the latest, December 29, 2025, ten days after the special order was filed with the clerk of the trial court. Thus, Longsdon's appeal was not timely.

Conclusion

Because Longsdon's appeal was not timely-filed following entry of the special order after final judgment, we dismiss the appeal.⁶

FOOTNOTES

1.   While all the beneficiaries remain parties to this appeal, only Fran Steinert filed a brief.

2.   All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016).

3.   Mid-Rivers Christian Church and Paul Rotermund settled with the trust regarding the distributions each had received.

4.   The transcript of that hearing is not in our record.

5.   Rule 78.04 was amended effective July 1, 2026, but the amendment changed only the rule's title. The 30-day deadline for filing an after-trial motion remains unchanged from the prior version of the rule, which was in effect when the trial court denied Longsdon's motion in December 2025.

6.   Even if Longsdon had appealed in time, we are dubious that her appeal would have been successful. Longsdon's contention that the June 2014 judgment triggered the ten-year limitations period for the beneficiaries to file their motion to revive is undermined by the June 2014 judgment's failure to resolve all of the claims in the beneficiaries’ lawsuit while the August 14, 2015 judgment did so. Thus, the August 14, 2015 judgment was the final judgment for purposes of the revival period such that the beneficiaries’ motion to revive appears timely.

James M. Dowd, Judge

Michael E. Gardner, Presiding Judge and John P. Torbitzky, Judge concur.