CITY OF RICHMOND HEIGHTS v. WATSON (2026)

Clinton Watson appeals from the circuit court's denial of his “Motion for Declaratory Judgment and for Clarification” relating to a 2014 final judgment. Because there is no statutory right to appeal the circuit court's ruling, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

Background

In 2007, as part of a redevelopment plan, the City of Richmond Heights sought to condemn property owned by a trust, of which Watson was a successor trustee. After the circuit court entered an order of condemnation, the property owners sought relief from this Court by filing a petition for writ of prohibition. This Court issued a permanent writ prohibiting the circuit court from doing anything other than dismissing the condemnation case, concluding that the City had failed to follow certain statutory procedural requirements. See State ex rel. Watson v. Sherry, 436 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). This Court also found that the City was entitled to return of the money it had paid into the court registry for the property. See id. Accordingly, in August 2014, the circuit court entered a final judgment, ordering that the City be returned the money it had deposited, that title to the property “be reinstated as it existed prior to” the proceedings, that a copy of the order be filed with the recorder of deeds, and that the condemnation action be dismissed with prejudice. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by Watson over the ensuing eleven years to set that judgment aside, he filed a “Motion for Declaratory Judgment and for Clarification” in December 2025.

In the motion, Watson sought “declaratory and clarifying relief concerning the continuing status of this condemnation action, the statutory obligations that remain unresolved, and the proper interpretation” of certain statutes. He requested the circuit court to declare: that the condemnation proceeding remains pending until the City either lawfully acquires the property or elects to abandon the proceeding in writing; that the 2014 judgment did not terminate the City's obligation to take one of those two actions; that the circuit court retains jurisdiction until one of those actions occurs; and that the City's removal of Watson's property from the redevelopment plan and physical encirclement of that property by the development “constitute factual abandonment, elimination or necessity, or a constructive taking.” Watson also asked the circuit court to identify the maximum constitutionally permissible duration for a condemnation action to remain pending and the specific statutory event that terminated the proceeding, if it was in fact no longer pending. Finally, the motion sought to clarify whether “the unresolved status of this condemnation” has resulted in an “ongoing constitutional impairment.” In reply to the City's opposition of this motion, Watson acknowledged that the motion sought “no enforcement.” The circuit court denied the motion, and Watson appeals.

Discussion

This Court has a duty to examine its jurisdiction sua sponte. Roberts v. Rsrv. at Heritage, LLC, 681 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). “The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 512.020(5)¹ provides, in relevant part, that a party may appeal from “any special order after final judgment in the cause.” Prior to briefing, this Court issued an order explaining that this was the only possible statutory authority for Watson's appeal and noting that it did not appear the circuit court's denial of his motion was a “special order” because it did not pertain to enforcement of a final judgment. We ordered Watson to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.

In response, Watson argues the circuit court's ruling is appealable as a “special order” under section 512.020(5) because it “resolves a post-judgment controversy regarding the statutory rights and obligations of the parties.” He cites no relevant authority for this proposition, and there is none.² To the contrary, “the phrase ‘any special order after final judgment in the cause’ relates to the enforcement or an ‘attack’ on the enforcement of a final judgment.” Hudson v. Joplin Reg'l Stockyards, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal citation omitted). Thus, section 512.020(5) “applies only to those orders attacking or aiding the enforcement of a judgment after it has become final.” Masonic Temple Ass'n of St. Louis v. Compass Square & Star, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). A “special order” occurs “only when a party seeks to enforce a final judgment or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment.” Id.

By Watson's own admission, his “Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Clarification” did not seek enforcement of the 2014 judgment, nor did it attempt to preclude enforcement of that judgment. Indeed, Watson's motion was wholly unrelated to compliance with or satisfaction of the orders in the 2014 judgment. It sought only declarations and clarification about the status of the condemnation action, the City's statutory obligations, and the impact the dismissal may have had on Watson's constitutional rights. Therefore, the circuit court's denial of Watson's motion is not an appealable special order under section 512.020(5).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. All pending motions are denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

2.   Watson cites State ex rel. St. Louis Cnty. v. Campbell, 498 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. App. 1973), a case that has nothing to do with what constitutes a “special order” under section 512.020(5).

MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Presiding Judge

James M. Dowd, Judge, concurs. John P. Torbitzky, Judge, concurs.