R.B., Respondent, v. J.B., Appellant. (2026)

Introduction

J.B. appeals the trial court's judgment granting a full order of protection against him and in favor of his childhood friend R.B. pursuant to the Adult Abuse Act, Section 455.010.¹ Because R.B. failed to present sufficient evidence that J.B.’s conduct caused him fear of physical harm, we find the trial court's judgment entering a full order of protection on stalking grounds is not supported by substantial evidence. We reverse the trial court's judgment, vacate the full order of protection, and remand for new trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment,² is as follows. The parties grew up together as children. As adults, J.B. and R.B. worked together at J.B.’s barbershop. Eight years before R.B.’s June 27, 2025 petition for an ex parte order of protection, J.B. fired R.B. from the barbershop purportedly for spreading rumors about him. The parties have had a tumultuous relationship ever since. In his petition for an ex parte order of protection against J.B., R.B. alleged J.B. was following him “in the gym[,] stalking [him][,] following [him] around all the time.” R.B.’s petition also alleged J.B. had caused him to be terminated from his employment as a law enforcement officer on two occasions by telling his managers that he “was involved in 5 homicides” and, that the week before R.B. filed the petition, J.B. had called his current employer “anonymous[ly] telling my sergeant I killed 5 people and to fire me.” R.B.’s petition did not include any dates pertaining to these allegations, other than the alleged call to his current employer. The trial court denied R.B.’s request for an ex parte order of protection and the matter was set for a hearing on a full order of protection.

R.B.’s Testimony

On July 10, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on R.B.’s petition. The only testimony came from J.B. and R.B., both of whom acted pro se. R.B. testified that he had been receiving threatening phone calls but did not explain the content of the phone calls, why he felt threatened by them, or how he knew J.B. was the caller. R.B. also told the trial court that J.B. had been antagonizing him, harassing him, stalking him, and trying to fight him at R.B.’s gym. The record is silent as to which behaviors by J.B. constituted antagonizing, harassment, stalking or instigating a fight. R.B. testified that J.B.’s conduct at the gym was caught on camera, but did not provide the video footage for the court's review.

R.B. also testified that J.B. stalked him and his wife while they were out at a local bar, and that his wife had videotaped J.B.’s behavior at the bar. R.B. claimed that J.B. was standing next to them, looking at them, antagonizing them and trying to “pick a fight with [him].” R.B. offered his wife's video phone footage into evidence and the court admitted it. After reviewing the footage, the trial court remarked that the video just depicted people out at a bar enjoying themselves. R.B. further testified J.B. was spreading rumors that he sent men to J.B.’s barbershop to threaten him. As a result, R.B. asserted, “I don't feel safe riding with my kids. I have two little kids, a four and a six-year-old. I don't feel safe with -- with them even in the car with me, because I feel like someone [that] does that type of thing to that extent, what else would they do.”

R.B. also explained that J.B. anonymously called Bellefontaine Neighbors and Moline Acres police departments where R.B. had worked, telling supervisors that R.B. was under investigation for homicide, which led the police departments to fire him. R.B. claimed J.B. called his current police department with similar allegations and that his supervisor recognized J.B.’s voice from a video of J.B. that R.B. had shown him.

J.B.’s Testimony

J.B. attributed the parties’ acrimonious relationship over the past eight years to R.B.’s resentment over J.B. firing him from the barbershop. J.B. told the court he believed R.B. was a murderer. He said he had an ex parte order of protection against R.B. because he feared for his life. J.B. explained that R.B. sent several people to his barbershop to threaten him, and one man attempted to kill him, claiming R.B. sent him. J.B. stated that he reported this incident to the police. He admitted discussing R.B.’s involvement in several murders and the attempt on his own life with the police, but denied calling R.B.’s employers. Instead, J.B. maintained that a different police department, the Florissant Police Department, contacted him as part of their investigation of R.B.. J.B. offered to show the court a copy of a Florissant police report pertaining to the investigation of his attempted murder. The court did not review the purported police report and ultimately J.B. did not submit the “evidence papers.”

J.B. denied stalking R.B. and his wife at a bar stating he did not recall who arrived first, and that he was there because they share mutual friends. J.B. also denied stalking R.B. at his gym or provoking a fight. J.B. admitted seeing R.B. several times at the gym without incident until two weeks before the hearing. He told the court that was the first time any exchange occurred, and R.B. acted as the aggressor and tried to provoke him into fighting to “possibly [ ] kill [him] and say it was self-defense.”

The Order of Protection

On July 14, 2025, the trial court entered a full order of protection in favor of R.B. prohibiting J.B. from stalking R.B., communicating with R.B., entering R.B.’s residence, or coming within 500 feet of him. In its judgment,³ the court found R.B. established the necessary statutory requirements to prove stalking. The court held that “Mr. R.B. has established a course of conduct [ ] the phone calls to past employers and multiple followings to the gym and club that serve no legitimate purpose.”

The court concluded that “Mr. R.B. also testified that he did not feel safe when Mr. J.B. was around. He testified twice about this and the court finds that his fear is credible and meets both the objective and subjective requirement [of alarm].” The court credited R.B.’s testimony that J.B. followed him to a club/bar—and that although the video evidence demonstrated J.B. was peaceful— J.B. “was leering near [Mr. R.B.] and would not have been there if Mr. R.B. was not present.” This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of a court-tried case is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). “We, therefore, will uphold the trial court's judgment as long as it is supported by substantial evidence, it is not against the weight of the evidence, and it does not erroneously declare or apply the law.” Binggeli v. Hammond, 300 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (internal citation omitted). “[W]e consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and defer to the trial court's determination of credibility.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

“Because of the potential stigma that may attach to an individual who is labeled a ‘stalker’ under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act, trial courts must exercise great care ․ to ensure sufficient evidence exists to support all elements of the statute before entering a full order of protection.” M.L.G. v. R.W., 406 S.W. 3d 115, 117 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, J.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's entry of an order of protection against him based on stalking. Specifically, J.B. contends R.B. failed to prove J.B. purposely and repeatedly engaged in an unwanted course of conduct that caused R.B. fear of physical harm. We agree.

Any adult who has been a victim of stalking may request relief by filing a verified petition under the Adult Abuse Act. Schwalm v. Schwalm, 217 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007).

[A] petitioner seeking protection from stalking by another must present evidence establishing the evidentiary prerequisites for entitlement to such an order of protection, namely: (1) that the respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct of at least two or more incidents, (2) that served no legitimate purpose, (3) that caused the petitioner a fear of danger of physical harm, and (4) that it was reasonable for petitioner to have a fear of danger of physical harm.

Binggeli, 300 S.W.3d at 624 (emphasis in original); Section 455.010(10). A pattern of conduct consists of “two or more acts that serve no legitimate purpose.” Schwalm, 217 S.W.3d at 337; Section 455.010(15)(b). An activity with a legitimate purpose is one that is “lawful, or is allowed.” Vinson v. Adams, 188 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). Alarm is defined as causing “fear of danger of physical harm.” Section 455.010(10)(c). “Proof of alarm involves both a subjective and an objective component.” T.R.P. v. B.B., 553 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, a petitioner must prove an allegation of stalking by a preponderance of the evidence to receive a full order of protection. Section 455.040.1.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, even assuming J.B.’s conduct at the gym and bar served no legitimate purpose, R.B. failed to show that J.B.’s conduct caused him fear of physical harm. R.B. only testified, “I don't feel safe riding with my kids. I have two little kids, a four and a six-year-old. I don't feel safe with -- with them even in the car with me, because I feel like someone [that] does that type of thing to that extent, what else would they do.” This statement speaks more to R.B.’s concern for his children than a fear that J.B. might cause him physical harm, as required by the statute.

In McGarth, petitioner McGarth sought an order of protection against respondent Bowen, alleging that Bowen “stalked him, harassed him, ․ attempted to place him in apprehension of physical harm, and threatened him.” McGrath v. Bowen, 192 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). This Court reversed the trial court's judgment issuing the order of protection because there was no substantial evidence that Bowen purposefully or repeatedly engaged in an unwanted course of conduct that caused petitioner fear of danger of physical harm; rather, the evidence adduced centered on Bowen's behavior towards McGarth's son and McGarth's concern for his son's safety. Id. at 517–18.

Moreover, although R.B. claimed J.B. made threatening phone calls, tried to “pick a fight” with him at the gym, and stalked him at a bar, R.B. never provided evidence that this conduct caused him fear of physical harm. R.B. provided no evidence of any physical altercation during any encounter with J.B., nor any evidence that he altered his own behavior—such as leaving the bar or gym upon seeing J.B.—that would suggest J.B.’s conduct caused him fear of physical harm.

In R.K., as in the case at bar, the parties, neighbors, were embroiled in a longstanding feud. R.K. and Kelly, had several confrontations over Kelly's habit of allowing his dogs to defecate on R.K.’s property, prompting R.K. to seek an order of protection based on stalking. See R.K. v. Kelly, 630 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). On one occasion, R.K. alleged Kelly and his dogs were on her property, and Kelly called her vulgar names, chest bumped her, and knocked her back two steps before leaving. Id. Although R.K. claimed she felt “unsafe” and “very threatened” by Kelly, she offered no testimony that she feared he would physically harm her. Id. at 910. Consequently, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment granting the order of protection because the evidence failed to establish either subjective or objective fear of physical harm. Id. at 911.

In M.D.L., this Court reversed a judgment granting a full order of protection on stalking grounds because the record lacked substantial evidence that petitioner feared physical harm from respondent's actions as required by Section 455.010(13)(a). M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 S.W.3d 525, 529–30 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).⁴ The parties in M.D.L. shared a child. Id. at 527. After separating, respondent S.C.E. engaged in many concerning acts including slashing M.D.L.’s boyfriend's tires, driving erratically behind her after a custody exchange, and threatening to ruin her reputation. Id. at 527–28. However, because M.D.L. failed to testify that she feared physical harm as result of S.C.E.’s actions, there was insufficient evidence of alarm. Id. at 530.

Similarly, the record here shows that despite a long-standing turbulent relationship, no physical altercation has ever occurred between the parties, and no evidence adduced showed that J.B.’s concerning actions ever caused R.B. to fear physical harm. Because the record lacks evidence that J.B. engaged in a course of conduct that caused R.B. alarm—a fear of danger of physical harm—the trial court's conclusion that J.B. stalked R.B. is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Conclusion

Because there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's judgment, we reverse and vacate the order. However, following the persuasive analysis in the Honorable Roy L. Richter's dissent in K.M.C. v. M.W.M., 518 S.W.3d 273, 280–82, (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (Richter, J., dissenting), and given the trial court's credibility determinations in this case, we find that remanding this matter to the trial court for hearing to determine whether R.B. feared he was in danger of physical harm is appropriate. “Where a plaintiff prevails in the trial court and an appellate court reverses because of insufficient evidence, the preference is to remand for a new trial.” Watson v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 304 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citing Moss v. National Super Markets, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Mo. banc 1989)). Our review of the record does not convince us that R.B. would be unable to make a submissible case upon remand. See id. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2021), unless otherwise indicated.

2.   See Bateman v. Platte Cty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal citation omitted).

3.   The judgment consisted of the Office of State Court Administrator's (OSCA) mandated check-the-box form and an attached typed legal analysis and factual findings section.

4.   The M.D.L. court cited to an earlier version of section 455.010 but the substance of the subsection on stalking has remained the same. Also, the court sustained the judgment entering a full order of protection on grounds of abuse. See M.D.L., 391 S.W.3d at 530.

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Presiding Judge

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge and James M. Dowd, Judge, concur.