CITY OF FLORISSANT v. LEE (2026)

Introduction

Jubin Lee (Appellant) appeals the judgment of the trial court finding her guilty of four municipal ordinance violations of the City of Florissant (City) and sentencing her to fines and court costs. She argues the trial court admitted only portions of the municipal code while improperly omitting others, incorrectly applied the relevant ordinances, improperly assigned fees, and failed to rule on a number of motions Appellant filed during trial. We affirm the trial court's findings of guilt on each charge, but because the City did not submit into evidence ordinances showing penalties for three of the four charges, we find the trial court plainly erred in imposing fines for those three violations. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.¹

Factual and Procedural Background

The underlying case here involves four City ordinance violations: animal nuisance, due to a crowing rooster; animal-at-large, due to chickens not enclosed in Appellant's yard; animal license, due to failure to obtain a pet license for chickens; and public nuisance, due to a large pile of wood chips or mulch present in Appellant's front yard. The municipal court found Appellant guilty of these charges, and Appellant requested a trial de novo in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.

At trial, Officer Frederick Schaljo testified that he responded to a call on October 11, 2023, regarding complaints of a rooster crowing. He testified the City had previously sent a warning notice telling Appellant she needed a permit to own chickens. The City submitted this notice into evidence, which also provided Appellant an application for a pet license. At Appellant's residence on October 11, 2023, Officer Schaljo heard a rooster crowing and observed chickens running loose as well as several chickens in Appellant's back yard. Appellant had not applied for a pet license for her chickens, and Officer Schaljo testified a license was required for any resident who owned chickens in the City. Officer Schaljo also testified the ordinance contained a limit of four pets, including chickens, to any resident. Additionally, Officer Schaljo observed a large pile of mulch or wood chips, approximately six feet tall, in Appellant's front yard. He issued three citations to Appellant: one for animal nuisance, due to the rooster's crowing; one for a violation of the ordinance requiring a pet license; and one for animal-at-large, due to the presence of chickens outside Appellant's yard. During trial, the City voluntarily dismissed the charge issued on October 11, 2023 for animal-at-large.

On October 25, 2023, Officer Matthew Stringer responded to a neighbor's complaint that chickens were in the street of Appellant's neighborhood. Officer Stringer observed chickens in the street and in Appellant's neighbors’ yards. He issued a citation to Appellant for animal-at-large. Finally, on December 8, 2023, Officer Schaljo issued a citation for public nuisance due to Appellant's failure to remove the wood chip or mulch pile in her front yard that he had observed previously, and about which the City had sent Appellant a notice to remove.

The trial court found Appellant guilty of all four charges. The court sentenced Appellant to fines totaling $475, plus court costs.

Standard of Review

“Upon review of a municipal ordinance violation, we must affirm the trial court's decision unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Jackson County v. Stamps, 708 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting City of Joplin v. Marston, 346 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)). We view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the municipality, but we review legal questions de novo. Id.

Point One: The trial court properly applied the Florissant Municipal Code in finding Appellant guilty of failure to maintain a pet license

Section 205.360 requires a pet license for chickens

In her first point on appeal, Appellant argues that her conviction for violating the ordinance requiring a pet license for her chickens was improper because the trial court relied on only some portions of the Florissant Municipal Code (City Code) and wrongly precluded her from offering other portions of the City Code showing an exception to the license requirement. We disagree.

Appellant's conviction for a violation of the pet license ordinance was premised on Sections 205.350 and 205.360 of the City Code. Section 205.350 is a general prohibition on keeping particular animals on premises within the City, including “fowl.” Section 205.360 nevertheless allows residents to own some of these animals upon receiving a permit by the City:

Any person desiring to keep any domestic animals, fowl or bees except for the usual domestic animal or fowl such as the usual children's pets provided they do not exceed four (4) in number in the City may file with the City's Health Department a written application for a permit․.

Appellant does not dispute that she failed to apply for and obtain a permit to keep chickens on her property under Section 205.360.

The trial court properly excluded uncertified copies of municipal ordinances

While acknowledging Section 205.360 requires a permit to keep chickens, Appellant argues that the next section of the City Code, Section 205.370, contains an exception to the permit requirement for residents engaged in farming. Appellant argued before the trial court and argues here that her residence constitutes a farm and her chickens are part of her farming operation. However, Section 205.370 of the City Code was not before the trial court, and it is not before this Court.

It is well-established that Missouri courts cannot take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. City of Center v. Andrews, 622 S.W.3d 211, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing cases). Rather, parties must submit them as evidence, in one of three ways: (1) a handwritten or printed certified copy; (2) a printed volume published by the city; or (3) filing a certified copy with the clerk of the court, kept by the clerk “readily available for inspection by the parties.” City of Joplin v. Marston, 346 S.W.3d 340, 342 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (discussing Sections 490.240 and 479.250, RSMo. Supp. 2008). Alternatively, the parties can stipulate to the ordinance. State v. Cochran, 365 S.W.3d 628, 637 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).

Here, Appellant attempted to submit City ordinances that she printed from an online database, ecode360.com. Section 490.240, RSMo. 2016 requires that any printed copy of an ordinance be certified:

Printed copies of the ordinances․of any city or incorporated town in this state, purporting to be published by the authority of such city or incorporated town, and manuscript or printed copies of such ordinances․, certified under the hand of the officer having the same in lawful custody, with the seal of such city or town annexed, shall be received as evidence in all courts and places in this state, without further proof[.]

Appellant argues the database she used contains official records of the City, thus they need not be certified. While that database does not appear to be an official City database, even if it were, a printed ordinance from an online source is still a “printed cop[y],” and must therefore be certified pursuant to the plain language of Section 490.240, in order to be admissible as evidence. Because Appellant did not obtain certification of her submitted copy or a stipulation as to the ordinance's language appearing in that copy, Section 205.370 of the City Code was not properly before the trial court. The trial court did not err in finding Appellant guilty of failure to obtain a pet license under Section 205.360 of the City Code. Point denied.

Point Two: The trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit 7

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the City's Exhibit 7, consisting of certified copies of the City Code ordinances underlying the charges against Appellant, because the City did not disclose Exhibit 7 to Appellant prior to trial. We disagree.

At trial, when the City submitted Exhibit 7, Appellant objected based on the substance of the ordinances and attempted to raise the argument that they did not apply to her because of her alleged farming operation. The court said it would not hear evidence at that time, but clarified it was inviting objections only regarding whether to admit those certified copies of the ordinances. Appellant responded she did not have any objection to the court receiving the ordinances.

Appellant now asserts on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted Exhibit 7 because the City had not previously disclosed it to Appellant. This objection is not preserved, and therefore can only be reviewed for plain error. In exercising such review, we determine whether “substantial grounds exist for believing that the trial court committed error that is evident, obvious, and clear, affecting a substantial right of the defendant, which resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.” Cochran, 365 S.W.3d at 633 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting State v. Beck, 167 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005)).

Here, Exhibit 7 consisted only of certified copies of ordinances Appellant was charged with violating. Appellant was aware of such ordinances and in fact had brought her own, uncertified copies of the same. She did not argue that the charged ordinances were a surprise to her or that she did not have time to prepare a defense. We find no grounds from the record to believe manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice occurred from the trial court's admission of Exhibit 7. State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Mo. banc 2025) (unless appellant makes facial showing of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, appellate court will decline to review for plain error). Point denied.

Point Three: The trial court did not err in excluding uncertified copies of City ordinances

Appellant reiterates her argument that the trial court erred in accepting the City's certified copies of ordinances, which omitted City Code Section 205.370 and 205.380; while at the same time rejecting her proffered copies of the omitted ordinances because they were uncertified. As discussed in Point One, the trial court did not err in excluding uncertified copies of City ordinances from its determination of this case. The City submitted certified copies of the relevant ordinances, which satisfied Section 490.240, RSMo. 2016.

Appellant further argues in her discussion of Point Three that the trial court improperly failed to consider the constitutional argument she raised concerning the nuisance charge against her, arguing that the ordinance is vague and conflicts with state statutes pertaining to farms. Her argument fails here for two reasons.

First, “[c]laims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in a point relied on are not preserved for our review.” Hollis v. Poplar Bluff Regional Med. Ctr., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). Though Appellant is pro se and we have attempted to review many points ex gratia despite her failure to comply technically with the rules of procedure, we also must hold her to the same standards as attorneys out of fairness and impartiality to all litigants. In re Marriage of Erickson, 419 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) (courts are precluded from granting pro se litigants preferential treatment). Appellant's argument appears only in the argument section of this point relied on.

Second, in order to preserve constitutional arguments for review, they must be “raised at the earliest possible opportunity; the relevant sections of the constitution must be specified; the point must be preserved in the motion for new trial, if any; and, it must be adequately covered in the briefs.” In re H.L.L., 179 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Mo. banc 2005). Appellant has not properly developed or preserved her constitutional arguments, thus we cannot address them here. Point denied.

Point Four: The trial court did not misapply the law in finding Appellant guilty of a nuisance due to a crowing rooster

Appellant argues that the trial court improperly relied on Officer Schaljo's testimony, rather than the standard required by City Code Section 205.065, to find her guilty of nuisance due to animal noise under that section.² We disagree.

Section 205.065 of the City Code provides the following:

The keeping of a dog or any other animal which emits any barking or other animal noises which produce actual physical or mental discomfort to a normal person of ordinary sensibilities, tastes and habits is hereby prohibited.

Appellant argues the trial court improperly relied on Officer Schaljo's subjective feeling that the rooster's crowing was annoying, rather than on evidence that any of her neighbors suffered actual physical or mental discomfort. However, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Appellant's crowing rooster constituted a nuisance under City Code Section 205.065. Officer Schaljo testified that he personally heard the rooster crowing, and that it was loud, obnoxious, and annoying, similar to a barking dog. Appellant did not dispute that Officer Schaljo was a person of ordinary sensibilities, tastes, and habits. Further, though the ordinance does not require the person complaining of the nuisance to be a neighbor, Officer Schaljo testified that the City was aware of Appellant's chickens due to neighbor complaints in September, the month prior to his issuance of the citation on October 11, 2023. We find the trial court's judgment in this respect was supported by substantial evidence, was not against the weight of the evidence, and did not erroneously declare or apply the law. Point denied.

Point Five: The trial court did not misapply the law in convicting Appellant of a public nuisance

Appellant argues in this point both that the trial court failed to rule on her motion to dismiss the charge of public nuisance due to the presence of a six-foot wood chip or mulch pile in Appellant's yard, and that the trial court misapplied the law in convicting her of public nuisance. We disagree.

Regarding Appellant's motion to dismiss, she filed the motion following a hearing that continued the trial to a later date. The City had rested, and Appellant's evidence was reserved for the next trial setting. Paragraph two of Appellant's motion to dismiss argued that City Code Section 405.245 requires ground cover, and Appellant was in the process of converting several areas of her yard to having ground cover. During trial, the trial court considered the motion and looked at Section 405.245, though it was never entered into evidence. The trial court noted that the court would have to make specific factual findings on the issue, and a motion to dismiss was not the proper way to resolve it. The trial court stated such arguments were more properly closing argument, and the court would consider them in its determination of the merits of the case.

“A motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence in a judge-tried case submits on the merits the issues upon which plaintiff has the burden of persuasion and requires the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence.” Gibson v. Gibson, 946 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). Municipal ordinance violations are quasi-criminal in nature, and in criminal cases, a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence amounts to an argument that the State failed to make a submissible case of guilt. See Andrews, 622 S.W.3d at 213; State v. Rivers, 554 S.W.2d 548, 549-50 (Mo. App. 1977). Here, the trial court certainly could have ruled on the motion to dismiss if it found the City had failed to make a submissible case regarding the issue of public nuisance. The trial court's statement that it would instead consider Appellant's arguments during closing argument implies the court did believe the City had made a submissible case but wanted to consider all the evidence at the end of the proceeding before ruling. In effect, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss at that time. The trial court did ultimately rule on the merits of the issue, as well as consider Appellant's arguments regarding other portions of the City Code, despite Appellant not providing certified copies of the Code. Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to specifically state it denied her motion to dismiss.

As to the merits, Appellant argues the trial court misapplied the law regarding a public nuisance because City Code Section 213.030, the basis of Appellant's citation, does not include “wood chips” or “mulch” in its list of items constituting a nuisance. Appellant argues instead that wood chips and mulch are regulated in City Code Section 405.245, which requires a minimum of two inches of ground cover, so her six-foot-high pile is in compliance, given her intent to spread the pile across her property grounds.

Section 213.030 of the City Code provides the following, in relevant part:

Any property, premises or land shall be a public nuisance if it has the presence of debris of any kind including, but not limited to, weed cuttings, cut and fallen trees and shrubs, overgrown vegetation and noxious weeds which are eight (8) inches or more in height or which constitutes a breeding place or harborage for rodents, mosquitoes, flies or other insects, litter, junk, rubbish, garbage and trash, lumber, wood and firewood not piled or stacked twelve (12) inches off the ground, rocks or bricks, ․ or the keeping, storage, depositing or accumulation of any material, dirt, sand, gravel, concrete, or similar materials which is unhealthy or unsafe and declared to be a public nuisance.

The evidence at trial was that Appellant had a pile of wood chips or mulch in her front yard that was approximately six feet tall. The City submitted a notice of public nuisance from the City Health Department, issued on October 11, 2023, directing Appellant to remove the pile of wood chips or mulch from her yard within seven days. By December 8, 2023, the pile remained in Appellant's yard, and Officer Schaljo issued the citation for public nuisance on that date. He testified that a pile that large could be a safety hazard for children, as well as a breeding ground for insects.

The trial court did not misapply the law in finding Appellant guilty under this Section 213.030 of the City Code. While Appellant is correct that the ordinance does not specifically name wood chips or mulch, it does, prior to its enumerated list of nuisances, state that such list “include[es], but [is] not limited to” that list. The list clearly prohibits items that could constitute both a safety hazard and a breeding ground for insects.

Appellant's argument that the mulch was present so that she could obey a different ordinance—not in evidence—requiring her to have at least two inches of ground cover, is unpersuasive. It is clear the trial court did not find her testimony to that effect credible. The evidence showed the pile was present in Appellant's yard for nearly two months with no application as ground cover. Appellant's assertion that she was permitted to store the mulch or wood chips for that purpose is not supported by evidence, and City Code Section 213.030 specifically prohibits “storage, depositing or accumulation of” many forms of ground cover, including “any material, dirt, sand, gravel, concrete or similar materials which is unhealthy or unsafe and declared to be a public nuisance.” The City had in fact declared Appellant's mulch or wood chip pile a public nuisance in October of 2023, and Appellant did not remove it for nearly two months, well beyond the City's deadline of October 18, 2023. The trial court did not err in finding Appellant guilty of the charge of public nuisance. Point denied.

Point Six: There was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction for the animal-at-large ordinance violation

Appellant raises several arguments regarding the credibility of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of guilt for the animal-at-large ordinance violation, including that the photographs of chickens outside Appellant's yard were inauthentic or had been tampered with, as well as that Officer Stringer offered perjured testimony to support the charge. However, the trial court is the finder of fact in a bench-tried case and is tasked with determining the credibility of witnesses and evidence. See State v. Anderson, 653 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting State v. Cannafax, 344 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)). We cannot reweigh the evidence on appeal, but only determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. Id.

City Code Section 205.240 states, “It shall be the duty of any person owning or having custody of any animal or fowl, ․ to keep such animal(s) or fowl on the premises of such owner or custodian.” Officer Stringer testified that he responded to Appellant's residence on October 25, 2023, following a neighbor's complaint of chickens in the street. He testified that he observed chickens in the street in front of Appellant's house and took photographs. Appellant asked him during cross-examination if he recalled her coming out and calling the chickens back into her yard, and he said yes. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant failed to keep her chickens on her premises on October 25, 2023,³ in violation of City Code Section 205.240. Appellant essentially conceded this violation by asking whether Officer Stringer recalled her calling the chickens back into her yard on that date. The trial court's judgment in this respect is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and did not erroneously declare or apply the law. Point denied.

Point Seven: The trial court plainly erred in imposing fines for three ordinance violations

Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to impose fines set out in the Uniform Fine Schedule, published pursuant to Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 37.49. While we disagree that the Uniform Fine Schedule is applicable here, we find that the City failed to introduce evidence of the applicable ordinance setting out the penalties for violation of the provisions underlying three of the charges against Appellant. Such omission renders the trial court's imposition of fines on three of the charges unsupported by substantial evidence, and the lack of evidence supporting the fines amounts to plain error affecting Appellant's substantial rights.

As we have discussed, a trial court cannot take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Andrews, 622 S.W.3d at 213. When a city prosecutes a violation of a municipal ordinance, if the penalty for such violation is contained in a separate municipal ordinance, that penalty ordinance must also be properly submitted as evidence. City of Joplin v. Klein, 345 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011). If the court does not have evidence of the applicable penalty, any judgment imposing a penalty is unsupported by substantial evidence. See id. at 357.

Here, the City properly offered into evidence the ordinances underlying each charged violation, but only one of them also contained the penalty. City Code Section 205.240 sets out a $25 fine for the first offense of animal-at-large, and the fine increases for each subsequent offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a fine of $25 plus court costs for the conviction of animal-at-large, thus we affirm this sentence.

However, there is no City ordinance in evidence prescribing fines for the remaining three charges. The trial court stated during trial that the range of punishment for each offense was $1 to $500, but there is no evidence in the record to support that stated range, and this Court is not permitted to look beyond the evidence to verify what the City's penalty ordinances provide. Thus, the trial court improperly imposed fines without evidentiary support for the charges of animal nuisance, failure to have an animal permit, and public nuisance.

While Appellant's point disputing the imposition of fines does not raise the issue of lack of evidentiary support, we may review for plain error. See Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 582 (discussing Mo. R. Crim. P. 30.20); Andrews, 622 S.W.3d at 214. We conclude the imposition of fines without evidence of the ordinances authorizing such fines is an error that is evident, obvious, and clear; and resulted in manifest injustice. See Andrews, 622 S.W.3d at 214. Thus, we must reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the imposition of fines for the above three charges. Further, the City may not offer additional evidence regarding the penalty for ordinance violations upon remand. Klein, 345 S.W.3d at 356-57 (discussing State v. Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705 (Mo. banc 2011) (“on remand, the state does not receive a second opportunity to prove its case”)). While Appellant's convictions for these ordinance violations stand, the only remedy therefore is to discharge Appellant of those three fines. Id. Point granted in part.

Point Eight: The trial court did not err in failing to rule on substantive motions

Appellant argues that the trial court denied Appellant a fair hearing because it failed to rule on several motions she filed. We disagree.

First, Appellant filed a motion for discovery sanctions on August 30, 2024, alleging the City failed to disclose evidence prior to trial. Much of this evidence Appellant admits she already had prior to trial. When the City handed her the exhibits at trial, the trial court asked whether Appellant wanted a continuance to review it, and Appellant declined. Appellant does not specify how the procedure here resulted in unfairness or prejudiced her at trial. See State v. Ward, 726 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (vague and indefinite statements are inadequate to establish prejudice). Appellant also argues the City's exhibits were incomplete, but she had the opportunity to present her own evidence regarding what exhibits were missing, and she expressly declined the trial court's offer of a continuance. She has not established that anything missing from the City's exhibits was not in evidence through other exhibits or would have affected the outcome of her trial. We find no error in the trial court's failure to grant Appellant's motion for sanctions here.

Next, Appellant argues the trial court failed to rule on her motions for contempt, which alleged that both Officer Schaljo and Officer Stringer committed perjury in their testimony at trial. The trial court denied Appellant's motions at trial and told her that Appellant could submit evidence and argue the officers’ testimony was not truthful during closing argument, and the trial court would decide whether the testimony was truthful during its deliberations as factfinder. Thus, the trial court did not fail to rule on Appellant's motions for contempt.

Appellant further argues that the trial court did not allow her to reopen the evidence after she had rested, and that the court restricted her time for closing argument. Neither of these arguments relate to her point relied on, which exclusively challenged the trial court's failure to rule on her motions. See Hollis, 674 S.W.3d at 92 (“[c]laims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in a point relied on are not preserved for our review”). A thorough review of the record shows Appellant was able to argue her many assertions that evidence had been falsified and that the City was targeting her unfairly. The trial court received offers of proof from Appellant, set other hearing dates to enforce subpoenas Appellant had filed on her neighbors, and heard extensive argument from Appellant, even outside closing argument, on Appellant's claims. We cannot discern a specific way Appellant was prejudiced from her brief or from our review of the record. Point denied.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's findings of guilt on each of the four citations, as well as the fine of $25 plus court costs for the animal-at-large ordinance violation. Because the remaining fines were not supported by evidence in the record, we must reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the fines for animal nuisance, public nuisance, and failure to obtain a pet license.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The City has filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's brief for multiple violations of Rule 84.04. While Appellant's brief is deficient in a number of ways, we choose to review the arguments contained therein to the extent we can discern them from her brief. The City's motion to dismiss Appellant's brief is denied.

2.   Appellant also argues that the trial court misapplied this law because it relied on Officer Schaljo's testimony that owning roosters is prohibited by the City, which is inconsistent with the City Code. However, that issue was not before the trial court and is not before us here. Appellant was not convicted of illegally possessing a rooster, but of a noise nuisance resulting from the rooster's crowing.

3.   Appellant further points to evidence that she installed a fence following these violations to make two points. First, she argues she remedied the problem, but that is irrelevant to the issue of whether Appellant's chickens were contained in her yard on October 25, 2023. Second, she argues that the materials she used to make the fence are prohibited by ordinance but allowed for farms, and she attempts to establish that because the City did not issue a citation for the fence, it tacitly concedes Appellant's yard constitutes a farm. As we have noted, Appellant's arguments that she is engaged in farming practices were not properly raised as a constitutional challenge below, and nor have they been properly raised as an affirmative defense. Regardless, the fact that the City did not issue a citation for her fence does not establish that she was operating a farm, and it does not constitute a defense to any of the charges against her.

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Presiding Judge, and James M. Dowd, Judge, concur.