SPINE SPECIALISTS OF MICHIGAN v. MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

OPINION

This case concerns the 2019 amendments to Michigan's no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., specifically the question whether the tolling provision added to MCL 500.3145 applies retroactively to personal protection insurance (PIP) claims that had already begun to accrue before the amendment was adopted. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the tolling provision does not apply retroactively to such claims.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. Jeremy Woods was injured in a car crash on January 21, 2017. He was insured under a no-fault policy issued by defendant, MemberSelect Insurance Company. Plaintiff, Spine Specialists of Michigan P.C., provided medical care to Woods. The dates of relevant medical services include an office visit on April 15, 2019, billed at $350; a spinal fusion procedure with laminectomy and discectomy on April 20, 2019, billed at $118,800; and an office visit on May 6, 2019, billed at $350. Woods assigned his right to payment of no-fault PIP benefits for these visits to Spine Specialists. Spine Specialists then sought payment from MemberSelect for the care it provided to Woods on these dates. MemberSelect refused to pay, and Spine Specialists sued, filing its complaint on September 21, 2020.

On June 9, 2021, MemberSelect moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that most of the claims brought by Spine Specialists were barred by the one-year-back rule contained in MCL 500.3145, which prohibits the recovery of PIP benefits to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part MemberSelect's motion for summary disposition. Pertinent here, the trial court granted MemberSelect's motion for summary disposition regarding Spine Specialists’ claims for services provided before June 11, 2019, the date on which the tolling provision became effective as part of MCL 500.3145.

Spine Specialists appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Spine Specialists of Mich. PC v MemberSelect Ins. Co., 345 Mich App 405, 407, 5 N.W.3d 108 (2022). In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the amended statute containing the tolling provision should not apply to the claims because, under the no-fault act, PIP benefits accrue as each expense is “incurred,” which occurs when treatment is received, not when payment is denied. Id. at 412, 5 N.W.3d 108. According to the Court of Appeals, in this case Woods's PIP benefits accrued in April and May 2019 when he received treatment, making those claims subject to the pre-amendment version of the statute, effective before June 11, 2019. Id. at 413, 5 N.W.3d 108. Without the tolling provision of the current statute, however, the pre-June 11, 2019 claims were barred by the one-year-back rule.

On the same date that the Court of Appeals panel in this case issued its opinion, another panel of the Court of Appeals published an opinion that instead applied the post-amendment version of the one-year-back statute to claims that accrued before the statute's effective date. See Encompass Healthcare, PLLC v Citizens Ins. Co., 344 Mich App 248, 998 N.W.2d 751 (2022). In Encompass, the question whether the old or new version of the statute should apply was not explicitly raised, but the panel stated in a footnote that the case was governed by the new version of the one-year-back rule “[b]ecause Encompass's complaint was filed after the amendments took effect[.]” Id. at 252 n 1, 998 N.W.2d 751. Spine Specialists sought leave to appeal in this Court.¹ We ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address “whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the tolling provision of the one-year-back rule, MCL 500.3145(3), does not apply to claims for personal protection insurance no-fault benefits that accrued, MCL 500.3110(4), before the amendment to § 3145 took effect on June 11, 2019.” Spine Specialists of Mich. PC v MemberSelect Ins. Co., 513 Mich. 904, 904, 997 N.W.2d 45 (2023).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Mich Farm Bureau v Dep't of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy, ––– Mich ––––, ––––; ––– NW3d –––– (July 31, 2024) (Docket No. 165166); slip op. at 22. MemberSelect moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). When a defendant brings a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept the allegations in the complaint as true unless contradicted by documentation that the defendant has submitted. Sunrise Resort Ass'n, Inc. v Cheboygan Co. Rd. Comm., 511 Mich. 325, 333, 999 N.W.2d 423 (2023).

“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). When considering a (C)(10) motion, a court must consider “affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties ․” MCR 2.116(G)(5). This evidence is considered “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Maiden, 461 Mich. at 120, 597 N.W.2d 817. If the evidence fails to establish a genuine dispute regarding any material fact, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10).

We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Mich Ass'n of Home Builders v City of Troy, 497 Mich. 281, 285, 871 N.W.2d 1 (2015). Statutes are to be interpreted according to legislative intent, with the clearest indication being the statute's plain language. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). “[C]ourts may not speculate about an unstated purpose where the unambiguous text plainly reflects the intent of the Legislature.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 683, 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002), citing Lansing v Lansing Twp., 356 Mich. 641, 649-650, 97 N.W.2d 804 (1959).

III. ANALYSIS

This case presents the question whether the tolling provision newly added to MCL 500.3145 applies to an action filed after the no-fault amendments took effect on June 11, 2019, when the underlying expenses were incurred before the amendment's effective date. Answering this question requires examining the text of MCL 500.3145 and understanding the changes that the 2019 amendments made to it.

Before its amendment in 2019, MCL 500.3145(1) provided, in relevant part:

An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. [MCL 500.3145(1), as enacted by 1972 PA 294.]

MCL 500.3145 was amended by 2019 PA 21, effective June 11, 2019, and now provides, in relevant part:

(1) An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for an accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident that caused the injury unless written notice of injury as provided in subsection (4) has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), if the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss, or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.

(3) A period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the commencement of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim. This subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the claim with reasonable diligence.

In the version of MCL 500.3145 effective prior to June 11, 2019, the key aspect of that provision was the “one-year-back rule.” This rule stated that any claims for benefits were strictly limited to expenses incurred within the year preceding the filing of the action. In other words, for a claimant to recover benefits, the action had to be filed within one year of when the medical services in question were rendered. If more than a year had elapsed, the statute barred recovery for those expenses. As we explained in Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich. 200, 220-221, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012):

The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that is the no-fault act ․ Given that Michigan is the only state with a no-fault automobile-injury reparations scheme with mandatory, unlimited, lifetime medical benefits, the Legislature adopted a unique approach to defining the temporal limitations for filing suit without allowing open-ended liability or time-barring claims before they accrue. The Legislature addressed this problem by enacting the one-year-back rule, which limits recovery to losses incurred within one year before suit was filed. Thus, the creation of MCL 500.3145(1) was the Legislature's reasonable and simple approach to resolving the problem of allowing a reasonable amount of time for pursuing a claim while protecting the fiscal integrity of the no-fault system.

Following the 2019 amendments, however, the one-year-back rule is no longer unqualified. As part of its comprehensive amendments to the no-fault act, the Legislature added a tolling provision that now extends the one-year period under certain circumstances. See MCL 500.3145(3). Under the amended statute, the allowable period may be extended by the time between a “specific claim for payment” and when the insurer “formally denies” that claim. MCL 500.3145(3). Now, a claimant may seek benefits beyond the strict one-year limit, depending on (1) the timing of the insurer's response to the claim and its issuing of a formal denial, and (2) whether the person claiming benefits pursues the claim with reasonable diligence.

There is no dispute that Spine Specialists filed its complaint after the amendment to MCL 500.3145 became effective, which introduced the tolling provision. Spine Specialists filed its complaint on September 21, 2020, seeking payment for services rendered in April and May 2019. If the pre-amendment version of the statute applies, as the Court of Appeals held, the claims were time-barred because they pertain to “loss[es] incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” MCL 500.3145(2). The Court of Appeals reasoned that “the loss was incurred when Woods received medical treatment from plaintiff in April and May 2019, and the claims for those services accrued at that time.” Spine Specialists, 345 Mich App at 414, 5 N.W.3d 108. By contrast, if the post-amendment version applies, as Spine Specialists contends, the claim might remain viable more than one year after accrual in the absence of a formal denial.

A. THE ACCRUAL DATE IS DETERMINATIVE

Spine Specialists primarily contends that retroactive application is unnecessary because the controlling law is not determined by the date the claim accrues, but rather by the law in effect when the action is commenced. According to Spine Specialists, the operative date is the commencement of the action. We disagree.

Substantive rights and liabilities are presumptively governed by the law in effect at the time a cause of action accrues. Husted v Consumers Power Co, 376 Mich. 41, 47, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965). The one-year-back rule serves as a “damages-limiting provision,” restricting recovery to losses incurred within the year preceding the filing of the action. Joseph, 491 Mich. at 214, 815 N.W.2d 412. Because the one-year-back rule, which the tolling provision is a part of, may “substantively reduce the monetary amount” of benefits available, it is a substantive provision that affects substantive rights. Andary v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 512 Mich. 207, 255, 1 N.W.3d 186 (2023).

As we emphasized in Andary, a claim for PIP benefits accrues at the moment medical services are rendered—that is, when the expense is incurred by the provider. See Andary, 512 Mich. at 238, 1 N.W.3d 186. This Court has determined that “incur” means “[t]o become liable or subject to, [especially] because of one's own actions.” Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich. 476, 484, 673 N.W.2d 739 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original).

Woods received the medical care at issue from Spine Specialists in April and May 2019. On those dates, Woods incurred the expenses for the treatment he received, thereby creating liability for payment—a right he assigned to Spine Specialists. Community Resource Consultants, Inc. v Progressive Mich. Ins. Co., 480 Mich. 1097, 1098, 745 N.W.2d 123 (2008) (“Generally, one becomes liable for the payment of services once those services have been rendered.”). When these expenses were incurred by Woods, the claims accrued. The no-fault act makes clear that “[p]ersonal protection insurance benefits payable for accidental bodily injury accrue not when the injury occurs but as the allowable expense, work loss or survivors’ loss is incurred.” MCL 500.3110(4) (emphasis added). Once a claim accrues under the no-fault act, an “action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss, or survivor's loss has been incurred.” MCL 500.3145(2).

It is well established that the date on which expenses are incurred determines when the right to recover PIP benefits accrues, and this accrual date dictates the parties’ substantive rights. See MCL 500.3110(4); see also Buhl v Oak Park, 507 Mich. 236, 243, 968 N.W.2d 348 (2021) (holding that a statute “may only be applied to causes of action that accrued after the effective date of the amendment”); Husted, 376 Mich. at 47, 135 N.W.2d 370. Thus, applying the amended statute to causes of action that accrued in April and May 2019—before the amendment's effective date—would necessarily require retroactive application of the statute.

To underscore the impact of the amendment, we note that the one-year-back rule and absence of a tolling provision in the pre-amendment statute significantly shaped insurers’ substantive rights and liabilities. For many years, Michigan courts (including this Court) read a judicial tolling provision into the one-year-back rule such that the running of this one-year period was tolled between the time a claimant made a claim for benefits (if the claim was brought with “reasonable diligence”) and an insured's formal denial of that claim. See Lewis v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch., 426 Mich. 93, 393 N.W.2d 167 (1986). In 2005, this Court overruled caselaw recognizing this judicial tolling of the one-year period. See Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 473 Mich. 562, 702 N.W.2d 539 (2005).

Accordingly, after 2005, insurers had no formal duty to deny claims in order to end tolling; this obligation, introduced by MCL 500.3145(3) in June 2019, changed the liability landscape by reinstituting the tolling formerly recognized by our Courts, imposing a new duty on insurers that has substantive implications. The new statutory tolling provision underscores the importance of two critical dates: the date on which a claim for payment is made and the date on which the insurer formally denies the claim. These dates now affect a claimant's right to recover and have the potential to substantially alter the scope of an insurer's liability under the one-year-back rule.

B. RETROACTIVITY

Our analysis, however, does not end here. Spine Specialists’ claims could proceed if the amendments to MCL 500.3145 apply retroactively.

In Michigan, statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless the Legislature clearly indicates an intent for retroactive application. Buhl, 507 Mich. at 244, 968 N.W.2d 348. Retroactive application of legislation is cautiously approached by this Court because it “ ‘presents problems of unfairness ․ [that] can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.’ ” Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate, 444 Mich. 656, 666, 513 N.W.2d 807 (1994), quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S Ct 1105, 117 L Ed 2d 328 (1992).

This presumption for prospective application is especially true when retroactive application would impose a new liability on a past action or take away a defense that was valid before the law changed. Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich. 417, 429-430, 818 N.W.2d 279 (2012). “A statute is construed to have prospective effect only unless the Legislature expressly, or impliedly, indicates its intention to give it retrospective effect.” Hughes v Judges’ Retirement Bd, 407 Mich. 75, 85, 282 N.W.2d 160 (1979). The most effective way for the Legislature to be clear and unambiguous about retroactive intent is by writing it explicitly into the statute's text. See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich. 578, 583-584, 624 N.W.2d 180 (2001) (stating that, “[i]n determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively only, ‘[t]he primary and overriding rule is that legislative intent governs,’ ” as evidenced by whether the Legislature used “express language regarding retroactivity”) (citation omitted); but see Andary, 512 Mich. at 247 n 23, 1 N.W.3d 186 (noting that “the presumption in favor of prospective operation can be rebutted by a clear, express command or necessary implication”).

The Legislature is fully capable of clearly expressing its intent for a statute to apply retroactively. In fact, it has done so explicitly on multiple occasions. See, e.g., MCL 141.1157 (“This act shall be applied retroactively ․”); MCL 324.21301a(2) (“The liability provisions that are provided for in this part shall be given retroactive application.”); MCL 224.19(2) (“The authority and powers granted in this section relative to bridges over navigable streams and the grant of that authority are retroactive ․”). “When it wishes to address the question of retroactivity, the Legislature has specifically done so in addition to providing for an effective date.” Selk v Detroit Plastic Prod., 419 Mich. 32, 35 n 2, 348 N.W.2d 652 (1984).

In our most recent opinion on statutory retroactivity, McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 514 Mich ––––; ––– NW3d –––– (July 10, 2024) (Docket No. 165741), we emphasized the importance of the Legislature's chosen language as a significant, often determinative, factor. Nevertheless, in that opinion, we reaffirmed that LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich. 26, 852 N.W.2d 78 (2014), remains the guiding framework for assessing whether a modified statute applies retroactively. LaFontaine states:

In determining whether a law has retroactive effect, we keep four principles in mind. First, we consider whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application. Second, in some situations, a statute is not regarded as operating retroactively merely because it relates to an antecedent event. Third, in determining retroactivity, we must keep in mind that retroactive laws impair vested rights acquired under existing laws or create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past. Finally, a remedial or procedural act not affecting vested rights may be given retroactive effect where the injury or claim is antecedent to the enactment of the statute. [Id. at 38-39, [852 N.W.2d 78].]

Though often labeled as the “LaFontaine factors,” this description is somewhat misleading—even if our own caselaw frequently uses it. The term “factors” may imply a balancing test or the weighing of competing elements, but retroactivity analysis is not about balancing interests. Instead, the so-called “factors” are better understood as discrete principles or considerations, each of which independently informs the retroactivity inquiry. For instance, clear legislative intent for retroactivity would be decisive, while in other cases, a statute's mere reference to past events may be irrelevant if it disrupts vested rights. Referring to these principles as “factors” may incorrectly imply that all must be balanced or equally considered in every case. In reality, only the applicable principles need to be assessed, and any one may be dispositive, obviating the need to address the others.

Under a LaFontaine analysis, the first and often most important principle to consider is “whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application.” LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 38, 852 N.W.2d 78. The amendments of MCL 500.3145 were specifically designated to be given “immediate effect.” 2019 PA 21, enacting § 2. This Court grappled with this type of statutory language in Johnson. There, we clarified that amendments and statutes given immediate effect are still presumed to apply prospectively only:

While 2005 PA 270 was given immediate effect, nothing in the statutory amendment suggests that the Legislature intended retroactive effect. The phrase “immediate effect” simply refers to Const. 1963, art. 4, § 27, which provides that “[n]o act shall take effect until the expiration of 90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed, but the legislature may give immediate effect to acts by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.” (Emphasis added.) Use of the phrase “immediate effect” does not at all suggest that a public act applies retroactively. [Johnson, 491 Mich. at 430, [818 N.W.2d 279].]

While the phrase “immediate effect” may carry some ambiguity, the use of it “does not at all suggest that a public act applies retroactively.” Id. That the Legislature “provided for the law to take immediate effect ․ only confirms its textual prospectivity.” LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 40, 852 N.W.2d 78. This is true because, again, the Legislature has “ ‘shown on several occasions that it knows how to make clear its intention that a statute apply retroactively.’ ” Brewer v A D Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich. 50, 56, 782 N.W.2d 475 (2010), quoting Frank W Lynch & Co, 463 Mich. at 584, 624 N.W.2d 180.

Had the Legislature intended for the amendment to apply retroactively—encompassing all cases filed after the effective date of the amendment regardless of when the cause of action accrued—it could have expressly stated so. Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich. 408, 425, 697 N.W.2d 851 (2005) (“The Legislature is held to what it said. It is not for us to rework the statute. Our duty is to interpret the statute as written.”). For instance, the Legislature could have provided language indicating that the tolling provision applies to all cases filed after June 2019, even if the claims accrued under the preamendment statute. Specific language to this effect, such as “this amendment shall apply to all actions filed on or after the effective date regardless of the date of accrual,” would clarify retroactive intent, ensuring that the tolling provision would govern cases filed after the amendment irrespective of the date of expense or treatment. See LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 40 n 30, 852 N.W.2d 78 (noting that MCL 445.1567(1) and (2), MCL 445.1568, and MCL 445.1570 each begin with the preface “Notwithstanding any agreement” as a sign they were retroactive). Instead, “immediate effect” was the only language used. See Buhl, 507 Mich. at 245, 968 N.W.2d 348 (“In this case, nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that MCL 691.1402a(5) was intended to apply retroactively. To the contrary, the amendment was given immediate effect without further elaboration.”). Further elaboration beyond “immediate effect” is necessary to support the intent for a statute to be applied retroactively. See McLain, 514 Mich at ––––; slip op. at 18-19.

In the absence of language indicating retroactive application, the Legislature effectively reaffirmed its existing approach under MCL 500.3110(4) regarding when claims accrue for PIP benefits and when a cause of action arises. The no-fault act already specifies that PIP benefits accrue when they are “incurred,” meaning when the insured receives treatment and becomes liable for payment—not when the injury occurs. MCL 500.3110(4). “[A]n expense is incurred or a patient becomes liable when an agreement to pay is executed and treatment is received.” Bronson Health Care Group, Inc. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 335 Mich App 25, 35-36, 966 N.W.2d 393 (2020). MCL 500.3110(4) explicitly provides: “Personal protection insurance benefits payable for accidental bodily injury accrue not when the injury occurs but as the allowable expense, work loss or survivors’ loss is incurred.” MCL 500.3110(4). This provision dictates the accrual date for claims, establishing that the right to seek payment of PIP benefits is triggered at the time an expense is incurred.

When the Legislature amended MCL 500.3145 in 2019 to include a tolling provision, it left MCL 500.3110(4) unchanged and included no retroactive language. This reinforces the existing accrual rule. To hold otherwise would require a clear “indication in the text that the Legislature intended for the amendment to be applied retroactively[.]” Buhl, 507 Mich. at 245, 968 N.W.2d 348.

By omitting retroactive language and leaving MCL 500.3110(4) intact, the Legislature signaled its intent for the amendment to apply prospectively under the existing accrual framework. The use of “immediate effect” does not suggest otherwise. As this Court has emphasized, “ ‘the best indicator of the Legislature's intent is the words used.’ ” Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 499 Mich. 29, 34, 878 N.W.2d 799 (2016), quoting Johnson, 491 Mich. at 436, 818 N.W.2d 279. This confirms under LaFontaine’s first principle that the tolling provision applies exclusively to claims accruing after the amendment's effective date, which is consistent with the Legislature's decision to omit retroactive language and preserve the existing statutory framework.

Although LaFontaine outlines multiple principles, not all are relevant in every case. Here, the second principle—“in some situations, a statute is not regarded as operating retroactively merely because it relates to an antecedent event,” LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 38-39, 852 N.W.2d 78—need not be addressed because it does not materially advance the retroactivity inquiry under these facts. See McLain, 514 Mich at ––––; slip op. at 21-22 (finding the second factor to be inapplicable). Instead, we'll consider LaFontaine’s third principle, which provides valuable guidance by directing this Court to consider the potential negative effects of retroactive laws, particularly noting their potential to “ ‘impair vested rights acquired under existing laws or create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past.’ ” Andary, 512 Mich. at 254, 1 N.W.3d 186, quoting LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 39, 852 N.W.2d 78. This guiding principle reflects a commitment to protecting the settled expectations of parties under existing law.

To assess this LaFontaine principle requires potentially examining two things: whether vested rights have been impaired, and whether new obligations or duties have been imposed on past transactions. See Buhl, 507 Mich. at 246, 968 N.W.2d 348. To properly analyze this principle, it is essential to understand the one-year-back rule itself, as this clarifies the purpose of its tolling provision. Recall that the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision, Joseph, 491 Mich. at 222, 815 N.W.2d 412, and so it “does not serve those purposes typically associated with a statute of limitations because it does not operate to cut off a claim or bar the action or the recovery; it simply limits the compensation available to the claimant.” Id. at 216, 815 N.W.2d 412. This damages-limiting provision caps insurers’ financial exposure under Michigan's no-fault framework.

Although the one-year-back rule provides insurers with substantial protection, it generally does not constitute a vested right. “It is the general rule that that which the legislature gives, it may take away. A statutory defense, or a statutory right, though a valuable right, is not a vested right, and the holder thereof may be deprived of it.” Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 589, 99 N.W.2d 490 (1959). However, because retroactively applying the tolling provision would “create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past,” LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 39, 852 N.W.2d 78, we do not find it necessary here to determine whether the one-year-back rule and tolling provision as applied here constitutes a vested right.

Beyond the question of vested rights, it is clear that MCL 500.3145(3) created a new duty for MemberSelect to formally deny a claim—a requirement absent under the pre-amendment version of the statute. The third LaFontaine principle strongly advises against retroactive application in this instance, as it would impose these new obligations on actions taken (or not taken) under the previous legal framework. At the time the claim began to accrue in this case, there was no tolling statute requiring a formal denial from insurers to secure the one-year-back limitation. By applying the new tolling rule retroactively, we would open MemberSelect to potential liability for what could now be labeled as a “failure” to provide a formal denial—a “failure” that was immaterial under the pre-amendment law.

The imposition of such a requirement could hold insurers liable for actions, or inactions, that, at the time, carried no legal significance. Insurers reasonably relied on the one-year-back rule to establish the boundaries of their liability exposure, and they were not required to take affirmative steps, such as issuing formal denials, to safeguard this protection. Retroactive application would disrupt this reliance, potentially exposing insurers to expanded liability without notice or recourse, and ultimately undermining the stability that the one-year-back rule provided.

Spine Specialists contends that issuing a formal denial is not a new duty, given that PIP benefits are considered overdue under MCL 500.3142 when they remain unpaid for 30 days following the submission of reasonable proof of loss. But a duty to pay on a sufficiently supported claim within 30 days is distinct from an obligation to issue a formal denial when declining a request to pay on a claim. Additionally, Spine Specialists argues that insurers have long followed the best practice of issuing formal denials or paying PIP benefits promptly to avoid penalties, such as attorney fees under MCL 500.3148. However, this argument conflates an insurer's general good practice with the statutory mandate introduced by the amendments to MCL 500.3145(3), which requires a formal denial to stop tolling.

Denying a claim, under the pre-amendment framework, meant that an insurer was under no statutory obligation to deny a claim with any particular procedural steps. An insurer was simply able to rely on the one-year-back rule, without tolling, to limit liability, bypassing the need for a formalized response. However, a formal denial under the tolling provision carries a heightened obligation, one that was not previously mandated by law, in order to invoke the one-year-back rule. This formal-denial provision, if applied retroactively, would not only create new legal significance for past actions, but could also require insurers to reconstruct their past responses to claims, which “would effectively rewrite history” by requiring an insurer defendant to go back in time and issue a formal denial of a plaintiff's claim at a time when it was not required to do so. Buhl, 507 Mich. at 247, 968 N.W.2d 348. Thus, applying MCL 500.3145 retroactively would place MemberSelect in a position where it must meet standards and obligations that did not exist when it originally denied Spine Specialists’ claim, undermining reliance on the then established one-year-back rule without the tolling provision. See In re Certified Questions from the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 416 Mich. 558, 572, 331 N.W.2d 456 (1982).

The final LaFontaine principle provides that “a remedial or procedural act not affecting vested rights may be given retroactive effect where the injury or claim is antecedent to the enactment of the statute.” LaFontaine, 496 Mich. at 39, 852 N.W.2d 78. However, where the third LaFontaine principle does not support retroactivity, the Court should conclude its analysis. See Buhl, 507 Mich. at 248, 968 N.W.2d 348 (“Although we disagree with the conclusion that MCL 691.1402a(5) satisfies the third LaFontaine factor and could end our analysis here ․”). This is especially true when, as here, the statute's text lacks any indication of retroactive intent—a consideration highlighted by the first LaFontaine principle. Cf. McLain, 514 Mich at ––––; slip op. at 23. The crux of our inquiry in cases like this one is to ascertain the statute's meaning and determine whether the text's ordinary language clearly indicates that the Legislature intended it to apply retroactively. Here, the statute's language contains no indication of retroactivity, and application of the third LaFontaine principle confirms this.²

In summary, the LaFontaine principles guide the analysis of retroactive statutory application, emphasizing a need for clear legislative intent to justify retroactive effect. In this case, no such intent is reflected in the amendments to MCL 500.3145. The “immediate effect” designation signifies a prompt enactment without implying retroactive applicability. See Johnson, 491 Mich. at 430, 818 N.W.2d 279. By failing to modify the existing accrual rule under MCL 500.3110(4), the Legislature preserved the framework governing when claims accrue, reinforcing that the tolling provision should apply only to claims that began to accrue post-amendment.

Furthermore, applying the relevant LaFontaine principles shows that retroactive enforcement would impose new duties on insurers regarding previously completed transactions, underscoring the conclusion that the statute should not be applied retroactively. This holding does not suggest that a tolling provision could never apply retroactively; rather, it emphasizes that when such a provision introduces a new duty, retroactivity must be clearly indicated. Here, the Legislature's silence on retroactivity, combined with the imposition of new obligations and duties for transactions already past, confirms that the tolling provision added to MCL 500.3145 should operate solely on a prospective basis.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that MCL 500.3145(3) does not apply retroactively to causes of action that began to accrue before the June 11, 2019 amendment became effective. For the reasons outlined in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

While I concur in the judgment, I cannot join the majority opinion because I believe that its reasoning is inconsistent with this Court's decision in Andary v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 512 Mich. 207, 1 N.W.3d 186 (2023). As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Centria Home Rehab, LLC v Allstate Ins Co, ––– Mich ––––, ––––; 12 NW3d 387, 389 (2024), our decision in Andary relied on the premise that “the rights associated with a no-fault insurance contract vested at the time of the vehicle crash that injured the insured.” See also Andary, 512 Mich. at 239, 1 N.W.3d 186. Thus, for accidents that occurred before the no-fault act was amended in 2019, the parties’ rights and duties were defined by the preamendment version of the act. Id. at 240-244, 1 N.W.3d 186; see also 1972 PA 294 and 2019 PA 21. On this basis, we concluded in Andary that the plaintiff insureds had vested statutory and contractual rights to continue receiving the uncapped personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits to which they had been entitled before the 2019 amendments became effective. Id.

The majority here uses different reasoning, stating that the parties’ rights are determined “by the law in effect at the time a cause of action accrues.” Ante at ––––. While it correctly cites Andary for the proposition that a claim for payment of PIP benefits accrues when the payable expenses are incurred, see Andary, 512 Mich. at 243, 1 N.W.3d 186; MCL 500.3110(4), the majority departs from Andary’s reasoning by concluding that the law in effect at the time of accrual defines the scope of the parties’ rights under a no-fault policy. We specifically rejected this argument in Andary:

Defendants are correct that a PIP benefits claim for a specific amount of money to pay for medical expenses does not accrue until the expense is actually incurred. MCL 500.3110(4); Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich. 476, 673 N.W.2d 739 (2003). But this fact does not change the vesting analysis at issue here: the law is well settled that the law in place at the time the parties’ rights and obligations vested under a contract control absent a clear retrospective modification. While [the plaintiffs] cannot seek reimbursement for specific medical expenses until the expenses are actually incurred under MCL 500.3110(4), their rights under the insurance policies for reimbursement of all reasonable and necessary medical expenses at a particular (uncapped) level, if those expenses occur, vested at the time of the automobile accidents causing their injuries—the events that triggered the coverage provided by the insurance policies. [Andary, 512 Mich. at 243-244, [1 N.W.3d 186].]

This distinction does not change the outcome in this case. Plaintiff, Spine Specialists of Michigan P.C., was proceeding as the assignee of its patient, Jeremy Woods. Woods, who was insured by defendant, MemberSelect Insurance Company, was injured in a car crash in 2017, before the no-fault act was amended in 2019. Accordingly, the relationship between MemberSelect, Woods, and Spine Specialists—as Woods’ assignee—was defined by the preamendment version of the statute. As we held in Andary, this entitled Woods to additional benefits that were eliminated by the introduction of caps in the 2019 amendments. It also entitled MemberSelect to the protections of the unamended version of MCL 500.3145, without the new tolling provision in MCL 500.3145(3). See MCL 500.3145, as enacted by 1972 PA 294.

I agree fully with the majority that the amended version of MCL 500.3145 is not retroactive and thus with its conclusion that Spine Specialists cannot avail itself of the new tolling provisions in MCL 500.3145(3). However, as the author of Andary, I would follow the reasoning we set forth in that opinion to reach the same result in this case. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Among the many arguments put forth by Spine Specialists in this case was that under MCR 7.215(C)(2), the Court of Appeals was required to follow the published holding in Encompass.

2.   Spine Specialists further argues that the amendments to MCL 500.3145 should apply retroactively because they were “curative” amendments designed to supersede this Court's decision in Devillers, 473 Mich. 562, 702 N.W.2d 539, and reinstate the standard articulated in binding precedent preceding that decision. See Lewis, 426 Mich. 93, 393 N.W.2d 167, overruled by Devillers, 473 Mich. 562, 702 N.W.2d 539. However, this Court has previously rejected a similar argument that purported “curative” legislation enacted many years after a judicial decision necessarily applies retroactively. See Buhl, 507 Mich. at 247-251, 968 N.W.2d 348. Even assuming that we were to agree that the amendments were intended by the Legislature to be curative in nature, in light of our analysis of the LaFontaine principles, a curative intent does not inform the question whether the Legislature intended the amendments to apply retroactively to claims that accrued before the effective date of the amendment.

Clement, C.J.

Brian K. Zahra, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Kyra H. Bolden, JJ., concur.