IVERSON v. FRANCE (2026)

The petitioner (husband) appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm the judgment.

In December 2025, on a complaint filed by the husband against the respondent (wife), a judge in the District Court issued an ex parte abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (first order). Shortly thereafter, the wife filed a motion to terminate the first order, which was allowed. She also filed a complaint seeking an abuse prevention order against the husband. After a hearing at which both parties appeared, a judge in the District Court issued such an order with a duration of six months (second order). The husband did not timely appeal from either the termination of the first order or the issuance of the second order. Contemporaneously with the G. L. c. 209A matters, the wife commenced divorce proceedings in the Probate and Family Court, and certain temporary orders issued in that case.

In his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the husband argued that he did not receive adequate notice or opportunity to present evidence in the divorce and G. L. c. 209A proceedings and that the second order did not meet the standards of G. L. c. 209A. He also filed a motion to stay all orders entered in the G. L. c. 209A matters and to stay proceedings in the Probate and Family Court. A single justice of this court denied relief on the ground that the petition did not present “the type of exceptional matter that requires the court's extraordinary intervention.” Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25, 120 N.E.3d 707 (2019).

The husband has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2), as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a party challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to “set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” Passing the question whether the rule applies here, it is clear that the husband has an adequate remedy in the ordinary appellate process. An abuse prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A after a two-party hearing is subject to appeal in the ordinary course. See Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679, 682, 672 N.E.2d 502 (1996). The fact that the husband did not timely pursue his right to appeal does not make it an inadequate remedy.² See Bishay v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 1012, 1012-1013, 166 N.E.3d 438 (2021) (“Our general superintendence power is intended for situations where a petitioner has no adequate alternative remedy, not where an adequate alternative exists that a petitioner fails to pursue or pursues unsuccessfully”). To the extent the husband challenges any interlocutory order of the Probate and Family Court, he can raise his issues on appeal from a final judgment. In addition, the petitioner does not explain why review of any interlocutory order could not be obtained pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par. See Saade v. Efron, 493 Mass. 1028, 1029, 225 N.E.3d 307 (2024), quoting Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020, 672 N.E.2d 535 (1996) (“Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, § 118, would suffice”).

Where the husband has these ordinary appellate remedies, the single justice neither abused her discretion nor committed any other error of law by denying extraordinary relief.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Moreover, court records indicate that a single justice of the Appeals Court has since allowed the husband's motion for leave to file late notices of appeal from the termination of the first order and from the issuance of the second order. Court records also indicate that the second order has since been extended by a judge in the District Court. The husband has filed new requests for relief concerning the extended order and making further allegations regarding the wife's counsel. These materials were not before the single justice, and we do not consider them.