COMMONWEALTH v. RYAN MCKENNA (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In July 2015 and again in March 2016, the defendant was charged by complaint with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI). In April 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to both OUI charges. In 2021, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas to the two OUI convictions. After a nonevidentiary hearing, a judge of the District Court denied the motion. No appeal was taken.

In December 2025, the defendant filed a second motion seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas to the same two OUI convictions. After the Commonwealth filed an opposition in December 2025, a different judge (second judge) held an evidentiary hearing in early 2026, denied the motion, and made written findings.

Discussion. “We treat a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 10 (2017). On appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial, the defendant claims that the second judge did not properly analyze the issues related to the breathalyzer and the defendant's decision to plead guilty, erred in finding the matter barred by direct estoppel, and did not properly conduct the evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

Direct estoppel, a form of issue preclusion, applies when (1) the current issue was litigated and determined, (2) the determination was essential to the defendant's conviction, and (3) the defendant had an opportunity to obtain review of that determination. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 498 (2020); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 709-710 (2005).

In his first motion for a new trial filed in 2021, the defendant claimed that, had he known that the breathalyzer result from the 2015 arrest would have been inadmissible, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have taken his case to trial. As previously noted, that motion was denied and no appeal was taken. In his second motion filed in 2025, the defendant made the same claim.

In this appeal, the defendant is estopped from relitigating his plea withdrawal claim because all three conditions of direct estoppel have been met. The claim was litigated and determined in his first motion, that issue was essential to the defendant's convictions, and he had an opportunity for review. See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 498.

The defendant attempts to recast his 2025 plea withdrawal claim by offering purported newly discovered evidence -- a notice from the Executive Office of the Trial Court that the 2015 breathalyzer test result in his case was inadmissible. However, this document is not new. It was included as an exhibit to the Commonwealth's opposition to the defendant's first motion for a new trial in 2021. The opposition was served on the defendant on July 27, 2021, approximately five months before a nonevidentiary hearing on his first motion was held on December 21, 2021. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to establish the existence of newly discovered evidence. See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305-306 (1986); Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 699-700 (2015).

Even though the claim is barred, the result would be the same if we addressed the merits. The record from the hearing and the second judge's brief findings do not reflect that he failed to properly consider the factors set out in Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 744-745 (2023). The judge understood that his role was to evaluate whether there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the government misconduct. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 347, 354-355 (2014). Moreover, given the favorable disposition the defendant received, the judge expressly discredited the defendant's testimony that he would have gone to trial but for the breathalyzer result. Additionally, apart from the breathalyzer result, there was substantial evidence from which a fact finder could have reasonably concluded that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired on both occasions.¹

Finally, the defendant claims that the second judge either failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing or did not conduct one properly. However, there was an evidentiary hearing, the defendant was permitted to testify, and he was cross-examined by the Commonwealth. The defendant did not object to how the hearing was conducted, and he did not seek to offer testimony other than his own. Despite noting the impropriety of the matter's being relitigated, the judge explored the defendant's claim in detail, and in the end, found him to be not credible. As the defendant's motion was not supported with an affidavit from plea counsel, the judge would have been well within his discretion to deny the motion without hearing as it failed to raise a substantial issue. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257, 259 (1981). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). The defendant's claim is without merit.

Order dated January 6, 2026, denying second motion for new trial affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the first incident, the defendant was unsteady on his feet, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, had bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred his speech, admitted to consuming alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests. In the second incident, the defendant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, admitted to consuming alcohol, was swaying as he spoke to the State trooper, and failed field sobriety tests. These are all “classic symptoms of alcohol intoxication.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017).