ADOPTION OF TEAGAN v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial that started in December 2023 and concluded in October 2024, a Juvenile Court judge terminated the parental rights of the mother and the father as to their daughter Teagan (age three) and son Derek (age one), pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26, and G. L. c. 210, § 3. Both parents challenge the unfitness determination. The mother additionally argues that the Department of Children and Families (department) did not make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children, that the judge violated her due process rights by denying a continuance, and that the judge erred in declining to order sibling visitation with a younger sibling who was not subject to the petition. The father also argues that the department's adoption plans were impermissibly vague. We affirm.

Unfitness and reasonable efforts. Before terminating parental rights, “the judge must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit and that the child's ‘best interests will be served by terminating the legal relation between parent and child.’ ” Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020), quoting Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). The judge “must also find that the current parental unfitness is not a temporary condition.” Adoption of Virgil, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 301 (2018). On appeal, “[w]e give substantial deference to the judge's findings of fact and decision, and will reverse only ‘where the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.’ ” Adoption of Luc, supra, quoting Adoption of Ilona, supra. We discern no basis for reversal.

The record shows that the parents had a sporadic six-year relationship marred by persistent domestic violence. From October 2020 through the trial ending in 2024, police officers responded to fourteen incidents. These incidents included 911 hang-up calls, bloody scenes, evident physical injuries on both the mother and the father, allegations of assault by both, denials of any violence despite obvious injuries, and refusals by both to cooperate with responding officers. In early 2021, while pregnant with Teagan, the mother reported to the police that the father struck her with a closed fist. In an incident in 2022, with her newborn son Derek inside the residence, the mother refused to answer the door for responding officers. Two months earlier in another incident, the mother, eight months pregnant, armed herself with a knife and slashed the tires of the father's car while he attempted to drive over her. As these examples illustrate, the record provides ample support for the judge's conclusion that domestic violence contributed to the unfitness of both parents. See Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 264 (2021) (domestic violence “significant factor in deeming the [parent] unfit”). See also Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599 (1996) (domestic violence “has a profound impact on children”).

Evidence also showed that both parents addressed mental health issues with substance use. The mother, who had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression, stopped taking her prescribed medications for a period of time but consistently used cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana, including while pregnant. Both Teagan and Derek were born testing positive for illicit substances. While the father had no mental health diagnoses, he routinely relied on marijuana to address his feelings of anxiety and admitted to using “too much.” At the time of trial, he continued to use marijuana two to three times per day. Using substances made the mother violent and aggressive, and the father's substance use was a trigger for the mother's use. These conditions contributed to the domestic violence that permeated their relationship. The judge could properly consider this milieu of violence, untreated mental health, and substance use and “was not bound to wait for a disaster to happen.” Care & Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998).

Unfitness was also evidenced by the parents’ failures to cooperate with the department and attempts to deceive the department. While Teagan's care and protection case was pending, the parents concealed the mother's pregnancy with Derek. After the department discovered that Derek had been born testing positive for substances, the parents refused to produce the newborn and evaded the department for ten days. While care and protection cases were pending for Teagan and Derek, the parents concealed the pregnancy with the youngest child, Maureen (a pseudonym); “did not maintain consistent communication” with the department; and left the hospital against medical advice in an effort to thwart department involvement with Maureen. Furthermore, the mother “rarely engaged” with the department. While the father “minimally engaged in services,” he did so only after the trial began, and did not make “meaningful [or] substantial improvements towards ameliorating his parental deficits.” Both parents “missed many visits,” and between July 2023 and March 2024, the father did not visit the children at all. Particularly given the conduct that occurred while the care and protection case was pending, the judge had ample evidence to conclude that the parents continued to put their children at risk. See Adoption of Ulrich, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 668, 677 (2019) (courts look for “appreciable improvement” rather than “mere participation” in services [citation omitted]); Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 126 (2005) (refusal to cooperate relevant to determining unfitness).

This deception, in particular, leaves us unmoved by the mother's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Her claim is of course waived as she did not raise it below. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020) (“parent cannot raise a claim of inadequate services for the first time on appeal, as the department would not have had the opportunity to address it”). Even if we considered the claim, “heroic or extraordinary measures” are not required, Adoption of Lenore, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 278 (2002), especially where a parent actively tries to deceive the department and thwart efforts to protect the children and provide services to the parents. See Adoption of Yalena, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 554 (2021) (department's obligation is “contingent upon [the parent's] obligation to substantially fulfill her parental responsibilities [including seeking and using appropriate services]”).

We do not attempt here to summarize the entirety of the record. We are satisfied that the details set forth show not only sufficient grounds for the judge to find the parents unfit but also sufficient grounds to show that they were “likely to remain so.” Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 266. See Adoption of Abigail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 196 (1986) (past pattern of behavior “has prognostic value”).

Due process. We disagree with the mother's contention that the judge denied her due process of law by refusing to continue the trial for a second time. On the first day of trial, neither the mother nor the father appeared, and the department reported that it learned the mother was in the hospital giving birth to Maureen (concealed from the department). Denying a request to continue by the mother's counsel, the judge noted the following: the case had previously been continued, the trial date was selected by the parties, the mother had not been in contact with counsel, the mother had not been in contact with the department, the mother had an outstanding arrest warrant, the trial involved two children, one case had been on the docket for two years, the next trial date available would be six months out, and no written motion or affidavit had been filed detailing the circumstances surrounding the need for the continuance. The judge invited counsel to file a written motion and an affidavit and stated she “would consider continuing the evidence,” but counsel did not file any motion or affidavit.

Applying de novo review to the constitutional claim, we discern no due process violation in these circumstances. Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. 630, 637 (2022). Due process is satisfied where a parent has “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (citation omitted). Care & Protection of Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 595 (2022), S.C., 106 Mass. App. Ct. 477 (2026). The trial judge retains discretion over the method of participation. See Adoption of Edmund, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 530 (2000). “A child also has an interest in timely adjudication in a termination proceeding.” Adoption of Patty, supra at 640.

Here, the judge faced a possible further delay in a trial involving not just one but two children who had been in department custody almost since birth, three years earlier in the case of Teagan and one year earlier in the case of Derek. While considering the mother's opportunity to be heard, the judge also properly considered the needs of these children in an expedited resolution of the case. See Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 764 (1983) (“Unless proceedings involving the custody of a minor are expedited, they fail to accomplish their purpose”). The judge properly considered all the information that had been presented and did not categorically rule out the possibility of a continuance should a motion and supporting affidavit be filed.

Even if the judge could have briefly continued the trial to enable the mother to appear, we discern no prejudice from starting the trial as scheduled. The judge proceeded with the trial but kept the evidence open, she allowed the witnesses for that day to be recalled to testify (two of three did testify again), and the judge expressly did not draw any adverse inference from the mother not appearing. The trial proceeded on that day, December 15, 2023, and the mother appeared on the remaining three days of trial (May 9, 2024, July 11, 2024, and October 1, 2024) and testified. Given the opportunities to recall witnesses, the extended periods of time between trial dates to prepare and review evidence and confer with counsel, the opportunities to testify, and the absence of any adverse inference for failure to appear, we discern no prejudice, and the mother identifies none. See Care & Protection of Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 595.

Sibling visitation. The mother argues that the trial judge erred in declining to order sibling visitation between Teagan, Derek, and Maureen. We disagree. Preliminarily, the “ ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not establish a presumption in favor of sibling visitation.” Care & Protection of Jamison, 467 Mass. 269, 284 (2014). There must be a determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that visitation would serve the best interests of each sibling subject to a visitation order. Id. at 285. The judge declined to order visitation stating that both preadoptive placements demonstrated appreciation for the importance of maintaining the sibling connection. The judge found that the “respective foster families have adequately arranged for sibling visitation between the two subject children.” Accordingly, the judge left visitation to the discretion of the department (posttermination) and the adoptive families (postadoption). No evidence before the judge suggested that a visitation order would be necessary, and the judge had no basis to issue an order sua sponte as to Maureen, who was not a subject of the petition. Contrast Care & Protection of Jamison, supra at 286 (prohibition by guardians perpetuated fragmentation). Thus, we discern no error or abuse of discretion.

Adoption plans. Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's approval of the adoption plans. The father contends that the plans lacked sufficient detail to demonstrate that they served the best interests of the children, but the record shows otherwise.

An adoption plan must be “sufficiently detailed to permit a judge to evaluate the type of adoptive parents,” the “home environment proposed,” and whether the proposal is “best suited” for the children's needs, but it need not be “fully developed” (citation omitted). Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 770-771 (2019). In Adoption of Varik, supra at 771, the adoption plan was deemed inadequate where it outlined the goal for adoption but “failed to specify the type of adoptive parents and the characteristics of the home environment suited to meet [the child's] specific needs.” Here, by contrast, the adoption plans for Teagan and Derek identified the preadoptive parents, their personal backgrounds, the familial dynamics, and the characteristics of the home environment. Further, both plans discussed the individualized needs for each child and how they have been, and will be, addressed by the preadoptive parents. These plans described the “kind of home environment and adoptive family makeup that ideally would best meet” the particular needs of Teagan and Derek. Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 771. Nothing more was required.

Decrees affirmed.