100 MAPLEWOOD STREET LLC v. LLAWM MALDEN LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this summary process action, 100 Maplewood Street LLC,¹ the landlord, appeals from a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court which vacated a District Court default judgment, and allowed the motions of tenant, LLAWM-Malden, LLC, for relief from that judgment and to dismiss. On appeal, the landlord claims that the tenant was properly served with the summary process complaint, the District Court had personal jurisdiction over the tenant, and that it was error to reverse the decision of the District Court. We affirm.

1. Background. This appeal arises out of a lease between the landlord and the tenant for a retail space located at 888 Eastern Avenue in the city of Malden (city). The tenant intended to use the premises for a liquor store. The lease provided that the tenant would begin paying rent once it received licensing approval from the city and the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (ABCC).

The city initially denied the license, but the ABCC remanded the matter back to the city with a recommendation that the license be granted. Rather than pursuing that recommendation as required by G. L. c. 138, § 67, and reconsidering its denial of the license, the city sought relief in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. A Superior Court judge denied the requested relief because the city had not exhausted its administrative remedies.

Treating the Superior Court judge's decision as tantamount to the city granting a liquor license to the tenant, the landlord demanded that the tenant begin paying rent. Because the tenant did not actually have a license, the tenant understandably did not pay any rent. As a result, the landlord commenced this summary process action. The constable attempted service of the summons and complaint by posting it “on two vacant store fronts that [were] unoccupied” at 888 Eastern Avenue. Subsequently, the landlord obtained a default judgment against the tenant for possession and rent in the amount of $33,006.78.

Unaware of the summary process action, the tenant continued to pursue the liquor license. When the city finally approved the license, the ABCC withheld its issuance due to the tenant's eviction. When the tenant became aware of the default judgment, it sought relief pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), claiming that the judgment was void for lack of service. A District Court judge denied that motion. As stated above, the Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for the tenant.

2. Discussion. Questions of personal jurisdiction are questions of law which we review de novo. See Doucet v. FCA US LLC, 492 Mass. 204, 207 (2023); Sullivan v. Smith, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 746-747 (2016). “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the validity of service of process.” Dumas v. Tenacity Const. Inc., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 114 (2019).

Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (2), as amended, 370 Mass. 918 (1976), service of a complaint on a domestic corporation may be made

“by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to the person in charge of the business at the principal place of business thereof within the Commonwealth, if any; or by delivering such copies to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, provided that any further notice required by law be given.”

Here, by posting the summons and complaint on a vacant and unoccupied storefront, the constable did not deliver those items to an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to the person in charge of the tenant's business. Accordingly, service was defective.

We similarly reject the landlord's claim that service was proper where, by certified mail, the same documents were sent to the tenant's principal place of business in Marshfield. In support, the landlord relies on language in the lease that governs notice in general, but that provision does not include any reference to either party waiving their rights related to service of process.

Even if the notice provision did apply to service of process, there is no evidence that anything was served by certified mail to the undeliverable Marshfield address. The documents the landlord cites to in the record do not include a signed return receipt showing that service took place. Also, a second and subsequent return of service, which the judge described as “suspicious,” shows that copies of the relevant document were mailed “USPS First Class Mail,” not certified mail.

Finally, for more than five weeks prior to the attempted service, the landlord had notice that the tenant could not be reached at the Marshfield address. Contrary to the landlord's claim, any failure on the tenant's part in not updating the Secretary of the Commonwealth with the proper address for the tenant's principal place of business does not absolve the landlord of service of process requirements. Rather, as rule 4 (d) (2) itself provides, “[i]f the person authorized to serve process makes return that after diligent search he can find no person upon whom service can be made, the court may on application of the plaintiff issue an order of notice in the manner and form prescribed by law.” The landlord failed to avail itself of this remedy. On this record, the landlord has not established valid service of process. See Dumas, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 114.

At bottom, as the Appellate Division properly determined, given the landlord's failure to comply with rule 4 (d) (2), the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the tenant, and the default judgment that entered was therefore void. See Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987) (“A judgment is void if the court from which it issues lacked jurisdiction over the parties”). The tenant was entitled to relief under rule 60 (b) (4), and the motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of proper service should have been allowed. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 4 (j), as appearing in 402 Mass. 1401 (1988).²

Decision and order of Appellate Division affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Maplewood misidentified itself in the pleadings as the address of the leasehold, 888 Eastern Ave, LLC.

2.   The tenant requests attorney's fees and double costs pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 498 Mass. 1601 (2026). Under rule 25, “[a]n appeal is frivolous [w]hen the law is well settled, when there can be no reasonable expectation of a reversal” (quotation and citation omitted). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 929 (1997). See Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993). Here, while the landlord toes the line of a frivolous appeal, we conclude that it has not crossed it. The tenant's request is therefore denied.