RACHAEL WALLACE v. BRIAN FORSYTH (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The wife, Rachael Wallace, appeals from a divorce judgment issued by a Probate and Family Court judge. The record before us lacks the wife's financial statements and all but four pages of the trial transcript. On this sparse record, we can discern no error in the judge's calculation of child support and division of the marital estate. Accordingly, we affirm.

1. Child support. The judge calculated child support “using the total of the Husband's base income and current overtime of $137,592 per year.” Recognizing that the “Husband's overtime fluctuates,” the judge required the husband to pay twenty-two percent of his annual employment compensation exceeding $137,592 in additional child support. The wife argues that this ruling is inconsistent with “the totality of the evidence presented at trial.”

This claim is impossible to review, as the wife has not provided us with the totality of the evidence presented at trial, but rather four pages of a trial transcript that is at least 218 pages long. “[I]t is an appellant's duty to produce an appendix containing all portions of the record relevant to the issues raised on appeal.” Lodigiani v. Paré, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 140, 141 n.3 (2023). “That a transcript must be submitted to support a claim that the evidence was insufficient is not some hypertechnical requirement, but a reflection of the fact that resolution of such a claim requires the reviewing court to see the entirety of the evidence that was presented.” Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782 (2003). On this record, we do not know what explanation the husband proffered for his fluctuating income, prior tax returns, and prior financial statements. In the absence of the trial evidence, we have no way of determining whether the judge's decision was inconsistent with that evidence.

2. Division of the marital estate. The lack of a trial transcript similarly hampers our review of the judge's division of the marital estate. For example, we have no way of knowing whether, as the wife asserts, the judge's findings are “contrary to testimony” or that “the evidence presented at trial” shows that “the parties contributed to the marital partnership equally.”

From what little has been provided to us, we discern no error. “The power to make an equitable division of the marital estate is entrusted to the judge's discretion, and we review the decision to ensure the judge properly relied on the statutory factors enumerated in G. L. c. 208, § 34.” Suwwan de Felipe v. El-Youssef Suwwan, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 160 (2025), quoting Openshaw v. Openshaw, 493 Mass. 599, 613-614 (2024). “[D]eterminations as to alimony and property division will not be reversed unless plainly wrong and excessive.” Davae v. Davae, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 61 (2021), quoting Hassey v. Hassey, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 524 (2014).

The judge made factual findings concerning “the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties, [and] the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.” G. L. c. 208, § 34. The judge explained that she did not consider alimony because neither party made it a contested issue on the trial scheduling order.

Because the wife has not provided us with her financial statements, it is impossible to discern what assets the wife retained in the divorce judgment. It appears, however, that the judge roughly divided the marital estate evenly, with the notable exception of the marital home. For the home, the judge provided the husband with $85,000 of the equity and then divided the balance of the equity equally. Considering that this $85,000 represents a gift from the husband's father intended to allow the husband to remain in the home that his great-grandparents purchased and that had remained in the family for generations, this record provides no basis for determining that the division was “plainly wrong and excessive,” Calvin C. v. Amelia A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 723 (2021), quoting Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371 (2011), S.C., 466 Mass. 1015 (2013).

Judgment of divorce nisi affirmed.