EVANGELIA VELENTZAS v. MICHAEL AYERS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The intervener plaintiff, Paul Darcy doing business as P.A. Darcy Co. (Darcy), appeals from an order issued by a judge of the Superior Court denying his special motion to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaims pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirm.

Background. The underlying case involves a dispute between trustees of a sixteen-unit condominium located in Medford. On October 28, 2024, the plaintiffs, former trustees of the condominium board, commenced this action against the current trustees asserting numerous claims arising from the plaintiffs’ disputed removal from the board and the defendants’ alleged mismanagement of the condominium trust. On December 23, 2024, Darcy, a former property manager for the condominium, who had been hired by the plaintiffs and fired by the defendants, successfully moved to intervene in the litigation. Darcy filed a complaint against the defendants on February 21, 2025, claiming breach of contract, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

The defendants filed an answer and counterclaims against Darcy on March 31, 2025, alleging tortious interference, defamation, and other claims not relevant to this appeal. Thereafter, on May 30, 2025, Darcy filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaims on three grounds: (1) failure to state a claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974); (2) the litigation privilege barred the claims; and (3) the defendants lacked authority to sue him because they were not lawful trustees of the condominium board. While that motion was pending, Darcy was ordered to file an amended complaint to include specific allegations against another party, a former property manager, McDonough Property Management, which he did on June 20, 2025. On July 3, 2025, the defendants again filed an answer and reasserted the same counterclaims (including for tortious interference and defamation, among other things). Thereafter, on September 2, 2025, Darcy filed a special motion to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaims pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H. After a hearing on September 11, 2025, a judge of the Superior Court denied Darcy's motion to dismiss filed on May 30, 2025, and his anti-SLAPP motion filed on September 2, 2025. Only the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion is before us in this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion. We review rulings on special motions to dismiss de novo. See Bristol Asphalt, Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass. 539, 562 (2024). However, as in the case here, when a special motion under the anti-SLAPP statute is dismissed because it was not filed within sixty days of service of the complaint, as required by the statute, we review the judge's decision for an abuse of discretion. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H (providing, in relevant part, that judge may consider special motion “at any later time upon terms [the judge] deems proper”).

We conclude that the judge acted within his discretion in determining that Darcy's special motion to dismiss, which was filed more than five months after the service of the defendants’ original counterclaims, was untimely. Contrary to Darcy's assertion, the judge could properly conclude that the operative date for purposes of calculating the sixty-day time period is March 18, 2025, the date on which the original counterclaims were served, and not July 3, 2025, the date on which the defendants served their answer and counterclaims in response to Darcy's amended complaint. Furthermore, the counterclaims at issue are identical in both pleadings. The sole difference between the two is the defendants’ request that any award of interest be calculated “as authorized by the condominium documents” rather than “12% per annum.”

Lastly, as the judge specifically noted, Darcy filed a prior motion to dismiss on multiple grounds in this case before filing his special motion to dismiss, including a motion to dismiss the counterclaims under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) and other grounds before he was required to amend his complaint. The judge reasoned that Darcy should not be permitted to “proceed in such a piecemeal way, moving serially to dismiss this case over an extended period using different vehicles.”

For these reasons, and because the purpose of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute is “to obtain the expeditious dismissal of meritless claims,” Bristol Asphalt, Co., 493 Mass. at 541, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's concluding that the special motion to dismiss was untimely filed and, consequently, denying the motion on that ground.⁴ ,⁵

Order denying special motion to dismiss affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

4.   Given our conclusion, we need not address the remaining arguments advanced by Darcy or the defendants.

5.   Darcy's request for appellate attorney's fees is denied.