COMMONWEALTH v. SEAN PELFREY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Sean N. Pelfrey, appeals from a conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b), after a jury trial in the District Court. He argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty. We affirm.

Background. The jury could have found the following facts. On May 23, 2024, at approximately 9 A.M., the defendant approached the victim inside the Burlington Coat Factory (store) in Natick and asked him for a few dollars. The victim refused to give the defendant any money and, according to the defendant, told the defendant that he had a firearm. The victim then ran into the store's employee-only back room. The defendant pursued the victim with a hatchet in hand. An employee stepped in front of the defendant with his arms out and attempted to defuse the situation. In response, the defendant said that he “needed to do what he has to do.” Upon hearing this statement, the store manager determined the situation to be dangerous, evacuated the employees from the area, had them lock themselves in secure locations, and called the police. When Natick Police Officer James Herbert arrived, he saw the defendant running away from the store. Herbert stopped the defendant and searched his backpack, where he located the hatchet and a machete. Herbert then interviewed the victim and observed he did not have any shoes on and “appeared to be scared or shaken up, based off the incident.”

The defendant testified in his own defense that the hatchet and machete in his backpack were work tools. He claimed that he held the hatchet in self-defense because the victim threatened him first with a broomstick and then with a firearm. The defendant testified that he followed the victim with the hatchet only because he was trying to protect himself.

Sufficiency of the evidence. “The elements of assault by means of a dangerous weapon are that a defendant committed an assault, the defendant intended to commit an assault, and the assault was committed by means of a dangerous weapon.” Commonwealth v. Buttimer, 482 Mass. 754, 767 (2019). “An assault may be perpetrated in either of two ways: an attempted battery or an immediately threatened battery” (footnote omitted). Commonwealth v. Oswaldo O., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 553 (2018). The judge instructed the jury on both theories. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him under either one.

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence “we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 Mass. 303, 307 (2024). Intent is “rarely proved by direct evidence.” Commonwealth v. Rosario, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 640, 643 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Riley, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 721, 730 (2009). “Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989). “An inference drawn from circumstantial evidence ‘need only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or inescapable.’ ” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341 (1977). However, a conviction cannot rest on mere conjecture or surmise, or on inferences piled upon inferences. See Commonwealth v. Chism, 495 Mass. 358, 396 (2025); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 94 (1988).

With respect to the attempted battery theory, the defendant argues that the evidence failed to show his intent to commit a battery or to take any overt step toward doing so. “Under the attempted battery theory, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended to commit a battery, took some overt step toward accomplishing that intended battery, and came reasonably close to doing so.” Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 295 (2002). Here, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant intended to commit a battery because he chased the victim while holding a hatchet, which he explained by saying he “needed to do what he has to do.” The jury could also reasonably infer that the defendant took an overt step toward accomplishing a battery when he followed the victim into the back room, hatchet in hand. Furthermore, the jury could infer that the defendant came reasonably close to accomplishing the battery because the only thing that stopped him was that a store employee intervened.

With respect to the immediately threatened battery theory, the Commonwealth must “prove that the defendant engaged in conduct that a reasonable person would recognize to be threatening, that the defendant intended to place the victim in fear of an imminent battery, and that the victim perceived the threat.” Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 530-531 (2010). Here, the jury could readily find that chasing someone with a hatchet is conduct that a reasonable person would recognize as threatening. Indeed, the store manager found the situation so threatening that she evacuated the employees from the area, had them lock themselves in secure locations, and called the police. As discussed supra, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer the defendant's intent to place the victim in fear of an imminent battery. Furthermore, the evidence supports the jury finding that the victim perceived the threat, which is why the victim fled into a restricted section of the store to escape the defendant. Additionally, when Officer Herbert interviewed the victim after the crime, the victim appeared to be shaken up. The evidence was sufficient under both theories.

Judgment affirmed.