JOHN DOE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO 527653 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming his classification by the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) as a level two offender. On appeal, Doe claims that the hearing examiner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, was based on an abuse of discretion, and was arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

We “review a judge's consideration of an agency decision de novo.” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019) (Doe No. 523391). “An agency decision should be set aside only if a court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law” (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 88. We give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency” (citation omitted). Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2021) (Doe No. 6969). “It is within the province of the hearing officer to assess the reliability of such evidence and to draw all reasonable inferences” therefrom. Doe No. 523391, supra. In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we consider “whether the decision was reasonable” (citation omitted). Doe No. 6969, supra. For a decision to be supported by substantial evidence, it must be based on “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).

Here, Doe contends that the hearing examiner's application of 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3) (2016) (factor 3) (adult offender with child victim) in his overall classification determination was an abuse of discretion. Doe further claims that the hearing examiner erred in failing to credit the victim's statements to the police that Doe, who was twenty-five years old at the time of the rapes, was unaware that the victim was thirteen years old. We disagree.

The evidence supports the hearing examiner's application of factor 3. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3) (2016) (defining “child victim” as “a victim younger than 16 years old”). When Doe committed the offenses, he was twenty-five years old and the child victim was thirteen years old. Moreover, because the child victim had known of Doe “for years,” as she would see him at parties and he would socialize with her friends, it was reasonable for the hearing examiner to conclude that Doe would have also known the child victim when she was as young as ten or eleven years old. This evidence sufficed to support the hearing examiner's finding that Doe targeted a child victim. Cf. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 528042 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 496 Mass. 437, 443 (2025).

The hearing examiner also acted within his discretion in not crediting the child victim's statements that Doe only learned of her true age after the rapes. Originally, the child victim denied that she and Doe had a relationship. After being confronted with evidence that Doe had raped her, the child victim acknowledged the rapes, yet she told police she did not want Doe to “get in trouble.” To that end, she changed her account of their relationship several times, at different points claiming she was dating the same person that Doe had been dating and that she was dating Doe. The hearing examiner's finding that the child victim “had a motive to continue to lie to the police, which was to minimize the situation and any potential consequences [Doe] might face” was supported by the evidence. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 291554 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 214 (2015). Accordingly, the hearing examiner permissibly relied on factor 3 in his overall determination that Doe presented a moderate risk of reoffense and dangerousness.

Finally, we see no merit in Doe's contention that the hearing examiner used a cursory checklist approach. To be sure, employing a “checklist” approach is improper. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 11204 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 576 (2020). Here, however, the hearing examiner tied specific facts to each of the factors and properly explained the weight he gave to each factor. The examiner's consideration of the evidence and application to the aggravating and mitigating factors was individualized and specific, and his corresponding determination was supported by substantial evidence and within his discretion.

Judgment affirmed.