COMMONWEALTH v. JOHNNY GRIFFIN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial in the Superior Court, a jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery on a family or household member, aggravated assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, violation of an abuse prevention order, and witness intimidation. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing global positioning system (GPS) monitoring for a period of three years as a condition of probation, (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant committed witness intimidation or that he caused serious bodily injury to the victim on February 23, 2023,¹ and (3) the judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence that the defendant committed an assault and battery causing serious bodily injury on June 9, 2021, and that he violated an abuse prevention order on February 22, 2023.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts that the jury could have found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and reserving certain facts for later discussion. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).

The defendant met the victim in 2019, they began dating, and they married in 2021. At trial, the victim testified that the defendant attacked her in 2020 and 2021 and that both attacks resulted in physical injuries. In 2022, the victim filed for divorce; in the same year, she obtained an abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A against the defendant that remained in effect through February 26, 2024.

On February 22, 2023, the defendant saw the victim while she was driving and asked her for a ride. The victim agreed. During the ride, the defendant began screaming at the victim. When she asked him to get out of the car, the defendant refused and “attacked [her] from the passenger side ․ punching and swinging.” The victim got out of the car and the defendant “threw [her] to the ground like a ragdoll ․ [and] hit [her] with a closed fist.” As a result of the attack, the victim suffered multiple bruises on her head, contusions to her face, a laceration on her hand, a concussion, a hematoma to her left eye “preventing the eye from [being] opened,” and swelling around both eyes.

The defendant was indicted on six charges. While in jail awaiting trial, the defendant sent the victim a letter. The victim also testified that, before he sent the letter, the defendant telephoned her from the jail multiple times, as frequently as “[ten] times a day, back to back sometime[s].”

A jury trial took place over four days in February 2024. The jury convicted the defendant of (1) assault and battery on a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (September 4, 2020, incident); (2) aggravated assault and battery causing serious bodily injury (February 22, 2023, incident), G. L. c. 265, § 13A (b) (i); (3) violation of an abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7; and (4) witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B. The jury acquitted the defendant of the two other charges, aggravated assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (b) (i) (June 9, 2021, incident); and aggravated assault and battery, violation of restraining order, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (b) (iii).

On February 20, 2024, the judge sentenced the defendant to from three to five years in State prison. His sentence on the witness intimidation charge included a five-year term of probation that started on his commitment, and the sentence on the assault and battery on a family or household member charge included a three-year term of supervised probation on his release. One condition of the defendant's probation after release was that he be subject to GPS monitoring.

Discussion. 1. GPS monitoring. To determine whether GPS monitoring is a reasonable condition of probation, a judge must conduct a balancing test that weighs the government's interest in rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the public against the intrusion on the defendant's privacy. See Commonwealth v. Govan, 496 Mass. 124, 129 (2025); Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 700-701 (2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020). A judge assesses the reasonableness of the condition based on the totality of the circumstances of a “particular defendant,” and no one factor is dispositive (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Arnold, 496 Mass. 805, 810 (2025). Further, “a judge determining the reasonableness of a GPS monitoring condition must consider, among all the circumstances, the duration of monitoring.” Id. at 811. We conduct an independent review of the judge's determination, but defer to the judge's findings of fact, absent clear error. See id. at 809; Commonwealth v. Streed, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 606, 608 (2025).

The defendant argues that the judge conducted an insufficient balancing test and erroneously determined that the three-year duration of the GPS monitoring ² was a reasonable condition of his probation. We are not persuaded.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing (hearing) shows that the defendant benefited from a robust argument by defense counsel and the filing of a sentencing memorandum. The judge actively engaged with counsel and the defendant, asked questions seeking additional information for his consideration, and inquired about the defendant's recommendation for community supervision after his release, to which defense counsel responded that the defendant “would be very successful with community supervision, I believe, and I don't think that would be an unreasonable result.”

The record also provides ample support for our conclusion that the judge carefully considered the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the victim and the public against the intrusion on the defendant's privacy, and the circumstances of the defendant's convictions, including the severity of the crime and his violation of the abuse prevention order issued to the victim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 722, cert. denied, 589 U.S. 977 (2019) (“although probationers do not give up all expectations of privacy while on probation, their expectations are significantly diminished”). First, the hearing occurred immediately following the trial, where the judge heard evidence that the defendant violently assaulted the victim over a period of years, violated the abuse prevention order multiple times, threatened the victim, and knew where the victim lived. Second, during the hearing, the judge reviewed a letter from the victim that included “a lot of information ․ about how the crimes ha[d] affected [her] and what response she has had to take.” The judge also heard from the victim's family members, one of whom spoke of how the defendant's actions could have killed the victim.

Next, the judge considered the defendant's prior criminal record. The defendant's record included convictions of multiple counts of armed robbery, a seventeen-year sentence in Federal prison as an “armed career criminal,” and previous abuse prevention orders against him initiated by two other women. When the judge asked the defendant about his supervised release from Federal prison, the defendant admitted that he had violated the release on two occasions. Throughout the hearing the judge stated that supervised release had not deterred the defendant and that he had violated the terms of his release when he assaulted the victim. Finally, we note that while not dispositive, at the conclusion of the lengthy hearing, the judge explicitly announced that he “did do the balancing test and concluded that the Commonwealth's interest in rehabilitation and protection of the public, namely [the victim], outweighs [the defendant's] privacy interest.”

We conclude that the judge properly balanced the interests of the Commonwealth and the defendant in imposing GPS conditions, and, where the defendant had violated the victim's abuse prevention order and was undeterred by the conditions of his previous supervised release such that he threatened and violently attacked the victim, the judge reasonably imposed GPS surveillance for the entire duration of the defendant's probation. There was no error.

Without citing any relevant authority, the defendant also contends that the GPS condition is unreasonable because his probation already includes a “stay away” order and the record lacks evidence showing how the GPS would assist in enforcement. This argument is without merit. See Govan, 496 Mass. at 133 (“it does not follow -- nor is it the case -- that GPS monitoring does not meaningfully advance the Commonwealth's legitimate interest in enforcing ‘stay away’ and ‘no contact’ orders”). See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 494 Mass. 723, 736 (2024) (“In light of the extensive abuse suffered by the victim and the evidence that she continues to live in fear of the defendant, the Commonwealth had a significant interest in enforcing an exclusion zone to protect her from further victimization”).

2. Sufficiency. a. Standard of review. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 674, 676 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547 (2025). “The inferences that support a conviction ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ ” Commonwealth v. Erler, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 157 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 162 (2019).

b. Witness intimidation. To prove witness intimidation, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant “(1) willfully; (2) threatened, intimidated, or harassed; (3) a witness ‘in a criminal proceeding of any type; (4) with the intent to impede or interfere with a criminal investigation or proceeding’ ” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Gardner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 304 (2023). The defendant's words need not be “expressly intimidating, threatening, or harassing, in order to fall within the meaning of intimidation” (quotation and citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Carvalho, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 840, 845 (2016); rather, “the jury may consider the context in which the allegedly threatening statement was made and all of the surrounding circumstances” (citation omitted). Id. at 846.

The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict because the letter that he sent the victim from jail did not (1) actually discourage the victim from testifying at trial, or (2) demonstrate an intent to intimidate or instill fear in the victim. Addressing the defendant's first argument, the witness need not refuse to testify for the defendant to be found guilty of witness intimidation. See Carvalho, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 845-846 (witness intimidation convictions affirmed where witness testified at trial to circumstances of intimidation).

Second, the evidence amply supported inferences that the defendant willfully threatened the victim with the intent to prevent her from testifying at his trial. See Commonwealth v. Theogene, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 646, 652-653 (2026) (“If conflicting inferences can be drawn from the evidence, ‘it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province’ ” [citation omitted]).

Here, the letter stated, in part, “[Y]ou follow through [with] this nonsense and I will tell the truth about everything I know about you crimanally [sic],” and asked, “[H]ow you gonna turn state witness on me?” The letter concluded with the defendant stating, “[Y]ou do what you think is best and I'll do what I can in response to it.” The letter was admitted in evidence, and the victim testified to its contents. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant sent the letter intending to prevent the victim from testifying against him at trial. See Gardner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 304-306 (sufficient evidence of witness intimidation based on letters from incarcerated defendant to victim, toward whom defendant had abusive and controlling relationship).

3. Motion to dismiss. The defendant's remaining claim requires little discussion. The defendant argues that he suffered undue prejudice when the judge denied his motion to dismiss and allowed the Commonwealth to present evidence on two counts of which he was ultimately acquitted at trial. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the presentation of the evidence prejudiced the jury and resulted in the guilty verdict on the four remaining counts. Because the defendant's claim is not supported by any relevant authority, nor is the motion to dismiss provided within the record, this claim does not rise to the level of appellate argument required under Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). See Commonwealth v. Gray, 423 Mass. 293, 297 (1996). To the extent that we understand the defendant's argument, we discern no error.

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the defendant initially argued that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of the victim's serious bodily injury at trial, the defendant conceded at oral argument that the evidence was sufficient to prove serious bodily injury based on impairment of an organ. We therefore need not review this issue further.

2.   While the defendant, in his brief, appears to broadly argue that the GPS condition was unreasonable, he clarified at oral argument that his specific challenge is to the three-year duration of the GPS monitoring.