E.A. v. A.N.N. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, A.N.N., appeals from a District Court judge's issuance of a harassment prevention order, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E. The defendant argues that the judge unlawfully granted the order against him without sufficient evidence.¹ We affirm.

Background. On January 29, 2025, the defendant appeared in the District Court for an arraignment on a disorderly conduct charge involving the plaintiff, E.A. The plaintiff was present at the arraignment and filed a petition seeking a harassment prevention order (order or 258E order) against the defendant. In her affidavit in support of the order, the plaintiff stated that she and the defendant were friends in high school and that she had not seen him in almost ten years. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant had been trying to contact her “via several channels,” including making calls to her and calling her mother and her friend to ask for the plaintiff's contact information. She also asserted that the defendant attempted to “friend” her on social media and that he went to her house after having no contact for “several years.”

The judge explained to the defendant that the plaintiff was requesting a 258E order that, if issued, would require him to stay away from her and refrain from any contact with her. The judge told the defendant, “You can oppose the order and we can have a hearing now to decide whether or not the order should issue or you can agree to it if you wish. I'm not going to force you to do either of them.” The defendant responded that he did not plan on ever seeing the plaintiff again. The judge then asked the defendant, “So do you have any objection to the issuance of this order.” The defendant responded, “No, your honor,” and the judge issued the order for one year. The judge explained to the defendant that he could not have any further contact with the plaintiff and asked the defendant if he had any questions. The defendant stated that he did not. On August 29, 2025, the defendant filed a motion to terminate the order, which the judge denied on September 2, 2025.

Discussion. The defendant argues that the judge unlawfully granted the order without sufficient evidence and that the judge should have granted his “initial appeal.” We are not persuaded.

Because the defendant failed to object to the judge's issuance of the order in the District Court, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal.² See Palmer v. Murphy, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 338 (1997) (“Objections, issues, or claims ․ that have not been raised at the trial level are deemed generally to have been waived on appeal”). The judge explained to the defendant that he could have a hearing to decide whether the order should issue, but the defendant told the judge that he did not object to the issuance of the order. Because the defendant raises the issue for the first time on appeal, the matter is waived.³ See Diaz v. Gomez, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 63 (2012) (defendant waived objection when he failed to raise claim in trial court).

Order entered January 29, 2025, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant also makes several other arguments that do not rise to the level of appellate argument and are thus waived. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

2.   The defendant's letter to the judge, motion to terminate, and motion for a retrial were insufficient to preserve the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 708-709 (2005) (issue first raised in motion to reconsider may be preserved for appellate review provided motion was filed within period allotted for taking appeal).

3.   Ordinarily, in reviewing the issuance of a contested harassment prevention order, we consider whether the judge erred in finding “by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the defendant had committed ‘[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.’ ” Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2016), quoting Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 60 (2014).