COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN ST GERMAINE (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, John St. Germaine, was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of (1) trafficking in cocaine in an amount of at least thirty-six grams, but less than 100 grams, pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2); (2) possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and (3) receipt of a firearm with defaced serial number, pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 11C.¹ On appeal, he argues only that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Specifically, he claims that the evidence showed neither physical proximity nor a logical relation between his possession of a firearm and his drug trafficking activities. Seeing sufficient evidence in the record, we affirm.

Background. We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). Police executed a search warrant at the defendant's residence. The search focused on two rooms on the second floor of the house -- a den and a bedroom. The officers began their search in the den, which was located to the left of a stairway landing. In the den, the officers found extensive drug trafficking evidence, such as drugs, cash, and ledgers detailing drug transactions.

Upon finishing his search in the den, one of the officers searched the bedroom on the other side of the stairway landing, across from the den. In the bedroom, the officer lifted up a mattress and found a handgun with a partially defaced serial number, and near it a fourteen-round high-capacity magazine loaded with nine bullets. Officers also found $960 in cash inside a box on the bedroom closet floor. In total, the officers seized more than ninety grams of cocaine and $5,149 in cash.

Later, at the police station, the defendant told officers that he wished he knew they were going to execute a search warrant at his home, as he would have told them about the firearm under the mattress. He also stated that he knew selling narcotics could be lucrative and wanted to raise money to send his daughter to nursing school.

A jury convicted the defendant of all charges relevant to this appeal.

Discussion. The defendant argues that because the firearm and the drug evidence were found in separate rooms of the house and the firearm was not readily accessible,² there was an insufficient nexus between the firearm and commission of a felony. We are not persuaded.

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677.

“Some nexus between the felony and the firearm” is required to convict a defendant under G. L. c. 265, § 18B. Commonwealth v. Hines, 449 Mass. 183, 190 (2007). Nexus includes both physical proximity and logical relation. Id. “The existence of the requisite nexus necessarily will be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. In evaluating whether a sufficient nexus exists, we also refer to “certain pragmatic factors,” id. at 189, discussed more fully below.

1. Physical proximity. The defendant attempts to distinguish his case from Hines, 449 Mass. at 188-190, and other cases by asserting that nexus requires the firearm to be in the same room as the drug supply. However, those cases do not create a requirement that the items in question must be found in the same room. Instead, they demonstrate that the items being found in the same room is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish physical proximity. See Hines, supra (sufficient nexus where firearm found in same room as drug supply); United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 31, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2004) (sufficient nexus where firearm and drug supply found in adjacent rooms, separated by curtain).

Here, the firearm and drug evidence were found in different rooms of the house, but those rooms were a relatively short distance apart, separated by only a stairway landing and under the same roof. A jury could also infer that the $960 in cash found in the same room as the firearm were proceeds from the defendant's drug trafficking activities. We see sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that the firearm and the items associated with drug trafficking were physically proximate. See Hines, 449 Mass. at 190.

2. Logical relation. Nexus also requires a logical relation between the firearm and the nature of the felony itself. See Hines, 449 Mass. at 190. To help prove nexus, the Commonwealth offered the following police expert testimony at trial:

“[W]here there are drugs, there's also guns when we're talking about people distributing drugs. Guns are a form of protection. Drug dealers have to protect their stash or their drugs, protect their money, not only from potential buyers, but also other drug dealers who they might be in competition with. So drug dealers do get robbed. We do know that. So, you know, guns are a way to -- it's a form of protection for people.”

As noted in Hines, “drug offenses frequently involve drug dealers being armed and that, in many cases, shootings and killings occur when a drug dealer is confronted by police, when a drug deal goes ‘bad,’ or when others try to steal the drugs.” Hines, 449 Mass. at 189.

Here, the defendant admitted to knowing about the gun and to trafficking drugs to pay for his daughter's education. He implied there was a logical relation between his firearm possession and drug trafficking when he told officers that he wished he knew they were going to execute a search warrant so that he could have told them about the firearm. The firearm's serial number was partially obliterated, which could lead to a reasonable inference of its use in illegal activity such as the defendant's drug trafficking. The police expert testimony and the defendant's admissions sufficiently establish a logical relation between the defendant's gun possession and drug trafficking activities. See Hines, 449 Mass. at 190.

3. Pragmatic factors. “[C]ertain pragmatic factors” can be relevant in evaluating whether sufficient nexus exists between the firearm and drug evidence. Hines, 449 Mass. at 189. These “nonexclusive” factors consider “whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found” (citation omitted). Id.

Here, the firearm, although unloaded, was found together with a partially loaded high-capacity magazine. The firearm was a handgun, with its serial number defaced, so that it could not be traced back to the owner. The jury convicted the defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm, although the conviction was later vacated pursuant to Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024), and the charge dismissed, making this factor of little value in determining nexus. The type of drug activity was not mere use, but trafficking, as shown by the amounts of cocaine and cash recovered. The time and circumstances under which the firearm was found were during the execution of a warrant to search for evidence of drug activity. Together, these pragmatic factors would support a finding of sufficient nexus between the firearm and items associated with the defendant's drug trafficking activities.

4. The Commonwealth's closing argument. The defendant claims that the Commonwealth “understated ․ [its] burden of proof for the crime of possession of a firearm during a felony.” The argument is without merit. The Commonwealth's statement, that firearm possession while committing a felony is sufficient for conviction, was consistent with the judge's instruction, which in turn was consistent with the statute. See G. L. c. 265, § 18B (“while in the commission of”). The defendant did not object to the argument or the instruction, nor did he request a more detailed instruction addressing physical proximity or logical relation.

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, there was sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find a nexus between the defendant's possession of a firearm and his drug trafficking activities.

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant was found guilty of other offenses, as well. Those convictions were subsequently vacated and the indictments dismissed; therefore they are not a part of this appeal.

2.   The defendant's brief claims that a finding of nexus requires the firearm to be “readily accessible.” He argues that because the firearm was kept in the middle of the mattress, instead of between a bed frame and the mattress, it was difficult to access, and therefore not “reasonabl[y] proximate.” Yet he neither cites any case law establishing “readily accessible” as a per se factor to find sufficient nexus, nor persuades us that we should recognize one. Regardless, a jury could have found from a photograph in evidence that the firearm here was relatively close to one edge of the mattress. See Hines, 449 Mass. at 188 (noting jury warranted in finding nexus where “readily accessible” firearm was stored inside locked safe).