COMMONWEALTH v. MARK ROSENFIELD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted of violating a harassment prevention order. See G. L. c. 258E, § 9. On appeal he argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he violated the order. We affirm.

Background. The defendant's neighbor obtained a harassment prevention order against the defendant in February 2023. At the time, the defendant and his then-wife, Tara Costa,¹ were living together in a house owned by Costa. The neighbor and her partner lived in an abutting property. The harassment prevention order required the defendant, among other things, to remain a certain distance away from the neighbor and her property.

In the preceding months, the defendant had “essentially stalk[ed]” the neighbor and her partner. For example, the defendant repeatedly “[came] up to agitate and aggravate and yell and harass” them, “wait[ed] outside in a car hauler,” “hid[ ] for [them] to come out of the house,” and “bl[ew] an air horn” while they were in their hot tub. Also, in September 2022, the defendant made a comment to the neighbor that “he was going to install cameras all over his property so that [the neighbor and her partner] had no privacy.”

In July 2023, while the harassment prevention order was in effect, the neighbor saw a man installing three cameras on Costa's property,² all pointed at the neighbor's house. The defendant and Costa were with the man when he installed the cameras. One camera was placed fifteen feet high in a tree and pointed directly at the neighbor's hot tub and bathroom window. At this height the camera overlooked a ten-foot-high “privacy wall” that the neighbor had installed in April 2023.

Discussion. On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). “[T]he evidence relied on to establish a defendant's guilt may be entirely circumstantial.” Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 544 (2010). Moreover, “[t]he inferences that support a conviction need only be reasonable and possible ․ not necessary or inescapable” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 413 (2023).

To convict a defendant of violating a harassment prevention order, the Commonwealth must prove “that a court had issued such an order; that the order was in effect on the date that the violation allegedly occurred; that the defendant knew the pertinent terms of the order; and that the defendant violated the order” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Kurko, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 719, 721 (2019). Here, the defendant challenges only the last element. In particular, although he does not seriously dispute that the cameras intruded on the neighbor's property, he argues that, because he did not personally install the cameras, he did not violate the harassment prevention order. We disagree.

“Where the evidence fairly raises an issue as to the defendant's intent either to direct, or acquiesce in, conduct of a third party, there must be proof that the defendant at least intended the act that resulted in the violation [of the protective order].” Commonwealth v. Collier, 427 Mass. 385, 389 (1998). Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence here was sufficient to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent. Just a few months before the neighbor obtained the harassment prevention order, the defendant threatened that he was going to install cameras on his property so that she would have no privacy. Consistent with this threat, and inconsistent with any discernible security purpose, one of the cameras was pointed into the neighbor's yard, directly at her bathroom window and hot tub. The defendant was also present when the cameras were installed. The judge could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that the defendant intended or shared the intent to do an act (installing the cameras) that constituted a violation of the harassment prevention order. See id. at 389-390.

We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the judge's inferences were unreasonable because Costa was the property owner and so the defendant could not have directed her to install the cameras. As discussed, the circumstantial evidence allowed the judge to find that the defendant intended that the cameras be installed. Even if conflicting inferences were possible, it was for the judge as fact finder to resolve them, and she was free to reject the inferences suggested by the defense. See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial the neighbor testified that she lived next to “Tara Costa and her -- I don't know what to call it at the time, separated husband, Mark Rosenfield.”

2.   The neighbor testified that the unnamed man was Costa's stepfather, brother, or mentor.