A.P. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff foster mother, A.P., appeals from a Superior Court judgment that affirmed, under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), a decision of a Department of Children and Families (DCF) hearing officer. That decision in turn upheld DCF staff's decision to “support,” under G. L. c. 119, § 51B (§ 51B), an allegation that A.P. had neglected various needs of her foster child, Beth (a pseudonym). Because the hearing officer failed to take into account critical evidence, we vacate her decision and remand the matter for further proceedings.

1. Standard of review. We review the hearing officer's decision to determine, among other things, whether DCF's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Cobble v. Commissioner of Dep't of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 390 (1999). Our review must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the supporting evidence's weight.” Id.

Here, the hearing officer based her decision on three alleged instances of neglect, yet she did not address significant evidence that was quite favorable to A.P. regarding two of those instances. We emphasize that this unaddressed evidence was offered by DCF itself -- by DCF witnesses whom the hearing officer appeared to credit fully. Thus, our decision to remand does not rest on second-guessing the hearing officer's credibility determinations as to A.P., as “it is for the agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the credibility of witnesses.” Cobble, 430 Mass. at 393 n.8.

2. Online schooling. First, the hearing officer implicitly found that A.P. neglected Beth by “enrolling [her] in an online school, despite the recommendations made by [DCF] and [Beth's] prior educational program opposing online schooling.” The adoption social worker (ASW) testified, however, that, while DCF expressed concerns, “[A.P.] wanted to move forward with the online school program. And once [Beth] was placed within that home, it was determined that [A.P] had that choice to move forward with that.” The hearing officer's summary of the ASW's testimony mentioned only DCF's opposition to online schooling, and not ASW's statement that DCF determined A.P. “had that choice to move forward with that.”

If the ASW was correct in testifying that DCF, despite its opposition, eventually acquiesced to A.P.s enrolling Beth in an online school, it is difficult to see how DCF could later find that same conduct to constitute neglect, without first giving clear notice to A.P. that its position had changed. In the administrative hearing context, just as in care and protection and termination of parental rights cases, “[t]roublesome facts ․ are to be faced rather than ignored” (citation omitted). Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 11204 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 575 (2020), quoting Adoption of Stuart, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 382 (1995). The hearing officer must resolve this issue.¹

3. Pressure to be baptized. The hearing officer found that Beth “expressed not feeling safe within the [foster] home” because she was “feeling pressured to be baptized.” Yet the hearing officer also found that A.P. had given “notice to [DCF] prior to [the foster] placement [that Beth] would need to be baptized to remain in placement.” This finding was supported by a DCF supervisor's testimony that A.P. and her husband, before Beth was placed with them, had made clear that Beth would need to be baptized for them to adopt her. The supervisor further testified that, although the clinical team had warned A.P. that Beth might not accept being baptized, “it's likely that [Beth] told the foster family that she would agree to be baptized so that she could have a family.”

In finding that A.P.’s pressuring Beth to be baptized constituted neglect of Beth's emotional needs, the hearing officer failed to address the “troublesome facts” that (1) DCF and Beth were on notice of A.P.’s commitment to having Beth baptized, (2) DCF nevertheless placed Beth in A.P.’s home, and (3) Beth likely agreed to be baptized. Again, it is difficult to see how DCF could later find that A.P.’s pressuring Beth to be baptized constituted neglect, without either Beth or DCF having first given notice to A.P. that they had changed their minds and that further pressure was unwelcome and inappropriate. The hearing officer must resolve this issue.

4. Other issues. In light of these unanswered questions about two of the three instances of neglect relied on by the hearing officer, we will not speculate about whether the third instance -- involving two derogatory statements allegedly made by A.P. and heard by Beth -- would be enough on its own for DCF to properly support the allegation of neglect. Nor need we address A.P.’s claim that DCF's decision interferes with her free exercise of religion. That claim is not ripe for decision where, among other reasons, important facts remain unresolved.

A.P.’s claim that DCF's reliance on hearing officers it employs is a per se violation of her right to a fair and independent decision maker is meritless. See, e.g., Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 345 (2013), and cases cited (absent showing of substantial risk of bias, “having the same agency responsible for adjudication and enforcement does not offend due process”).

Conclusion. We vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Superior Court for entry of a new judgment remanding the matter to DCF for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We remind DCF that hearing officers, like judges, should “avoid simply recounting the testimony of the witnesses [but] should instead state the facts they find occurred.” Commonwealth v. Demos D., 497 Mass. 78, 89 n.8 (2026), quoting Commonwealth v. Mosso, 496 Mass. 768, 771 n.5 (2025).