JEAN HARMEL JEROME v. QUIRK CHEVROLET INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, the plaintiffs, Jean Harmel Jerome and MarieCarmel Sanon-Jerome, appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Quirk Chevrolet, Inc. (Quirk). We affirm.

Background. The evidence at trial permitted the trial judge to find the following facts. In June 2015, the plaintiffs bought a 2015 Chevrolet Suburban from Quirk. In connection with that transaction, they each signed credit applications. They signed two versions of a motor vehicle purchase contract (exhibits 1 & 1A). They also signed two versions of a retail installment sale contract (exhibits 2 & 2A), which was the contract with the financing bank, Santander Consumer USA, Inc.² The plaintiffs took possession of the vehicle. Because it had mechanical problems, Jerome could not use the vehicle to drive for a rideshare service, and the plaintiffs defaulted on the retail installment sale contract. In June 2016, the bank repossessed the vehicle.

Quirk's operations manager testified based on his knowledge of Quirk's normal business practices, although he had not personally conducted the June 2015 transaction. He explained that the two versions of the motor vehicle purchase contract for the plaintiffs’ transaction were nearly identical, except that one (exhibit 1) listed a total price of $61,660 and a trade allowance of $35,200, and the other (exhibit 1A) listed a total price of $50,000.04 and a trade allowance of $23,540.04. The operations manager noted that on both versions the amount to be financed, down payment amount, and fee charges were the same. Both versions listed the Massachusetts sales tax as $3,112.44, which was supposed to be calculated by applying the 6.25 percent rate to the total price, after adjustments not relevant here. From his review of the documents, the operations manager explained that the sales tax amount had been calculated incorrectly on the first motor vehicle purchase contract (exhibit 1). As a result the other motor vehicle purchase contract (exhibit 1A) was generated, on which Quirk reduced both the total price and the trade allowance to arrive at the same sales tax amount. Similarly, the two versions of the retail installment sale contract had the same amount financed, monthly payment, term, and interest rate, but on the second version (exhibit 2A) the total price was adjusted from $61,660 to $50,000.04 to correlate with exhibit 1A, the correct version of the motor vehicle purchase contract.

On February 7, 2020, the plaintiffs filed their Superior Court complaint against Quirk, alleging, as amended in August 2020, counts for common-law fraud and misrepresentation, unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of express or implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

Quirk filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort claims and the four-year statute of limitations for G. L. c. 93A claims. A Superior Court judge (motion judge) granted summary judgment to Quirk on the claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but denied summary judgment on the remaining claims against Quirk.

The case was tried in a bench trial before a different Superior Court judge (trial judge). On a special verdict form, the trial judge found that the plaintiffs knew or should reasonably have known about their fraud claims against Quirk prior to February 7, 2017, and about their G. L. c. 93A claims prior to February 7, 2016. The judge also found that Quirk did not make an intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, breach a contract, violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing, or unjustly enrich itself. Judgment entered for Quirk.³ The plaintiffs appeal.

Discussion. The plaintiffs argue that the trial judge “incorrectly decided” their claims against Quirk. They contend that Quirk made intentional fraudulent misrepresentations, on which the plaintiffs reasonably relied; violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing, causing the plaintiffs damages; and was unjustly enriched. The plaintiffs also implicitly argue that the statute of limitations does not bar their claims. Because the trial judge's conclusions are supported by the record, we are not persuaded.

Pursuant to Rule 20(8)(a) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018), the parties “agree[d] to waive ․ detailed findings by the judge in a bench trial,” and the trial judge “answer[ed] special questions on the elements of each claim, at a level of detail comparable to a special jury verdict form pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 49 (a)[, 365 Mass. 812 (1974)].” See Rule 20(2)(h) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018). In these circumstances, we “review to determine whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [prevailing party]” (quotations and citation omitted). K & K Dev., Inc. v. Andrews, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 344 (2023). Unlike this court, the trial judge had the opportunity to view the witnesses as they testified, and could base his credibility determinations on those observations. See Aspell v. Raad, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 296 (2025) (“ ‘[T]he credibility of the witnesses rests within the purview of the trial judge’ and is entitled to deference” [citation omitted]).

As to the statute of limitations issue, Jerome testified that he first learned of the discrepancies between the versions of the contracts after he filed a complaint about the transaction with the Attorney General's office in late 2016 or early 2017 and subsequently received from it the two versions of the motor vehicle purchase contract (exhibits 1 & 1A) that contained different amounts. The evidence at trial, however, permitted the trial judge to find that exhibits 1 and 1A, both dated June 23, 2015, bore Jerome and Sanon-Jerome's signatures. This evidence supported the judge's conclusion that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about their fraud claims prior to February 7, 2017, and about their G. L. c. 93A claims prior to February 7, 2016.

As to the plaintiffs’ argument that the discrepancies between exhibits 1 and 1A and between exhibits 2 and 2A constituted misrepresentations by Quirk, the evidence permitted the trial judge to find that those discrepancies were not misrepresentations. The trial judge could credit the operations manager's testimony that because the sales tax had been calculated incorrectly on exhibits 1 and 2, Quirk reduced both the total price and the trade allowance to reach the same sales tax amount, and generated exhibits 1A and 2A to reflect those recalculations.

The plaintiffs argue that the trial judge should have found that Quirk falsified their credit applications. The credit application forms (exhibits 6 & 7), which were signed by each of the plaintiffs, stated that Jerome was earning $6,500 monthly and Sanon-Jerome $80,000 annually. In contrast, the plaintiffs each testified that they told Quirk that Sanon-Jerome was unemployed. The trial judge was not required to believe the plaintiffs’ testimony, which was contradicted by the documentary evidence. The trial judge's answers on the special verdict form in Quirk's favor shows that he did not.⁴

In these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the judge's answers on the verdict form under the standard set forth in K & K Dev., Inc., 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 344.⁵

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Santander Consumer USA, Inc., and its parent company, Santander Consumer USA Holdings, Inc., were named as defendants in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. After summary judgment was allowed in favor of those defendants on most claims, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims against them. On appeal, the plaintiffs make no argument about the claims against those defendants and we do not discuss them further.

3.   Neither the docket entries nor the judgment appealed from were included in the record appendix, as required by Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1) (A) (iii) and (v) (d), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).

4.   To the extent that we do not discuss other arguments raised by the plaintiffs, they “have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion.” Commonwealth v. Sosa, 493 Mass. 104, 124 n.12 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

5.   In our discretion, Quirk's request for appellate attorney's fees and double costs pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 15, and Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 498 Mass. 1601 (2026), is denied.