PAUL JONES v. MONTACHUSETTS REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Paul Jones, brought this action in the Superior Court alleging violations of G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act), G. L. c. 149, § 148B (independent contractor statute), and G. L. c. 151, §§ 1, 1A (minimum wage and overtime statutes), by the defendants Montachusetts Regional Transit Authority (MART) and several of its employees. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), on the basis that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's claims. We affirm.

Background. We accept as true the facts drawn from the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. See Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 250 (2021). MART is a regional transit authority established pursuant to G. L. c. 161B that provides public transportation via contracts with vendors in north central Massachusetts. One such vendor is the Commonwealth Community Recovery Division, Inc. (CCRD). The plaintiff worked as the director, dispatcher, and driver for CCRD to provide non-emergency medical transportation.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was misclassified as an independent contractor and should have been classified as an employee of MART, and due to his misclassification, he was deprived of back pay and other financial benefits under G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act), and G. L. c. 151, §§ 1, 1A (minimum wage and overtime statutes).² A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for all but one of the individual defendants, finding that they did not exercise sufficient managerial responsibilities over the plaintiff to warrant individual liability under the Wage Act. Another Superior Court judge (motion judge) then granted the remaining defendants, Khan and MART, judgment on the pleadings, ruling that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's claims.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. Whether MART has waived sovereign immunity presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 46 (2013). “We accept as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff[’s] complaint as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them.” Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014).

2. Sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the Commonwealth, as well as its agencies and instrumentalities, cannot be sued in Massachusetts courts without its consent. “Among other functions, [sovereign immunity] ‘protects the public treasury against [depletion by] money judgments.’ ” Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370, 373 (2012), quoting New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp., 424 Mass. 344, 351 (1997). Suit can only occur “in the manner and to the extent expressed [by] statute.” Smith, supra, quoting Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 601 (2010).

“The rules of construction governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are stringent.” Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981). “Consent to suit must be expressed by the terms of a statute, or appear by necessary implication from them.” C & M Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392 (1985), quoting Woodbridge, supra.

As a threshold matter, the plaintiff contends that the defendants have waived the defense of sovereign immunity by waiting more than four years to raise it. We recognize that, for sovereign immunity to have its full effect, it ought to be asserted at the earliest possible opportunity. See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 316 (2002), quoting Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 688 (1999) (“[T]he right to immunity from suit is effectively ‘lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice’ ”). However, because sovereign immunity challenges whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, it can be asserted at any point. See Donahue v. Trial Court, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183 (2021). See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (1), as appearing in 450 Mass. 1403 (2008) (defenses that are waived if not asserted does not include subject matter jurisdiction).

3. The independent contractor statute. The plaintiff asserts that MART misclassified him as an independent contractor instead of an employee and thus violated the independent contractor statute. The motion judge found that sovereign immunity barred this claim. We have recently held that public employers such as the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought under the independent contractor statute. See Harrison v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 666 (2022) (“[S]tatutory claims against the MBTA must include within the statute a waiver of sovereign immunity”). For the same reasons as set forth in Harrison, we conclude that sovereign immunity also applies to MART.

The plaintiff attempts to distinguish Harrison, arguing that the language in the enabling legislation for the MBTA (G. L. c. 161A) is not identical to MART (G. L. c. 161B) and that the differences support the conclusion that MART has waived sovereign immunity. We are not persuaded. Any variance in the language of G. L. c. 161A and G. L. c. 161B enabling statutes is a difference without a distinction. Both the MBTA and MART are “a body politic and corporate” as well as “a political subdivision of the commonwealth.”³ G. L. c. 161A, § 2; 161B, § 2. The use of such identical language results in the same conclusion -- that the enabling statutes have not waived sovereign immunity for either the MBTA or MART. See Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 214-215 (2019), quoting Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 188-189 (1969) (“Where the Legislature uses the same words in several sections which concern the same subject matter, the words must be presumed to have been used with the same meaning in each section”). If regional transit authorities like MART were not protected by sovereign immunity, there would have been no reason for the Legislature to include them in the limited waiver of public employers’ sovereign immunity to tort claims as set forth in G. L. c. 258, § 2. See G. L. c. 258, § 1 (defining “public employer” to include regional transit authorities and MBTA).

4. Wage Act. Next, the plaintiff argues that the defendants violated the Wage Act. The motion judge also found that this claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff could establish that he was an employee of MART, the Wage Act only applies if the plaintiff was working as a “mechanic, workman and laborer.” G. L. c. 149, § 148. See Donahue, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 184. “A review of early workers’ compensation cases reveals the common meaning of ‘laborer’ to describe ‘a person without particular training who is employed at manual labor ․ while workmen and mechanics broadly embrace those who are skilled users of tools.’ ” Id. at 184, quoting Devney's Case, 223 Mass. 270, 272 (1916).

Here, the plaintiff was the director of CCRD and made management decisions such as how much work CCRD would accept from MART. He also employed other drivers. While he was responsible for ensuring CCRD's vehicles were properly maintained, nothing required the plaintiff to complete the maintenance himself. Thus, we conclude that the plaintiff does not meet the definition of a laborer, workman, or mechanic under G. L. c. 149, § 148, and therefore, the motion judge properly dismissed the plaintiff's Wage Act claim as barred by sovereign immunity. See Donahue, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 184 (Wage Act waived sovereign immunity of Commonwealth “only in certain limited circumstances”).⁴

For similar reasons, we conclude that sovereign immunity also precludes Khan or any other individual defendant from liability under the Wage Act. The plaintiff cannot sue MART under the Wage Act because he does not fall into the statutory exceptions, and therefore he also cannot sue people working for MART. This applies to Khan, as well as to the other individual defendants: Badgley, Dunn, Fisher, and Shumovskaya.⁵

5. Overtime and minimum wage statutes. Finally, we conclude that dismissal of the plaintiff's claim under the minimum wage statute was proper because the Legislature has not abrogated sovereign immunity. See Grenier v. Hubbardston, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 911 (1979). The plaintiff also alleges that MART had failed to pay him overtime pay, but that claim must also fail because the overtime statute does not create a private right of action since its enforcement rests with the Attorney General. See Newton v. Commissioner of Dep't of Youth Servs., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 350 (2004). See also Donahue, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 187.

We conclude that none of the statutes under which the plaintiff has sued the defendants provide a waiver of sovereign immunity, either expressly or by necessary implication, and thus his claims are barred.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   In an earlier phase of this case, a Superior Court judge dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, ruling that claim preclusion applied based on an earlier Federal case filed by the plaintiff. This court reversed, concluding the different Federal and State tests for whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor rendered claim preclusion inapplicable. See Jones v. Montachusetts Regional Transit Auth., 103 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (2023).

3.   The plaintiff argues that, because MART was operating in a commercial capacity, sovereign immunity is not applicable. We find no such distinction in G. L. c. 149, § 148B, or in the case the plaintiff relies on, Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 616-619 (1973).

4.   Although the Wage Act by its terms applies to cities and towns, see Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n v. Malden, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 62 (2017), the plaintiff does not argue that MART is a city or town.

5.   Since we conclude that the plaintiff is not among those that the Wage Act authorizes to sue a government employer, let alone its managers, we need not reach the question of whether summary judgment for Badgley, Dunn, Fisher, and Shumovskaya was appropriate.