CHRISTOPHER LORETI v. TOWN OF ARLINGTON (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Christopher P. Loreti, filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the town of Arlington (town) under the Massachusetts public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10, seeking the names and resumes of three withdrawn candidates for the position of town manager (names and resumes), and an e-mail message sent by one of the candidates withdrawing from the process (contested e-mail) (together with the names and resumes, the “disputed records”).¹ The judge dismissed the complaint concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). On the plaintiff's appeal, we consider whether the requested records are exempt from disclosure under the privacy exemption set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), as amended through St. 2020, c. 253, § 2 (privacy exemption). We conclude that the names and resumes are exempt and thus were properly withheld. We further conclude that only the name and identifying information contained in the contested e-mail is exempt and the balance of the e-mail must be disclosed. We therefore vacate so much of the judgment as dismissed entirely the request for disclosure of the contested e-mail and order entry of a modified judgment allowing the request, in part, and ordering production of the contested email with each instance of the withdrawn candidate's name and email address redacted. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Background. We set forth the facts as drawn from the plaintiff's complaint and accompanying exhibits. See Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 14 (2018).

1. Screening process. The town formed a preliminary screening committee (screening committee) to complete an initial, confidential review of the applicants for the town manager position.² Of the twenty applicants, the screening committee selected four candidates, including one alternate, to recommend to the select board. Thereafter, the candidates would be publicly interviewed by the select board. After being notified of their selection to move forward in the process, three of the four candidates, including the alternate, withdrew from consideration (withdrawn candidates). Two of the withdrawn candidates “did not wish to be identified” as they were both “chief executive officers of other municipalities.”³ With only one candidate remaining (remaining candidate), the town consulted the division of open government of the Attorney General's office to determine whether the select board could move forward with interviewing the remaining candidate.⁴ The town ultimately concluded that the screening committee could proceed, and the remaining candidate was hired following a public interview.

2. First request. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff made his first request. The town declined to produce any responsive records, citing the privacy exemption. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the supervisor of records (SOR) of the Secretary of State's public records division. The town replied, and the SOR closed the appeal noting that the plaintiff could appeal from the town's response to the SOR if he was still dissatisfied. The SOR declined to opine on the plaintiff's requests related to the executive session and the applicability of the privacy exemption. The plaintiff again appealed, and the SOR then determined that the town had not met its burden to show that the requested correspondence was covered in its entirety by the privacy exemption. Following the SOR's determination, the town confirmed that the contested e-mail was the only responsive record but again declined to produce it as it “expressed personal information” regarding the candidate's withdrawal that could “embarrass and harm” the candidate's future employment. The plaintiff again appealed to the SOR. At the plaintiff's request, the SOR reviewed the contested e-mail in camera and issued a determination that the contested e-mail could be withheld by the town pursuant to the privacy exemption, as it “constitute[d] intimate details of a highly personal nature,” disclosure of which was “likely to result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities.” The SOR declined to reconsider her determinations.

Concurrently, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the division of open government alleging that the town had violated the open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-25. The division of open government found that the screening committee violated the open meeting law by “discussing topics in executive session that were not appropriate for executive session”⁵ and “by creating insufficient meeting minutes.” The division of open government ordered the screening committee to amend the minutes for the executive sessions to include a summary of the discussions and interviews that occurred therein.

3. Second request. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed his second request. In response, the town provided the meeting minutes for its open and executive sessions during which the vote to recommend the candidates was taken, but it again declined to provide the resumes, citing the privacy exemption. The plaintiff appealed to the SOR, the town responded, and the SOR did not change her position.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, the plaintiff filed the complaint at issue here. The town filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6). After a hearing, the judge dismissed the complaint; this appeal followed.

Discussion. “We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo.”⁶ Buffalo-Water 1, LLC, 481 Mass. at 17. In so doing, “we accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and the attached exhibits, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the allegations ‘plausibly suggest’ that the plaintiff is entitled to relief on that legal claim” (citation omitted). Id.

Here, the plaintiff seeks information from the town under the public records law. The “primary purpose” of the public records law “is to give the public broad access to governmental records.” Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 382-383 (2002). The categories of records and documents to which the public must be afforded access are set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. The statute establishes a broad definition of public records, with twenty-three enumerated exemptions.⁷ See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a)-(j), (l)-(x), as amended through St. 2025, c. 16, § 1.⁸ “Due to the broad scope of the public records law, in any court proceeding challenging the withholding of a requested document, ‘there shall be a presumption that the record sought is public, and the burden shall be upon the custodian to prove with specificity the exemption which applies.’ ” Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015), quoting G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c).

At issue here is the scope of the privacy exemption, which excludes from the definition of public records, and thus from mandatory disclosure, “personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”⁹ G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). The inquiry is whether “the public interest in obtaining information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy.” Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 156 (1979) (Collector of Lynn). This requires “a balancing between any claimed invasion of privacy and the interest of the public in disclosure.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 858 (1995).

When considering the existence of a privacy interest, and the extent to which it outweighs any public interest, we assess: “(1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources” (footnote omitted). People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). There may also be “case-specific relevant factors” that contribute to our balancing of the competing interests. Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 858.

1. Names and resumes. We conclude that the names and resumes of the withdrawn candidates fall squarely within the privacy exemption.¹⁰ Each of the withdrawn candidates held another public position at the time of their application, and two withdrew, at least in part, to avoid public identification. While there are cases in which the disclosure of names is not an unwarranted invasion of privacy, see, e.g., Hastings & Sons Publ. Co. v. City Treas. of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 817-818 (1978) (requiring disclosure of municipal police officers’ names and payroll records); Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 Mass. 587, 594-595 (2005) (requiring disclosure of names and addresses of reserve deputy sheriffs); Pottle v. School Comm. of Braintree, 395 Mass. 861, 866 (1985) (no invasion of privacy in disclosure of school employees’ names and addresses), this is not one of those cases. Here, the existence of the names in the meeting minutes (and corresponding publication of the resumes) communicates to their current employers that they are actively seeking other employment. See Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984) (“the same information about a person, such as his name and address, might be protected from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of privacy in one context and not in another”). See also Georgiou v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 434 (2006) (judge should not discount “the potential embarrassment or stigma that might attend disclosure”). On these facts, disclosure of the withdrawn candidates’ identities would no doubt result in “personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 477 Mass. at 292. See Torres, 391 Mass. at 9 (“Certainly the expectations of the data subject are relevant in determining whether disclosure of information might be an invasion of privacy”). Contrast Somerville v. Supervisor of Pub. Records of the Commonwealth, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 44 (2025) (“There is nothing in the record here to suggest that permit holders had a particular expectation of privacy when transacting business with the city”). The requested information is also plainly not available from any other source, further weighing against disclosure. See Pottle, 395 Mass. at 866 (no privacy interest in school employees’ names and addresses where, among other factors, this information is available from other sources).

The plaintiff relies largely on Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Northampton, 375 Mass. 127 (1978) (Northampton), asserting, in essence, that a candidate becomes a “finalist” for a public office at the moment they are recommended by a screening body for further consideration. He argues that the mere recommendation triggers mandatory disclosure of the candidate's identity and credentials due to their diminished expectation of privacy at that stage. We disagree. In Northampton, supra at 130, candidates that were considered “finalists” were discussed at an open meeting by a subsequent hiring body.¹¹ The court reasoned that “open and public discussion of [a candidate's] professional competence” is to be expected when a candidate “reache[s] that level of consideration,” thereby decreasing any privacy interest and increasing the public interest in disclosure. In contrast, here the withdrawn candidates were recommended by the screening committee to the select board, but each then withdrew before further consideration.¹² Gerstein v. Superintendent Search Screening Comm., 405 Mass. 465, 474 (1989), is instructive. There, the court “decline[d] to order the disclosure of the identities of those candidates who were considered only by the screening committee and not by the school committee.” Id. Gerstein also clarified Northampton, noting, “[w]e suggested in Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Northampton, ․ that there are substantial reasons for protecting the identity of individuals who were candidates only early in the process.” Gerstein, supra.¹³

We turn next to the public interest in disclosure. It is well settled that “[t]he public has an interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.” Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 158. However, beyond this baseline principle, the plaintiff has not articulated any public interest in disclosure of the requested records aside from an unsupported allegation that they might show the town manipulated the process in favor of the internal candidate. This allegation alone is not sufficient to outweigh the withdrawn candidates’ privacy interests. See Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 452 (2019) quoting National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174, rehearing denied, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (“Where ‘the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged [g]overnment impropriety might have occurred’ ”). In the absence of a showing that the town has behaved in an inefficient or unlawful manner in screening applicants, the public interest does not substantially outweigh the withdrawn candidates’ privacy interests. See George W. Prescott Publ. Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 279 (1985) (“the public has a vital interest in full disclosure of all information which is relevant to ․ alleged misuse of authority”).

2. Contested e-mail. Having reviewed the contested e-mail in camera, we conclude that the name and e-mail address of the withdrawn candidate are exempt from disclosure under the privacy exemption for the reasons set forth above. However, because “the existence of some exempt information in a document will not justify cloture as to all of it” and “the right to access extend[s] to any nonexempt segregable portion of a public record,” we consider the balance of the contested e-mail. (quotations and citation omitted). Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 857-858.

The remaining content of the contested e-mail does not contain “intimate details” of “a highly personal nature” that would warrant nondisclosure. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 157. See id. (public disclosure of tax delinquency lists results in personal embarrassment but does not amount to publication of “intimate details” of “a highly personal nature”). Here, the reason given for withdrawal is generic and vague and refers to “family considerations”; it does not expose any personal details that ought to be kept private, and the redaction of the withdrawn candidate's identity sufficiently protects any privacy interest. See Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 861 (privacy exemption “protects from public scrutiny information that would lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy of any person mentioned in the requested materials”). The rest of the contested e-mail, primarily expressing the withdrawn candidate's gratitude for consideration with no other identifying or personal details, is not exempt and must be disclosed.

Conclusion. So much of the judgment as dismissed entirely the request for disclosure of the contested e-mail is vacated, and a modified judgment shall enter allowing the request, in part, and ordering production of the contested e-mail with each instance of the withdrawn candidate's name and e-mail address redacted. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.¹⁴

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The plaintiff's first public records request (first request) sought: (1) “Resumes of the 3 Town Manager candidates who withdrew from consideration after being named finalists by the Preliminary Screening Committee”; and (2) “Any and all correspondence from those 3 finalists provided to the Preliminary Screening Committee or any other town official explaining why they were withdrawing from consideration for the Town Manager position.”The plaintiff's second public records request (second request) sought the resumes of the withdrawn candidates, as well as “the revised meeting minutes of the Town Manager Screening Committee for February 7, 2023[,] showing the name of the four finalists for the position of Town Manager and the results of the vote or votes taken to select them as finalists. (If such votes were in Executive Session, then the [roll] call votes on each.)”

2.   The select board was advised prior to posting the town manager position that “candidates are only going to apply if they have a level of confidence that their application will be kept confidential until they [a]re selected as a finalist.”

3.   The other withdrawn candidate also held a public position.

4.   The remaining candidate was an internal applicant, serving as the deputy town manager at the time of his application.

5.   In particular, the division of open government concluded that the screening committee should not have gone into executive session to discuss how to proceed once three of the four finalists withdrew from consideration. On the other hand, the division of open government concluded that the screening committee “appropriately selected four finalists during an executive session,” and that “re-open[ing] its review of the applicant pool” after the three finalists withdrew “also was an appropriate task to undertake in executive session.”

6.   We likewise review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 556 (2020).

7.   It is uncontested that the disputed records fall within the broad definition of the term “public records” set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.

8.   Two amendments to G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, were enacted during the pendency of this case, neither of which is relevant to the claims at issue here.

9.   The parties agree that the question presented in this case is analyzed under a balancing test, therefore we need not address the plaintiff's argument that the latest amendment to the privacy exemption was intended to remove the categorical exemption of personnel and medical files or information.

10.   The plaintiff specifically concedes that the disclosure of the resumes would result in the identification of the withdrawn candidates, even if their names were redacted. And we agree. Accordingly, we need not address the plaintiff's contention that resumes are “self-curated promotional material” that carry no expectation of privacy.

11.   As the plaintiff himself points out, whether the candidates are considered in an open meeting is not dispositive, where we review only the issue of the privacy exemption of the public records law. See Gerstein v. Superintendent Search Screening Comm., 405 Mass. 465, 474 (1989) (“even though the screening committee's meetings ․ were open meetings, we decline to order the disclosure of the identities of those candidates who were considered only by the screening committee and not by the school committee”). We note that the plaintiff has not alleged any violations of the open meeting law.

12.   In his brief, the plaintiff contends that the town's stance here (that the withdrawn candidates were not “finalists” for the purposes of the privacy exemption) is inconsistent with the town's statement in its letter to the division of open government that the screening committee had identified four candidates as “finalists” for recommendation to the select board. We note that the town's letter to the division of open government concerned compliance with the open meeting law, an issue not before us on appeal. Moreover, the label used by a party is not controlling. Garcia v. Steele, 492 Mass. 322, 330 (2023). See Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 494 Mass. 562, 570 (2024) (determination of services provided “is not governed by the label ․ used by the parties to characterize their relationship”).

13.   The court also noted that Northampton was decided before the enactment of G. L. c. 39, § 23B (8), which authorized the holding of an executive session “[t]o consider and interview applicants for employment by a preliminary screening committee ․ if an open meeting will have a detrimental effect in obtaining qualified applicants,” unless the meeting is “to consider and interview applicants who have passed a prior preliminary screening.” Gerstein, 405 Mass. at 468, quoting G. L. c. 39, § 23B (8). General Laws c. 39, § 23B (8), is now codified in G. L. c. 30A, § 21 (a) (8), and slightly reworded in ways not relevant here.

14.   We decline both parties’ requests for an award of attorney's fees and costs.