COLLEEN HALL v. BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2023, Colleen Hall brought a complaint in the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) against Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Bayer), the gravamen of which was a products liability claim related to her use of an intrauterine device manufactured by Bayer. That complaint was ultimately dismissed because Hall's claims were time barred under the statute of limitations. Hall did not appeal from the dismissal of the complaint; she only appealed from the denial of her motion for sanctions. The Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department (Appellate Division) affirmed the denial of the request for sanctions. Hall seeks review in this court of that decision.

After the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of sanctions, Hall filed a motion to correct the record pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019). A BMC judge denied that motion as untimely. Hall also seeks our review of that order. We affirm both the Appellate Division's decision and the order denying the motion to correct the record.

1. Sanctions. In the BMC, Hall sought sanctions to be imposed against Bayer pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 37, as amended, 423 Mass. 1406 (1996). Those motions were denied, and the denials were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Hall claims the Appellate Division “erred” by affirming. We disagree.

Our review of discovery sanctions is governed by the well-established abuse of discretion standard. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). Where a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” a judge may impose sanctions under Mass. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2), as amended, 390 Mass. 1208 (1994). A party may be entitled to expenses based on conduct related to discovery obligations. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 37 (a) (4), as amended, 417 Mass. 1401 (1994).

Here, as the Appellate Division stated, Hall requested sanctions against Bayer's counsel for “ongoing misrepresentations and procedural misconduct ․ and obstructive discovery practices.” However, Hall failed to provide any evidence that Bayer intentionally committed discovery violations, acted in bad faith, or disobeyed a court order. Instead, she offered objections to certain discovery requests and to Bayer's responses to her requests, which do not demonstrate misconduct. In any event, given the convoluted procedural path this case took, and the fact that the earlier summary judgment decision was revisited and the case was instead dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, Hall was not entitled to any discovery.

Hall's claim fares no better under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, which we also review for abuse of discretion. See Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 417 (1998). In pertinent part, Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as appearing in 488 Mass. 1403 (2021), provides that “[t]he signature of any attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate that the attorney has read the pleading; that to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” A willful violation of the rule may subject an attorney “ ‘to appropriate disciplinary action,’ although the rule is silent as to the particular disciplinary measures that may be imposed” (citation omitted). Van Christo Advertising, Inc., supra at 414.

Hall's arguments in the BMC in support of rule 11 sanctions were for “ongoing misrepresentations and procedural misconduct that have caused confusion, delays, and obstructive discovery practices, resulting in significant prejudice to [Hall].” However, as the Appellate Division determined, Hall did not demonstrate that Bayer's counsel made misrepresentations, caused discovery delays, or engaged in other misconduct.

In the Appellate Division, and here, Hall claims that the BMC improperly denied the request for sanctions without holding a hearing, without a written opposition from Bayer,¹ and without findings of fact or a memorandum of decision. Hall claims this was inconsistent with due process and Mass. R. Civ. P. 78, 365 Mass. 839 (1974). These claims are without merit.

Contrary to Hall's claim, not all requests for rule 11 sanctions will necessitate an evidentiary hearing and detailed findings. See von Schönau-Riedweg v. Continuum Energy Techs., LLC, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 540 (2020). See also Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 118 (2004), S.C., 459 Mass. 697 (2011) (rule 11 sanctions imposed without hearing did not violate due process). The specially assigned BMC judge who denied the request for sanctions was intimately familiar with the case, its lengthy procedural history, and the parties. His summary denial of the motion did not violate due process, rule 78 did not require a hearing to be held,² and there is no need to remand the matter as Hall requests.³

2. Motion to correct record. Hall also claims that the BMC, pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (2), should have corrected the record to identify the second amended complaint as the operative complaint. We disagree.

The initial problem with Hall's claim is that she waited to file this motion until after the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of her request for sanctions. See Hamed v. Fadili, 408 Mass. 100, 104 (1990) (“It is implicit in [rule 8 (e)] and in the very nature of the appellate process that any correction to the record must take place before the appeal has been decided”). Although rule 8 (e) empowers this court to correct the record, we see little point in doing so where the case has been dismissed and Hall did not appeal from the order dismissing it.⁴ The motion to correct the record was properly denied.⁵ ,⁶

Decision and order of Appellate Division affirmed.

Order denying motion to correct record affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The BMC ruled on the motion prior to the opposition deadline.

2.   Rule 78 requires courts to have regular times and places where motion hearings may be held. It carries no mandate as to which matters require hearings. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 78.

3.   Hall also claims that the Appellate Division failed to resolve material disputed facts underlying the motion. However, finding facts and weighing evidence are functions of the trial court, which do not fall within the appellate office. See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 314 (2024).

4.   Hall attempts to argue that dismissal was improper, but that issue is not before us.

5.   To the extent that Hall's additional claims rise to the level of appellate argument, we find nothing in them that warrants further discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

6.   The parties’ requests for attorney's fees are denied.