COMMONWEALTH v. STEVEN PRICE (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Steven Price, appeals from a conviction, after a jury trial in the District Court, of reckless operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). We conclude that evidence that the defendant sped through a very busy intersection, nearly causing a collision, provided sufficient evidence of reckless operation. Further concluding that the handling of the identification evidence and instructions was proper where, at a prior hearing, the trooper recognized the defendant in a courtroom containing at least twenty persons before the case was called, we affirm.

1. Sufficiency. “[W]e consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Lagotic, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 405, 407 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 216 (2019). “The inferences that support a conviction ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ ” Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713, cert. denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014). To prove the defendant guilty of reckless operation, the Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public way in a reckless manner. See Commonwealth v. Maraj, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 263 (2025). To show recklessness, the Commonwealth had to demonstrate that “ ‘a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another’ flowed from the intentional conduct.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 Mass. 416, 423 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 (2010).

Here, the defendant accelerated quickly enough to “kick up a bunch of dust and debris.” He then ran through an intersection without slowing down, forcing another vehicle “to hit its brakes and swerve to avoid” the defendant's vehicle. He was going approximately fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone. “It was commuter traffic at that time, and there's multiple businesses in that area, people coming in and out and entering and exiting ․, and that intersection is very busy at that time of day.” The jury could reasonably find that the defendant's speeding through the busy intersection during commuter traffic created a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm. See Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass. 770, 781-782 (2025) (sufficient evidence of reckless operation where defendant was “tailgating ․, traveling at excessive speeds, and weaving through traffic without signaling” prior to crash); Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770, 770 (1965) (sufficient evidence of reckless operation where defendant “went to the left of a traffic island marked ‘Keep Right’ and twice weaved from left to right on the road,” passed two vehicles, and then collided with a third); Maraj, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 259 (defendant drove “at a high rate of speed,” “passed through an intersection without stopping at a stop sign,” and then crashed into house). Cf. Commonwealth v. Moore, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 40, 45-46 (2017) (leading “police on a high-speed chase through busy city streets at rush hour, driving dangerously and erratically and committing serious traffic violations before running the red light at the intersection” created “plain and strong likelihood of death”).

We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant operated the motor vehicle. The trooper received the defendant's name and date and birth from the driver and obtained a computer image of the defendant that matched the driver's appearance. The trooper then identified the defendant in court. The jury were entitled to credit the trooper's testimony. See Commonwealth v. Nordstrom, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 493, 498 (2021).

2. Identification. Several months prior to trial, a judge allowed the defendant's motion for an in-court nonsuggestive identification procedure. On the day of that court hearing, the trooper recognized the defendant while the defendant was sitting in the courtroom prior to the case being called. There were at least twenty people in the courtroom. The case was then called, at which point the trooper saw the defendant join counsel at counsel table. While the defendant was at counsel table, the trooper identified the defendant from the stand.

On the morning of trial, the trial judge held a voir dire of the trooper and denied the defendant's motion to exclude the prior in-court identification. As it turned out, the Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence of the prior in-court identification; rather, it was the defendant who introduced that evidence in an apparent attempt to discredit the trooper's identification on the day of trial.

It is hard to see how the defendant can object to his own introduction of the prior identification. See Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 557 n.6 (2015). In any event, we discern no error. There was nothing suggestive about the trooper's identification of the defendant before the case was called from a crowd of at least twenty persons. See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241 (2014), quoting United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368-1369 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987) (identification of defendant who “ ‘sit[s] somewhere in the courtroom other than the defense table’ ” is “alternative, less suggestive identification procedure[ ]”). This was not a one-on-one identification, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279-281 (2006), and the defendant provided no reason why other circumstances made it suggestive. The judge, who credited the trooper's testimony, had no reason to find that the subsequent in-court identification was improper. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 265 (2014) (in-court identification proper after unequivocal nonsuggestive identification). Similarly, in light of the nonsuggestive prior identification, there was no error in the admission of the trooper's in-court identification at trial. See id.

3. Identification instruction. “Trial judges are accorded considerable discretion in framing jury instructions, both in determining the precise phraseology used and the appropriate degree of elaboration.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 781, 784 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Newell, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 131 (2002). Here, both parties explicitly agreed that the portion of the identification instruction regarding express certainty should be omitted and approved the judge's language regarding the prior courtroom identification. Accordingly, we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 732 (2024). We discern none.

Although the trooper expressed complete certainty at the prior hearing, she expressed no level of certainty regarding the identification before the jury. Similarly, as there was no prior showup identification, the judge properly omitted any reference to such in the identification instruction. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 490 Mass. 171, 188-189 (2022) (within judge's discretion to omit portion of identification instruction not relevant to case). There was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Judgment affirmed.