JAMES LYONS v. ATTORNEY GENERAL (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff brought a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that an amendment to Rule 85A of the Rules of the House of Representatives (House Rule 85A) “alter[ed] legislation recently adopted by the voters at the ballot box, in derogation of the separation of powers and the rights of the voters.” A Superior Court judge dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Background. We recite the pertinent facts alleged in the complaint. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci, 476 Mass. 553, 554 (2017). Massachusetts voters passed ballot question 1, entitled “A Law Expressly Authorizing The Auditor To Audit The Legislature,” in the 2024 election. As a result the State Auditor's enabling statute, G. L. c. 11, § 12, was amended to give her authority to audit “the general court.”

Shortly after the election, the House of Representatives amended House Rule 85A. As amended, House Rule 85A directs House officials to request an audit from the State Auditor, who is then permitted to select a neutral private firm to conduct the audit.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Massachusetts Legislature and former chairman of the Massachusetts Republican Party, campaigned and voted for question 1. He raises two claims in this action. Count 1, labeled a “Buckley claim” in reference to Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195 (1976), appears to assert that House Rule 85A is unconstitutional because it undermines the people's vote on question 1. Count 2, labeled a “Paisner claim” in reference to Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593 (1983), appears to assert that House Rule 85A violates the separation of powers because “[t]he topic of auditing the Legislature is not an internal organizational matter of the house ․” As relief, the plaintiff seeks “a declaration and injunction according the voter-adopted Question 1 primacy over [House Rule 85A]” and a declaration that G. L. c. 11, § 12, “is constitutional, in the face of the Legislature's assertions.”

The Attorney General moved to dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), arguing among other things that the plaintiff lacked standing and that he failed to identify an actual controversy. The judge allowed the motion and concluded that all of the claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not have standing to seek relief against any of the defendants. Final judgment then entered dismissing the action in its entirety without prejudice.

Discussion. Standing is properly challenged by way of a motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6). See Kenn v. Eascare, LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 647 & n.6 (2024). To survive such a motion, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. See Cubberley v. Commerce Ins. Co., 495 Mass. 289, 293 (2025). We review the judge's decision de novo, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See id. at 292.

The plaintiff invokes multiple doctrines in support of his assertion of standing, but none warrants overturning the dismissal. First, the plaintiff does not have standing to pursue his claims under the public right doctrine, which allows a citizen to bring an action “in the nature of mandamus to compel the performance of a duty required by law.” Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 (1996). This doctrine applies only where a public officer owes a “specific” duty directly to the public that the law requires to be performed. Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 460 (1956). See Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., supra (doctrine applies to “particular” duties required by law); Perella v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 540 (2002) (doctrine limited to “clear and unequivocal duties”).

Here, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the defendants owe any specific duty to the public for which he can compel performance. Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 327 Mass. 310 (1951), on which the plaintiff heavily relies, does not cure this defect. In Sears the court held that the plaintiffs had standing under the public right doctrine to challenge a new law on the basis that it was not adopted within the constitutional requirements for laws enacted by initiative. See id. at 313, 315. But later in Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., 423 Mass. at 715, the court made clear that Sears is limited to constitutional challenges to “the procedure used to adopt [a law].” Conversely, the public right doctrine does not apply to “substantive constitutional challenges,” such as those the plaintiff seeks to raise here. Id.

The other doctrines invoked by the plaintiff also afford him no relief. The plaintiff does not have voter or proponent standing because he has not plausibly alleged any electoral harm, cf. Vigneault v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 362, 364 (1968), or that he is one of the first ten signers of an initiative petition seeking to protect the petition, cf. Buckley, 371 Mass. at 197-198. He does not have taxpayer standing, which applies only to claims to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds. See Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., 423 Mass. at 711-712. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). Nor can he maintain his claims under what he calls “disclosure standing” because he has not alleged that he requested any information to which he is entitled but the defendants failed to disclose. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989).

In addition, we agree with the defendants that dismissal was appropriate for the separate reason that the complaint fails to allege an actual controversy. An actual controversy exists when there is a “real dispute” between the parties that if not “adjusted ․ will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litigation.” Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 44 (2022), quoting Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Attorney Gen., 436 Mass. 132, 134-135 (2002). See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU v. Commonwealth, 425 Mass. 534, 536-37 (1997). The plaintiff's abstract complaint about the constitutionality of House Rule 85A does not come close to meeting this standard. See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, supra at 135-136.

Judgment affirmed.