COMMONWEALTH v. SAMANTHA BUCCI (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On December 2, 2024, a jury found the defendant, Samantha Bucci, guilty of negligently operating a motor vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), and the judge found her responsible for the civil motor vehicle infraction of speeding in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 17.¹ On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred in denying her motion for a required finding of not guilty for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle charge because there was insufficient evidence to support the negligence element. We affirm.

Background. On June 11, 2023, the defendant met with her friends at the Flying Rhino, a restaurant and bar, at 3 P.M. or 4 P.M because she was having a “really emotional day” following the recent death of her father. She consumed three martinis from about 6 P.M. to 9 P.M. and then had three tequila shots under the belief that her friends would drive her car home. She stopped drinking alcohol between 9:45 P.M. and 11 P.M. After the Flying Rhino closed at about 9 P.M., the defendant and her friends went to a karaoke bar across the street, where she thought they would sing one song and then leave. Her friends remained at the bar and continued to drink, so she became upset because she had a difficult day and wanted to go home. The defendant went back and forth between sitting in her car and returning to the bar, where she drank water, until about 1:30 A.M. when she retrieved her keys from her friends and began driving home.²

While the defendant was driving, she was “really upset” with her friends and spoke to them via a hands-free telephone call. At about 1:40 A.M., Boylston Police Officer Monaghan, who was on patrol duty in a stationary marked cruiser on a residential, “relatively straight road,” in Boylston, saw that the defendant was driving “well in excess of the speed limit” with a speed fluctuating between the “high 50s” and sixty-eight miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone. He did not see the car swerve, cross over lanes, hit the curb, or travel on the wrong side of the road. The defendant later testified at trial that she “did not realize how fast [she] was going, because ․ [her] friends were calling [her]” and she was “so distraught with [her] friends.”

Officer Monaghan initiated a stop, and after a brief delay, the defendant pulled the vehicle over. The front right tire was positioned on the sidewalk and off the road.³ Officer Monaghan approached the vehicle and saw the defendant “fumble[ ]” with her wallet as she attempted to retrieve her driver's license. She provided her documentation and told Officer Monaghan that she was coming from the Flying Rhino and that she had three martinis and at least two shots. The officer noticed that her eyes were “red, glassy and bloodshot” and her speech appeared slurred. He also noticed an odor of alcohol. He then asked the defendant to perform a field sobriety test. The area where they conducted the test was “generally flat,” “clear,” and “well lit.” There were no other vehicles on the road at the time, and Officer Monaghan shut off his emergency lights to eliminate the potential distraction. He briefly demonstrated the “walk and turn test,” and the defendant stated that she understood the instructions and that she did not have any conditions that would impair her ability to perform the test. There was a “solid white painted fog line” for the defendant to follow.

At the start of the test, the defendant stepped out of starting position. Officer Monaghan instructed her to begin the test three times, and she finally made her first attempt after his third request. She took a step, but “immediately stumbled and lost her balance.”⁴ She “tried one more time, [but] stumbled more significantly,” so he terminated the test. The defendant told Officer Monaghan, “I knew I shouldn't have had that much. I'm so fucked. I'm going to get a DUI.” Officer Monaghan formed the opinion that she was intoxicated and placed her under arrest.

At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty for the negligent operation charge, which the judge denied.⁵ The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. This appeal followed.

Discussion. When reviewing a challenge to a denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). To convict a defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), “the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon a public way (3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379 (2017). The defendant contests only the third element of negligence.

“A defendant's driving need not have been erratic to support a conviction of negligent operation, so long as the conduct, taken as a whole, might have endangered the lives and safety of the public.” Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 370 (2019). Evidence of intoxication alone or speeding alone cannot independently prove negligent operation, but each is a factor that can support a conclusion that the defendant drove negligently. See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1022 (2019); Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 379-380.

Here, the defendant argues that neither impairment in itself nor speeding in itself can establish negligent operation. The defendant also argues that evidence of her pulling the car over onto the curb should not be considered in the negligence analysis because she had pulled onto the sidewalk “for the safety of the officer.” We are not persuaded. Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient such that a rational fact finder could find that the defendant operated her vehicle negligently. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 369-370.

The testimony presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the finding of guilty for the negligent operation charge. See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. Notably, it is undisputed that the defendant traveled at a fluctuating speed between the “high 50s” and sixty-eight miles per hour on a residential road with a thirty-five mile per hour posted speed limit late at night after consuming six alcoholic beverages and while engaging in an emotionally intense telephone call. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 370-371; Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381.

In Commonwealth v. Ross, the court determined that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant acted negligently where he showed signs of intoxication and drove fifteen miles per hour above the speed limit on a two-lane residential road lined with trees, poles, and fences. See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381.⁶ Comparably, here, the defendant was speeding thirty-three miles per hour over the speed limit and exhibited signs of intoxication where she admitted to consuming six alcoholic beverages in a fairly short period of time, failed a field sobriety test, had an odor of alcohol, slurred her speech, had eyes that appeared glassy and bloodshot, drove one wheel of her car onto the sidewalk when pulling over for the officer, and told the officer, “I knew I shouldn't have had that much. I'm so fucked. I'm going to get a DUI.” See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392-393 (2017) (defendant found to be intoxicated where eyes were bloodshot and glassy, speech slurred, she admitted to drinking three beers, parked car diagonally across two spaces, swayed when standing, and failed two of three field sobriety tests).

While it is true that speeding alone cannot satisfy the negligence element of negligent operation, excessive speeding can add considerable weight in determining whether a defendant operated a vehicle negligently, and here, the defendant was driving nearly twice the posted speed limit. See Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922-923 (2004) (defendant's speed of more than twice posted speed limit posed risk to lives and safety of public). Additionally, the defendant admits in her testimony that she was engaged in a telephone call to the point that she did not realize how fast she was driving. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 370-371 (defendant could have endangered public where defendant had consumed alcohol, drove twenty to twenty-five miles per hour below speed limit, and held cell phone while driving).⁷ Furthermore, while a minor civil infraction coupled with intoxication may not always constitute negligence, here, the defendant was driving at an excessive, fluctuating speed while showing signs of intoxication. Contrast Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at 1022 (scant evidence of faulty vehicle lights considered with proof of intoxication insufficient to support negligent operation conviction).

While the defendant also argues that evidence that she drove one tire of her vehicle onto the curb should not be considered in determining the defendant's negligence, the defendant's consumption of alcohol coupled with her being distracted and speeding is sufficient to establish negligence. See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381. Nevertheless, to the extent that the defendant contends that evidence of her driving the front wheel of her tire onto the sidewalk was not admissible as irrelevant, she did not object to that testimony at trial. See Commonwealth v. Shruhan, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 320, 323-324 (2016). Furthermore, the jury was not required to credit the defendant's explanation that she pulled onto the curb for the officer's safety and may reasonably have inferred that she did so accidentally as a result of driving while intoxicated. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014) (“Where conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies” [quotation and citation omitted]). Cf. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 392-393 (parking car crooked across two parking spaces was evidence of intoxication).

Because a rational fact finder could have found that the defendant operated her vehicle negligently beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied. See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For the negligent operation charge, the defendant received nine months of administrative probation with a sixty-day license suspension and was required to complete the “Brains at Risk” program. The speeding violation was placed on file.

2.   The defendant testified that she did not feel intoxicated at that time.

3.   At trial, the defendant testified that she intentionally positioned her car on the curb “for the safety of the officer” because she was trying to pull over as far as possible where there was recent construction on the road. The officer did not instruct her to pull onto the curb, nor did he direct her to remove her car from the sidewalk.

4.   At trial, the defendant contended that she stumbled because she was wearing “flip flop” sandals, which got caught in a “little crack in the road.” The officer did not recall her footwear at trial.

5.   The defendant had filed a written motion for a required finding of not guilty, but she did not present an oral argument and did not raise the motion until the judge was addressing final jury instructions with the parties. Because the defendant did not move for a required finding of not guilty until the close of all of the evidence, we may consider evidence presented during the defendant's case in determining whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Dustin, 476 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2016).

6.   The defendant argues that the court considered the particular road conditions when making this determination in Ross, and these conditions were not present when the defendant was driving. However, the principal issue in Ross was the sufficiency of the evidence of speeding coupled with intoxication to support a negligent operation offense. See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 377. Nevertheless, the road conditions that were present during this incident were comparable to Ross: the defendant was driving at night on a two-lane residential road. See Ross, supra at 380.

7.   While the defendant was not holding her cell phone nor found in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 13B, the defendant admits that the emotionally intense telephone call distracted the defendant from her driving. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 370 n.4 (evidence that defendant's use of cell phone “was definitely a distraction” supported conclusion that defendant drove negligently).