ARIANNA KETCHAKEU v. 7Q59 AMHERST LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This suit was brought in the Housing Court by plaintiffs Arianna Ketchakeu, Penelope Hosley, and Kalyani Kortright (together, the plaintiffs) against defendants 7Q59 Amherst, LLC, and Xian Dole (together, the defendants). The merits of the suit are not relevant to the issues before us, but in brief, through the actions of the defendants, there were several State sanitary code violations, including a gas leak, in the apartment the plaintiffs rented from the defendants, and the defendants failed to provide reasonable alternative accommodation for the plaintiffs when they could not occupy the premises.

The record demonstrates the defendants’ repeated failure to appear in court proceedings. During the course of the proceedings, a first Housing Court judge ordered the corporate defendant, 7Q59 Amherst, LLC, to obtain counsel. The corporate defendant obtained counsel, who subsequently withdrew. A second judge warned at a hearing on February 12, 2024, that the corporate defendant would be defaulted if it did not secure successor counsel. On April 11, 2024, after, in the first judge's words, defendant Dole “made it clear that 7Q59 Amherst, LLC will not be hiring counsel,” the first judge defaulted the corporate defendant on liability, stating that a hearing on damages would be scheduled.

On July 5, 2024, a default was entered against defendant Dole for repeatedly failing to provide discovery as ordered, after a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions that, although Dole had notice, she did not attend. Given the defendants’ jury demand, the first judge issued a written order requesting briefing as to whether a damages hearing required a jury and ordered the parties to reappear on July 29, 2024. The plaintiffs filed a brief, the defendants did not. Although some mail to Dole was returned, she had actual notice of the hearing; she filed a motion, dated July 26, to continue it until November 2024. She failed to appear at the July 29 hearing.

In any event, the next day, July 30, the judge ordered the parties to return on August 5 for a further hearing, and ordered that in addition to the court's notices, the plaintiffs’ attorney provide notice to the defendants via email, which the plaintiffs’ attorney did. The Housing Court did not receive any additional returned mail sent to Dole. Dole failed to attend the August 5, 2024, hearing related to whether a jury was required for a damages hearing, and a default judgement on liability was entered against her.

On September 23, 2024, defendant Dole updated her address with the court and on September 24, 2024, she filed a motion to remove the default. She alleged that she had not received notice of the July 30 court order and the August 5 hearing.

On September 30, the second judge heard the motion to remove default and denied it, concluding that Dole had actual notice of the August 5 hearing via email. The judge also noted that he had continued the September 30 hearing for two hours to allow Dole to prepare, while the plaintiffs had traveled from out of town to testify at the hearing.

The judge then conducted a damages hearing on September 30, 2024, at which Dole testified at length. On December 20, 2024, the judge entered a final judgment against the defendants. In the course of the judge's order on damages, the judge addressed the merits of the claims on the basis of factual findings made after the testimony taken at the September 30 hearing. The judge concluded that the plaintiffs had met their burden with respect to violation of the implied warranty of habitability and failure to cure the sanitary code violation, G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (c); for interference with quiet enjoyment, G. L. c. 186, § 14; and for retaliation, G. L. c. 186, § 18. The order, however, did not purport to address the merits of the claims, but only damages. No party suggests, however, that this order, not the defaults, was the operative determination of liability, and we will assume without deciding that that is correct..

As to the amount of damages, that order awarded the plaintiffs damages of $22,150 and reasonable attorney's fees, but declined to separately award G. L. c. 93A damages on the ground that damages were already awarded and multiplied as a component of the breach of warranty claim and the other statutory claims.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on December 30, 2024, arguing that the judge erred in not awarding multiple damages under G. L. c. 93A and failed to consider the egregious nature of the defendants’ actions when assessing a damages multiplier. The plaintiffs petitioned for reasonable attorney's fees on January 3, 2025. Defendant Dole filed her own motion for reconsideration on January 17, 2025, based on her belief that the order was “not fair” and because the decision had caused her financial and other stress. A hearing was scheduled on January 27, 2025, which the defendants again failed to attend. Dole instead filed an additional motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2025.

On April 2, 2025, the judge issued a decision on the motions for reconsideration granting the plaintiffs’ motion and denying Dole's motions. The order awarded the plaintiffs damages of $34,550 and attorney's fees of $19,731.14. An amended final judgment entered on April 3, and judgment entered on April 4, awarding attorney's fees.

The defendants filed a notice of appeal on April 25, 2025. Although signed by attorneys, the notice of appeal stated that it appealed “the court's April 2, 2025 Decision, Order, and Amended Judgment resulting from its ‘Cross Motions for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs’ on the following issues.” No issues were listed.

The defendants’ brief requests a new hearing on the cross motions for reconsideration, rather than a new trial on the underlying claims. Notwithstanding the limited prayer for relief and the wording of the notice of appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that because the plaintiffs’ timely filed motion for reconsideration tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original judgment, the defendants’ notice of appeal following the entry of the amended judgment properly brought before us that judgment and all interlocutory orders in the case.

Turning to the merits, the defendants complain only about due process. Noting that the Code of Judicial Conduct permits judges in their discretion to make accommodations for self-represented litigants, they complain that because they were self-represented litigants, the judges were required to and failed to exercise their discretionary powers with respect to self-represented litigants to provide the defendants certain types of assistance they describe as “accommodations.” They also argue that the assistance they claim the judges should have provided was required as a matter of due process.

To begin with, the corporate defendant was never a self-represented litigant. To the extent Dole initially appeared purporting to represent, “pro se,” the corporate defendant, that is, of course, not permitted. See Burnham v. Justices of the Superior Court, 439 Mass. 1018 (2003). The defendants note that the corporate defendant was defaulted in the order issued by the first judge on April 11, 2024. The order stated,

“The defendant 7Q59 Amherst, LLC is hereby defaulted for failure to appear through counsel. [The second judge] made it very clear from the bench at the February 12, 2024, hearing when allowing the withdrawal of counsel [for both defendants], that the [corporate defendant] must be represented by counsel in these proceedings -- and that he would likely enter a default if no counsel appeared. At the instant hearing, the [individual defendant] made it clear that [the corporate defendant] will not be hiring counsel. Accordingly, a default shall enter against [the corporate defendant], establishing liability. A damages hearing shall be scheduled by the court after a Case Management Conference in this matter.”

The defendants have not provided us with the transcript of this February 12, 2024, hearing, and therefore, they are unable to demonstrate that the warning given to them by the second judge was inadequate. The appellant is responsible for ensuring that the record, which includes the transcript, “is adequate for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Woody, 429 Mass. 95, 97 (1999). Consequently, we conclude there has been no due process violation shown. And indeed, even if all the second judge said was that he “would likely enter a default if no counsel appeared,” that provides sufficient notice for the first judge's action in defaulting the corporate defendant.

The defendants next complain about the alleged failures of the judge at various points to explain things or provide assistance to the defendants, or to inform them of the court's discretionary power to provide “accommodations” to pro se litigants.

The defendants first argue “[t]he lower court did not state if or how it informed [a]ppellants of the consequences of a ‘default,’ ․ Absent from the [o]rder was any guidance to the [a]ppellant that it was required to have an attorney to represent it in a civil action.” However, the defendants cite no source of law that imposes an obligation on a judge to explain to a person purporting to represent a corporate defendant or to a pro se litigant what the word “default” means. Nor are we aware of any source of law, and none is cited, imposing a requirement to provide legal “guidance” in an instruction to such a person, that a corporate defendant must obtain counsel. Indeed, the argument is insubstantial. See Jordan v. Register of Probate for Hampden County, 426 Mass. 1020, 1020 (1998) (“pro se litigants ․ will be held to the same standards as litigants who are represented by counsel”).

The defendants also complain, similarly, that the first judge did not, in the April 11, 2024 order, make “any reference to the power of discretion held by the presiding judge to assist [a]ppellants in seeking counsel, referral(s) to counsel, or allowing additional time to secure counsel.” Again, we are aware of no source of law, and none is cited, that requires judges to describe the discretionary power they have to assist the self-represented or, frankly, of any requirement of offering assistance to a corporate defendant that is required by law, but has failed, to obtain counsel to represent it.

On July 5, 2024, the first judge defaulted the individual defendant for failing to provide discovery ordered to be provided by court order of May 23, 2024. Again, the defendants argue that the judge violated due process by not, in that order, “articulat[ing] any discretion within his power to provide accommodations to [the individual defendant].” Once again, they cite no source of law requiring a judge in a civil matter such as this to provide such accommodation, though he may have discretion to do so, or to announce that he has such discretion.

The appellants complain about other hearings at which assistance was not provided to allow them, they argue, meaningfully to assert their defenses, and complain again that the judges did not announce that they had discretion to provide some assistance to pro se litigants. While it is indeed apparent that, as the defendants put it, “[a]ppellant Dole did not understand the procedure and content required to effectively assert her defenses in a meaningful way,” the defendants fail to provide any legal basis for concluding her due process rights as a pro se civil litigant were violated.

Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the second judge's April 2, 2025, order denying Dole's amended motion for reconsideration, when both her original and the amended motions failed to allege any newly discovered evidence, change of relevant law, or any particular demonstrable error in the decision. See Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v. Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012).

The plaintiffs have requested attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 186, §§ 14, 18, and G. L. c. 93A, § 9, under which they were successful in the trial court. They are entitled to such fees, see Yorke Mgt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 (1989), and so their request is allowed. Plaintiffs should submit an application for attorney's fees compliant with the procedure in Mass. R. A. P. 25 (b), as appearing in 498 Mass. 1601 (2026), within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision. The defendant will have fourteen days thereafter to respond.

The plaintiffs finally argue that this appeal is frivolous and warrants sanctions. We agree and consequently award double costs, with statutory interest, to run from the date of the filing of the appeal. See G. L. c. 211A, § 15; Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 498 Mass. 1601 (2026).

The amended judgment is affirmed. The order on the cross motions for reconsideration and the plaintiffs’ petition for attorney's fees and costs is affirmed.

So ordered.