SEAN MURPHY v. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The self-represented plaintiff, Sean Murphy, appeals from a judgment allowing the defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We affirm.

Background. “For the purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022).

On March 2, 2023, a Bristol Superior Court judge sentenced Murphy to a committed sentence of eighteen months to eighteen months and one day at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (MCI-Concord). While incarcerated, Murphy received eighty days of “completion credits” for completing a Correctional Recovery Academy (CRA) program, and his release to supervision (RTS) date was set for February 23, 2024. See G. L. c. 127, § 129D (c). Murphy was then notified that he would need to submit a “home parole plan”² by February 13, 2024. Murphy submitted two parole plans, both of which were denied on the ground that his proposed residences were not appropriate.

The first proposed residence, on Sodom Road in Westport (Sodom Road residence), was denied because it was associated with a person, John Oliveira, who had previously violated the conditions of his parole.³ The second proposed residence, Steps 2 Solutions, a sober home in Lynn, was denied because Steps 2 Solutions was not an approved residence by the Massachusetts Alliance for Sober Housing.⁴

Murphy subsequently filed three grievances relating to the fact that he had not been released to supervision, all of which were denied. Murphy was released from MCI-Concord in the afternoon, following lunch on April 1, 2024. Incidentally, another inmate was released the same day at 9:30 A.M., while Murphy was held in a cell with no running water or bathroom for the morning. The MCI-Concord director of security told Murphy that “inmates are normally released between 9:00-10:00A.M.” and the director of security “has never seen anyone released after 10:30 A.M.”

Murphy thereafter filed the underlying action, alleging negligence by the defendants in investigating his proposed residences and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, articles 1, 10, 11, and 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). He additionally requested a declaratory judgment “that the Parole Board [board] must have different regulations, policies and procedures for inmates being released on RTS.” On July 3, 2025, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that “[t]he First Amended Verified Complaint fails to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief ․ Further, no actual controversy exists entitling the plaintiff to a declaratory judgment ․”

Discussion. “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether the allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Lanier, 490 Mass. at 43. “What is required at the pleading stage are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief” (citation omitted). Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

1. Negligence claims. The Massachusetts Torts Claims Act (MTCA) provides that “[p]ublic employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” G. L. c. 258, § 2. However, the MTCA exempts defendants from liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort,” G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), and “any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization.” G. L. c. 258, § 10 (e).

Additionally, “[p]ublic employees sued in their individual capacity ․ are not shielded by the MTCA, but they are protected by the doctrine of common-law immunity.” Grafton & Upton R.R. Co. v. Burt, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 511 (2026). “Under the doctrine of common-law immunity, a public official exercising judgment and discretion is not liable for negligence or other errors during official decision-making, provided the official acted in good faith, without malice, and free of corruption.” Bresler v. Muster, 496 Mass. 111, 122 (2025).

Because Murphy's claims relate either to the decision not to grant Murphy a parole permit, see G. L. c. 127, §§ 128, 130B, or to claims of intentionally delaying his release, the MTCA immunizes the defendants from liability insofar as Murphy sued them in their official capacities. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), (e).⁵ Additionally, in their individual capacities, the defendants are immune provided that they “acted in good faith, without malice, and free of corruption.” Bresler, 496 Mass. at 122. Here, Murphy's complaint “fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that ‘actual malice’ was the controlling factor behind [the defendants’] conduct.” Id. at 120. Accordingly, the defendants are also immune in their individual capacities from Murphy's claims that they acted negligently. See id. at 122.

2. Retaliation claims. To establish retaliation for engaging in constitutionally protected activity, “the plaintiff must prove that ‘(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two.’ ” Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 602 (2004), quoting Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2000).

Murphy's claims of violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and MCRA all relate to allegations that the defendants retaliated against Murphy for engaging in protected conduct. Specifically, Murphy alleges that the defendants (1) denied his first parole plan to retaliate against Murphy because “Oliveira beat [a] January 2015 parole search,” (2) denied his second parole plan to retaliate against Murphy because of grievances Murphy filed regarding the denial of his parole plans, and (3) held Murphy until after lunch to retaliate against Murphy for the same grievances. Each of these allegations fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636; Mole, 442 Mass. at 602.

Taking each retaliation claim in turn, Murphy first alleges that defendants Brian McGaffigan and Lynn Zariv denied the parole plan proposing the Sodom Road residence as Murphy's postrelease residence because they “were retaliating against Murphy because Oliveira beat the January 2015 parole search.” However, Murphy identifies no relationship between himself and Oliveira such that denying Murphy's parole plan would serve to retaliate against Oliveira. See Mole, 442 Mass. at 602.

Second, Murphy alleges that defendants Iraola and Brown denied his parole plans because he filed grievances against Zariv and McGaffigan. Murphy does not plausibly allege or establish a causal connection between Murphy's filing a grievance against Zariv and McGaffigan for denying the first parole plan and Iraola and Brown “retaliating” against him by denying his second parole plan. See Mole, 442 Mass. at 602. Indeed, Murphy does not allege that he filed any parole plans beyond the first two submitted. Nor does he allege that the board would have denied a conforming parole plan if submitted. Therefore, the claim fails because it both fails to plausibly allege a causal connection between Murphy's protected activity and any adverse action and that the defendant's actions were adverse. See id.

Third, Murphy alleges that MCI-Concord “was retaliating against [him] because he filed the abovementioned grievances” by holding him in a cell without running water or a bathroom and waiting until after lunch to release him on April 1, 2025. Murphy alleges that “Superintendent Dean Gray gave the order to hold [him] until after lunch on his release date,” yet Superintendent Gray was not named as a defendant. Neither was the MCI-Concord booking sergeant whom Murphy claims, along with Superintendent Gray, “intimidated, coerced and threatened Murphy by holding in custody until after lunch.”⁶

3. Declaratory judgment. “[T]o make out a request for declaratory judgment ․ [i]t is not enough to claim a constitutional violation; rather, a plaintiff must plead a particular constitutional violation and demonstrate that such a violation extends beyond the plaintiff's individual case and is ‘consistently repeated’ by the administrative agency.” Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 137 n.9 (2013). Murphy requests a declaration that “that the Parole Board must have different regulations, policies and procedures for inmates being released on RTS,” but does not identify a particular policy whose application results in a “consistently repeated” constitutional violation. See id. To the extent that Murphy identifies any of the board's policies, he does not allege that those policies result in constitutional violations but contends that those policies were applied pretextually or inconsistently. Namely, Murphy alleges (1) that despite the policy prohibiting parolees from nonincidental association with people whom a parolee “know[s] to have a criminal record,” Parole Board, Policies and Procedures, 120 PAR § 359, the board denied his first parole plan to retaliate against him because of Oliveira's actions, and (2) that despite the policy requiring MASH to approve a sober home, the board “regularly releases inmates to Steps 2 Solutions.” Because Murphy does not allege a consistently repeated constitutional violation, but rather alleges violations particular to his circumstances, Murphy's claim for a declaratory judgment was properly dismissed See Grady, supra.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   A prospective parolee must submit a parole plan approved by the parole board before the parole board will issue a parole permit pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 130B. The parole plan must include, inter alia, “a parolee's physical address and cohabitants.” G. L. c. 127, § 130B (a).

3.   The board notes that their general conditions of parole policy prohibits parolees from nonincidental association with people whom a parolee “know[s] to have a criminal record.” Massachusetts Parole Board, Policies and Procedures, 120 PAR § 359. The board found Oliveira in violation of his parole after a field parole officer found a locked toolbox with drugs in the basement of the Sodom Road residence, but the violation was later “nullified.”

4.   Murphy alleges that “The Department of Correction ․ and MCI Concord regularly releases inmates to Steps 2 Solutions.”

5.   The board contends that it is also immunized by G. L. c. 258, § 10 (i), which exempts from liability “ an [sic] claim based upon the release, parole, furlough or escape of any person ․ unless gross negligence is shown in allowing such release, parole, furlough or escape.” However, Murphy's claim is not based on Murphy's release, but the opposite -- the decision not to release him.

6.   To the extent that Murphy's claims should be read as relating to the Department of Corrections, “there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983,” Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1981), and the MTCA immunizes public employers from liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort.” G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).