COMMONWEALTH v. HELMDEAN NOEL (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Helmdean Noel, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child by force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A; one count of rape and abuse of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23; five counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B; one count of posing a child in a state of nudity, G. L. c. 272, § 29A (a); one count of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22; one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors, G. L. c. 272, § 28; and one count of dissemination of visual material of a child in a state of nudity, G. L. c. 272, § 29B.¹ On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the motion judge erred by denying the defendant's pretrial motion to subpoena records related to prior allegations of sexual abuse of the victim by a family member, (2) the trial judge erred by foreclosing certain cross-examination regarding the prior allegation of sexual abuse by the family member, and (3) the defendant was materially prejudiced by an overwhelming amount of prior bad act and character evidence. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain details, such as excluded evidence, for later discussion.

In January 2020, Taylor,² when she was twenty-three years old, reported to the police that the defendant had sexually abused her when she was a child. At the time of trial, Taylor was twenty-six years old.

1. Taylor's relationship with defendant. When Taylor was in preschool, she lived with her mother and two older brothers, Jake and Lawrence.³ The defendant was introduced to Taylor's family through the Big Brothers and Sisters Program of Massachusetts as a mentor or “big brother” to Jake. After Jake moved out of State to live with his father, the defendant spent time with Lawrence and Taylor (the children). The defendant provided emotional and financial support to the children. He took them on outings and played video games with them, bought them clothes and school supplies, and always helped when asked.

The defendant was the emergency contact for the children with their schools, he could pick them up from school, and the school bus dropped Taylor at his address. The defendant's home was a second home to Taylor. When she was older, she would take public transportation to his house, and he would drive her home. When Lawrence was younger, he was present, too. But as he became a teenager, he spent more time with friends. The defendant's home had a computer, printer, and an Internet connection. Taylor's home did not. The defendant helped the children with their homework and attended school events.

2. Sexual abuse. Taylor testified that when she was six years old and in first grade, she was alone with the defendant, and he told her to jump on his bed. She was clothed, but then he told her to take her pants off and jump and do splits. Then he had her remove her underwear. The defendant was holding a camera and later admitted to having recorded her and showed her the video recording. He told her it was their secret and, because Taylor's favorite thing was to go to the library, he suggested they call this “library time.”

When Taylor was in fifth grade, the defendant told her it was time to start “training” her body. During this training, the defendant would show Taylor video recordings on his laptop of girls between one and eighteen years old being sexually abused by adult men. Taylor recalled a video recording about a girl named Tara and another named Vicki and that the defendant said they were from Cambodia. The defendant would direct Taylor to do what she had seen the girls in the video recordings do.

The defendant also had Taylor insert into her vagina sex “toys,” which she described by shape, color, and other features. This caused her pain, and if she said she did not like it or wanted to stop, the defendant would encourage her to keep going. The defendant had Taylor use lubricants, including a lubricant from a clear bottle with a purple cap. At the end of each session, the defendant would instruct Taylor to stimulate him with her hand or suck his penis.

The defendant would tell Taylor how happy he was with her training progress. The defendant “was practically [her] savior,” so she wanted to do her best for him. The defendant also gave her prizes after the sessions, such as taking her to eat at a restaurant.

When Taylor was in sixth grade, the defendant began raping her vaginally. The vaginal rapes were painful as it felt like the defendant's penis was hitting her cervix and, because his penis was curved, a wall to the side.⁴ Taylor told the defendant she did not enjoy what they were doing. One time, when Taylor was in middle school, the defendant raped her anally. Though the defendant used a numbing cream, when the defendant attempted to insert his penis into her anus, it was painful, and she defecated on him.

In high school, Taylor and the defendant argued about Taylor not following through on “deals” the defendant made with her for rape in exchange for a prize the defendant had given her. The defendant raped Taylor vaginally for the last time when she was eighteen. Shortly after Taylor went to college, she cut off communications with the defendant.

Lawrence testified that he spent more time at the defendant's house than Taylor, but sometimes she was already at the defendant's house when Lawrence arrived. Lawrence testified that he never heard or saw anything inappropriate between the defendant and his sister.

A neighbor of the two-family home where the defendant lived with his mother testified that she never saw anything concerning between the defendant and the children. She said she never saw the defendant alone with Taylor; her brother was always there. A Boston police detective testified that the neighbor had told him she did see Taylor alone with the defendant. The detective also testified that the neighbor reacted with surprise when she was asked to testify.

3. Video recordings of Taylor. The defendant would record the training sessions and, later, the rapes, in his bedroom, which had distinctive bright green walls, a full-size bed with a headboard, and dressers. The recordings were made. The defendant put a plain sheet over the bed and headboard and had Taylor wear a Mardi Gras mask that the defendant kept in the top drawer of his dresser, so that neither Taylor nor the bedroom were identifiable. Sometimes the green wall of the bedroom was visible in the video recordings. The videotaping could take hours. The defendant took a blue pill to prevent his penis from becoming flaccid during the process.

The defendant would instruct Taylor to orally stimulate his penis, to touch her body in certain ways, and to insert her fingers into her vagina. Other times, the defendant would ask Taylor to dance. Even though the defendant's attempt to anally rape Taylor ended with her defecating on him, he still wanted to make a recording of it. With Taylor facing the camera, he positioned his penis between her legs to make it appear that he was penetrating her anus. He sent this video recording to his friend Alister.

The defendant uploaded the recordings to his laptop computer, an “HP,” and later an Apple. Taylor saw the defendant edit the video recordings and post them on a website called “Dreamboard.” He created short clips called previews, adding music and ensuring that either Taylor was wearing a mask or nothing above their necks was showing. He identified Taylor as “Princess” in the video recordings. He used a neighbor's unsecured wireless (WiFi) network to upload the preview to Dreamboard. The defendant told Taylor that the rules of Dreamboard required that he had to upload his video recordings in exchange for access to other recordings.

The defendant told Taylor he was proud of their video recordings. He pointed out that she was the only Black girl in the video recordings that they watched together. This caused Taylor to feel like they were “making history” or “making a contribution.” She felt that the recordings were a team effort.

4. Taylor's disclosure and first complaint. Taylor testified that she did not report the defendant at first because she thought she was helping him. She wanted to keep their secret. In fifth and sixth grade, she thought she was on a team with the defendant and that she was helping him when nobody else could. She also did not think her mother would believe her. When she was in high school, she was worried that no one else would take care of her. She thought she was “in too deep.” She decided to “bury it.” She would “ghost” him for weeks at a time. She reported the abuse to authorities in 2020.

The Commonwealth introduced first complaint evidence that in the summer after ninth grade, Taylor told a friend about the abuse. The first complaint witness testified that Taylor told her that “during her childhood, she had been raped by someone who was a close family friend to her mother.” This witness testified that Taylor did not state that the abuse was ongoing or identify the abuser by name.

5. Testimony regarding video recordings. James Fottrell from the United States Department of Justice's child exploitation and obscenity section testified about how to find child pornography on the Internet and his investigation into Dreamboard.⁵ That website operated from approximately 2008 to 2010. Fottrell described it as a “sophisticated child pornography community” of offenders “who were taking extraordinary steps to hide their identity” and location. Membership was by application only and required approval by the administrators. The application involved uploading child pornography to another location for administrators to review. Once accepted, applicants became regular members, though there were different levels of membership. Members had to post child pornography regularly to avoid being expelled. Members had to post previews of their video recordings. Other members could then comment. The preview was stored in one location, and if a user liked it, they would receive a link to a password-protected archive file stored in a different location.

Fottrell described a series of video recordings posted on Dreamboard that showed a minor girl, known as Tara, orally stimulating the penis of an adult and being penetrated vaginally and anally by an adult man with his penis.

In 2020, Fottrell was asked to look through Dreamboard evidence for a video series named “Princess” that involved a girl, who is Black and wearing a Mardi Gras mask. Taylor and the defendant are both Black. Fottrell located video recordings matching this description. They were created by a producer who identified himself as “none11.” Taylor testified that the defendant used the username “none11.” Fottrell recovered several other “Princess” video recordings on another Dreamboard user's device, as well as on a known child pornography site. In all, he located thirteen Princess video recordings in three different locations. Seven of these video recordings were admitted as one exhibit (videos). Numerous still images from the videos were admitted as well.

Fottrell did not discover any forensic link between the Princess videos and the defendant. A stipulation was entered and read to the jury stating, “Law enforcement seized the defendant's laptop. It could not be searched because of technological issues that made it impossible to access.”

Taylor testified that she recognized herself in various still images from the Princess videos. She recognized herself from the shape of various parts of her body. She testified generally that she has a beauty mark on her stomach and a darker line below her belly button, and separately identified both features in exhibit no. 51, one of the still images from the videos. She also testified that she has a beauty mark on the outer part of her vulva. She testified that she recognized the defendant's hands in four of the still images. She recognized the defendant's bed and the “distinct green color” of the defendant's bedroom walls. She identified the male voice in one of the videos, which said, “Come on, [nickname], better job”; Lawrence testified that this was a nickname the defendant used for Taylor. Of course, the jury could see the defendant's size and build in the courtroom and compare him to the man's body in the videos.

Taylor testified that when the defendant began abusing her in first grade, and through at least sixth grade, the defendant was uncircumcised, and she described the sensation and mechanics of manually retracting his foreskin during the abuse. She testified that sometime while she was in high school, the defendant told her he was having his penis circumcised, though he did not say why. She recalled a recovery period afterward -during which the abuse paused -- because she remembered feeling “happy,” like she “was on a vacation” from what the defendant called “library time.” She testified that after the defendant recovered from the circumcision, he resumed raping her, and filming it. The defendant's medical records confirm that the defendant had an adult circumcision.

Lawrence also identified the person in the still images as his sister; he identified the defendant's voice on the recording as the defendant's; and he identified the mask the girl in the Princess videos wore as the same mask he had seen at the defendant's home. Before ever being shown that photograph, Lawrence had independently described the mask he remembered from the defendant's bedroom drawer: asked what it looked like, he said it was “[g]reen” and “had ․ bells on it” -- a description matching the purple-and-green, bell-trimmed Mardi Gras mask worn in the Princess videos. Lawrence testified that the defendant's bedroom walls were green; he identified them in a photograph of the defendant's room.

Discussion. As the defendant appropriately acknowledges in his brief, sexual abuse of a child was depicted in the videos introduced in evidence. The central issue in dispute was the identity of the assailant, which depended primarily on the reliability of Taylor's identification of herself and the defendant in the videos and the physical evidence corroborating that identification -- not on the jury resolving a credibility dispute between conflicting accounts. That distinction bears on both the harmless-error and prejudice analyses that follow.

1. Motion to subpoena records. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to subpoena records held by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 885 (1979) (rule 17). When Taylor was in kindergarten, she spent time in foster care due to physical abuse and neglect by her mother. When Taylor was four or five, her oldest brother touched her, under her underwear. She moved back with her mother and Lawrence when she was about six years old. Her oldest brother moved out of State at some point to live with his father.

The defendant argued that the DCF records bore directly on Taylor's credibility at trial. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, contending that the defendant failed to show that the DCF records had specific relevance to the charged offenses, and that the records would not be admissible at trial.

At the hearing, the defendant argued that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 (2006), he was not required to show that the DCF records would have been admissible at trial. In response, the motion judge ⁶ stated,

“I agree that there has to be a higher showing on a Rule 17 motion which has not been met here. This information would not be admissible under [Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 (1978)] or -- and could not be used at trial under Bohanan [sic]. The Rule 17 motions are denied for the reasons stated in the Commonwealth's opposition.”

On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred by applying the wrong legal standard, namely, requiring the defendant to show that the DCF records would have been admissible at trial. Passing over that issue, we conclude that the defendant did not make the requisite showing that the information in the DCF report was relevant. See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 Mass. 645, 648 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997) (“We may ‘affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record and the findings’ ”).

“[A] defendant seek[ing] pretrial inspection of statutorily privileged records of any third party” must satisfy the requirements established in Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122. Commonwealth v. Labroad, 466 Mass. 1037, 1038 (2014), quoting Dwyer, supra at 139. It is well settled that “ ‘[p]otential relevance and conclusory statements regarding relevance are insufficient’ to satisfy Dwyer’s requirements” (citation omitted). Labroad, supra at 1039, quoting Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004). Instead, the defendant bears the burden to “set forth with particularity some factual basis indicating how the privileged records were likely to be relevant and material to an issue in the case, and that an examination of those records would disclose exculpatory information material to the defendant's guilt.” Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 438 (2007). “Generalizations and unsubstantiated statements concerning a particular victim's credibility are not enough.” Id. at 436.

Here, the defendant's rule 17 motion was tantamount to a “general fishing expedition” (quotation and citation omitted). Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 142. The defendant argued in his motion that the DCF records were relevant to “what [Taylor's] home situation was like, what she disclosed about sexual abuse, and her credibility at the time.” At the motion hearing, defense counsel stated that

“prior incidents where [Taylor] may have been assaulted by other people, truthful or not, would certainly be relevant. They either can make it more likely that she's being truthful or less likely that she's being truthful. It could impact her ability to recall things, it could affect her transference if she is putting actins [sic] on Mr. Noel that maybe someone else was doing to her.”

Much of this language is conclusory and merely suggested that the DCF records were potentially relevant, which is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Dwyer, supra. Where the defendant's arguments were “ ‘entirely speculative’ and failed to ‘provide a factual basis for demonstrating that the privileged materials ․ were relevant and material to any issue in the case,’ ” it was within the motion judge's discretion to deny the defendant's motion to subpoena the DCF records. Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 628 (2014), quoting Bourgeois, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 437.

2. Scope of cross-examination. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to admit two prior allegations of sexual abuse of Taylor by third parties, the older brother and a substitute teacher.⁷ In his motion, the defendant proffered that “[w]hen [Taylor] was about four or five years old, her oldest brother[, Jake,] apparently touched her underneath her underwear. DCF investigated this and she was briefly sent to a foster care facility during the investigation.” Additionally, the defendant argued that when Taylor was fifteen years old and in high school, “she reported a substitute teacher for rubbing her shoulders and touching her back.” The matter was referred to DCF and the district attorney's office, but criminal charges were not brought against the teacher. The trial judge ruled that the incident with the substitute teacher was not rendered inadmissible by the rape shield statute, G. L. c. 233, § 21B. The trial judge ruled that the defendant could not reference the incident with Jake because there was “insufficient basis to know whether [Taylor] in fact made any complaint when she was a very young child ages [four] or [five].”

The defendant argues on appeal that the trial judge abused her discretion by foreclosing the defendant from cross-examining Taylor about the prior allegation of sexual abuse of Taylor around age four or five by her oldest brother. We disagree.

“The right to confrontation guarantees that, in most circumstances, a criminal defendant as a matter of right may cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71 (1995). A judge has broad discretion “to direct the course of a trial,” which “extends to limiting and otherwise controlling cross-examination.” Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 451 (2003). A judge may not, however, completely bar inquiry into a relevant subject. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 873 (2010). “In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine and thus to confront a witness against him has been denied because of an unreasonable limitation of cross-examination, we weigh the materiality of the witness's direct testimony and the degree of the restriction on cross-examination.” Commonwealth v. Jacques, 494 Mass. 739, 746 (2024), quoting Miles, supra at 72.

Here, there is no dispute that Taylor's direct testimony was central to the Commonwealth's case. Her testimony was direct evidence of the assaults and was alone sufficient to convict the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 6 (2021) (sexual assault “victim's testimony alone, believed as it was by the jury, suffices to support the defendant's convictions”).

The trial judge did foreclose all cross-examination regarding the alleged sexual abuse of Taylor by her older brother when Taylor was four or five years old. Accepting arguendo that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination, we conclude that this restriction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the trial judge permitted the defendant to achieve the purpose behind that desired inquiry -- to examine whether, prior to and during Taylor's alleged abuse by the defendant, Taylor knew that sexual contact was inappropriate and that she had the ability to report it. Specifically, the trial judge permitted the defendant to cross-examine Taylor regarding her report of sexual abuse by a substitute teacher when she was fifteen years old. This questioning allowed the defendant to demonstrate that Taylor knew (1) that an adult's sexual contact with a child was inappropriate years before the alleged abuse by the defendant ended and (2) that she had the ability to report sexual abuse. We also note that the defendant also could have just asked that question directly, independent of the circumstances of the abuse of Taylor when she was four or five years of age, as defense counsel acknowledged at oral argument.

Second, the alleged sexual contact between Jake and Taylor was quite different than the video-recorded rapes that the defendant was alleged to have committed. Contrast Jacques, 494 Mass. at 749 (error to foreclose all cross-examination about prior sexual abuse by third party where “the similarities between [victim's] allegations against the defendant and her allegations of abuse against the third party [were] unique, specific, and striking”).

Third, the Commonwealth's case was strong. The jury were able to confirm that Taylor was depicted in the photographs and video images based on her testimony that she has a birth mark on her stomach and a darker line below her belly button and separately identified both features on the victim depicted in exhibit no. 51. Likewise, the jury were able to confirm that the defendant was depicted in the photographs and the video images based on Taylor's testimony that she recognized the assailant by the “patchy color on his thighs.” The defendant's medical records confirm that he had been burned below the waist. Also, Taylor and Lawrence identified the defendant's voice extracted from audio of one of the child abuse videos. Moreover, the victim reported the crimes to police and then Fottrell searched Dreamboard for video recordings that met certain criteria, which itself was corroboration.

For all of these reasons, if there was constitutional error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (identifying, as relevant to this determination, importance of witness's testimony, whether it was cumulative, presence of evidence corroborating or contradicting witness on material points, extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and overall strength of prosecution's case); Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 73-75 (1995).

3. Prior bad act and character evidence. The defendant argues that his trial was overwhelmed by “bad act” and character evidence. We review the judge's decision for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 421 (2014). While prior bad acts are “inadmissible for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the crimes charged,” they may be admitted to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or pattern of operation” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014). Even if relevant to a proper purpose, however, prior bad act evidence “will not be admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Id. See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2022).

The defendant argues that Taylor testified that the defendant committed various sexually inappropriate or abusive acts beginning when she was in first grade, including having Taylor jump on the bed naked, years before the indicted charges. This testimony was proper as it went to preparation of the victim, plan, absence of mistake, and pattern of operation. See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249; Commonwealth v. Hanlon, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 810, 817 (1998) (“Evidence of uncharged acts similar to the offense charged is admissible to show a common plan or pattern of conduct which may explain the defendant's intent or modus operandi, to corroborate the victim's testimony, or to counter the defendant's denial” [citations omitted]).

The defendant next argues that Taylor should not have been permitted to testify that the defendant told her that he was sexually attracted to children since his time in Haiti and that his attraction was “re-awaken[ed]” in college after viewing child pornography. The defendant's objection was sustained, but he did not move to strike the testimony. Taylor also testified that the defendant stated, “[P]eople like him were not being accepted.” The prosecutor asked and Taylor testified without objection that the defendant told her she was helping him.

We review any error for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Almele, 474 Mass. 1017, 1019 (2016). We discern no such error.

Taylor's testimony that the defendant admitted he was sexually attracted to children bore on his motive, state of mind, and intent. See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 74, 78 (2014) (“defendant's statement about his sexual attraction [to boys ages nine to fourteen] admissible to prove the ‘probable existence of the same passion or emotion’ at the time the incident occurred” [citation omitted]).

The defendant also challenges the admissibility of Taylor's testimony concerning the defendant's contacts with other child pornography users and producers, including one story about the defendant sending money to a man in Africa while disguised to avoid detection. The challenged testimony was relevant to the two indictments for dissemination of child pornography. This testimony also showed that the defendant was distributing child pornography in a way independent of Dreamboard.

The defendant argues that Fottrell's testimony about his service awards, the various ways someone could obtain child pornography online, the methods Dreamboard users employed to post and view child pornography and avoid detection, as well as “disturbing details” about the Tara video series, was excessive and highly prejudicial. The defendant argues that this testimony and the defendant's interactions with other child pornographers were only marginally relevant.

As an initial matter, Fottrell never testified that the defendant was a member of Dreamboard. In addition, some indictments alleged dissemination of child pornography, and the testimony was relevant to establish that the defendant had disseminated the videos. The videos corroborated Taylor's testimony, and Fottrell's testimony explained to the jury how and where he located the videos. More importantly, any prejudice was not unfair, as it flowed directly from the evidence's properly probative effect in corroborating Taylor's testimony and establishing the charged dissemination offenses, rather than from any tendency to inflame the jury independent of that evidentiary value. See Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 758 (2016).

In support of his claim, the defendant relies heavily on Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 127-130, in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge abused her discretion by permitting a child witness to testify in such volume and detail about uncharged sexual abuse that it overwhelmed the two charged incidents and diverted the jury's attention from them. See id. at 128 (in sixty-five transcript pages of witness's direct examination, only fifteen concerned charged conduct, while twenty-one concerned uncharged sexual abuse witness described as occurring “[u]ncountable” number of times).

This case is different in both degree and kind. Considered as a whole, this evidence did not overwhelm the trial in the manner that requires reversal in such cases as Dwyer or its recent application in Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 107 Mass. App. Ct. 60 (2026). There, prior bad act evidence overwhelmed the case where the Commonwealth introduced extensive uncharged-abuse testimony from two additional named victims, comprising more transcript pages than the testimony concerning the charged conduct itself, and where the convictions rested on the complainants’ credibility without independent corroboration. See id. at 65.

Here, by contrast, the vast majority of the challenged testimony described abuse of Taylor in the course of “training” her for the charged offenses. In addition, the Commonwealth's case did not rest on Taylor's credibility alone; rather, as described above, the jury were able to corroborate Taylor's testimony by comparing it to the videos and still images. Moreover, the jury could rely on Lawrence's identifications, and Fottrell's independent forensic investigation. Indeed, the specific testimony the defendant challenges on this point -- his stated attraction to children, the anecdote about sending money to a producer in Africa, and Fottrell's background testimony about Dreamboard's operation and his own awards -- did not overwhelm the evidence of the charged offenses. See Commonwealth v. Childs, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 74 (2018) (concluding that prior bad act evidence did not overwhelm case where “the bulk of the victim's testimony and all ․ Commonwealth exhibits concerned the charged conduct”). See also Commonwealth v. Nascimento-Depina, 496 Mass. 1, 9, cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 260 (2025) (finding that risk of unfair prejudice from prior bad acts is “slight” where prosecutor made limited inquiry into uncharged conduct and related testimony lacked detail).

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After sentencing, the judge, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, as amended, 489 Mass. 1503 (2022), reduced several of the defendant's convictions to their nonaggravated counterparts and vacated four counts as duplicative, having learned that the statutes underlying the aggravated offenses did not take effect until after some of the charged conduct occurred.

2.   A pseudonym.

3.   Both brothers’ names are pseudonyms.

4.   Taylor identified a penis straightener in a photograph taken of the defendant's bedroom.

5.   Fottrell testified concerning “child pornography.” While that term is used in Federal statutes and law, the phrase “child sexual abuse material” is preferred by some law enforcement agencies and organizations advocating against child exploitation.

6.   The case was tried before a different judge.

7.   The Commonwealth simultaneously filed a motion in limine to preclude the defendant from referencing alleged sexual abuse of the victim by third parties.