ADOPTION OF CASPIAN v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found the mother of Caspian, Tommy, and Agnes unfit and terminated the mother's parental rights. The judge also approved the adoption plans proposed by the Department of Children and Families (department).² The mother appeals, advancing several arguments we address below. We affirm.

Background. Caspian was born in March 2016, Tommy was born in February 2017, and Agnes was born in November 2019. The department became involved with the mother when Caspian tested positive for marijuana at birth; the department also had concerns about the mother's mental health.

The parents have a history of domestic violence, and the police responded to the home numerous times between 2022 and 2025 for reports of domestic disputes. In 2025, the mother was arrested three times for assault and battery against the father. In July 2025, the father obtained a temporary restraining order against her. At the conclusion of the trial, the mother was incarcerated.

The mother has a long history of struggling to manage symptoms of deteriorating mental health and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and anxiety. Throughout 2020, the mother experienced several episodes of acute mental health symptoms that resulted in hospitalizations. In June 2020, the department reviewed a safety plan with the parents that required the father to ensure that the children were not left alone with the mother. On July 6, 2020, the department received a report, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), that the mother had been arrested after locking herself in a room with two of the children and that she had knives with her. The mother was hospitalized, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12, and the department subsequently supported an allegation of neglect. The department discussed safety planning with the father and advised him that the mother should not be left alone with the children. On July 25, 2020, the department received a 51A report alleging that the mother appeared at her psychiatrist's office demanding medications, while experiencing a psychosis and incoherent; the department supported the allegation of neglect. In August 2020, the mother was again hospitalized after cutting her wrists and calling 911 to report that she was at home with Agnes and wanted to harm herself. The children were removed from the parents following the mother's hospitalization.

On August 25, 2020, the department filed a petition in the Juvenile Court seeking custody of the children. After an emergency hearing, a judge awarded temporary custody of the children to the department. After the children's removal from the parents, the department placed the children in foster homes. In December 2022, the department changed the children's permanency goals to adoption. A trial commenced on January 2, 2025; continued over numerous nonconsecutive dates; and concluded on August 20, 2025.

Discussion. 1. Unfitness. The mother contends that the judge's finding of her unfitness was based on erroneous findings of fact and that the evidence failed to establish current unfitness. We disagree.

“In deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be served by terminating the legal relation between parent and child.” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). “We give substantial deference to a judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the best interest of the child, and reverse only where the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.” Id. Subsidiary findings must be proven by a fair preponderance of evidence. See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 (1997).

The mother challenges the judge's findings that the mother struggled to meet her mental health needs and could not coordinate her care. Based on our review of the record, the evidence amply supported the judge's findings. The mother had a history of not recognizing or treating her deteriorating mental health until dangerous symptoms manifested prompting arrest or hospitalization. These challenges continued throughout the pendency of the case. On May 23, 2025, while trial was ongoing, the mother went to the emergency room “because she was not feeling mentally well” following an altercation with the father that had resulted in the mother's arrest the previous day. The mother was subsequently hospitalized for seven days before being transferred to a transitional mental health facility and offered five days of treatment; she chose to leave after three days of treatment.

The evidence supported the judge's finding that the mother was unable to demonstrate an understanding of her mental health diagnoses or symptoms. At the time of trial, the mother was not taking the medication that was prescribed to her after her May 2025 hospitalization. Moreover, she testified at trial that she was “not sure” what schizoaffective disorder meant or what her schizoaffective symptoms were. The mother previously told the department social worker that she had bipolar disorder, and her medical records discussed the diagnosis, but, at trial, the mother denied any prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder. The mother also refused the department's offer to assist her engaging with the Department of Mental Health (DMH). See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 147 (2020) (mother's unwillingness to adhere to service plan requiring she obtain treatment for her mental health challenges is “relevant to the determination of unfitness”).

The mother next challenges the judge's finding that the mother was unable to meet the children's specialized needs. The evidence amply supported the judge's finding that the mother was unable to provide for the children's “considerable medical and educational needs.” The mother failed to maintain contact with the children's providers “to understand [the children's] services and progress” and could not explain how she would provide for their significant medical needs if they were returned to her care. She “demonstrated a lack of knowledge of basic aspects of the children's lives, including what grade [Agnes] was in, [Agnes]’s diagnosis, and the name of [Tommy]’s school.”

The mother also failed to demonstrate an ability to effectively supervise the children at visits and exhibited volatile behavior during visits. At a 2022 visit, the mother yelled at Agnes's foster parent in front of the children, banged on the foster mother's car, and yelled obscenities at the social worker. Two visits, in May and October 2024, ended early because of the mother's behavior. At the May visit, the mother had to be escorted outside by police after yelling obscenities at the social worker while Tommy was still in the visitation room.

Based on our review of the record, the evidence supported the judge's findings that the mother's “untreated mental health and episodes of violence render her incapable of serving as a safe caretaker” for the children. See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 146 (“Mental disorder is relevant only to the extent that it affects the parents’ capacity to assume parental responsibility, and ability to deal with a child's special needs” [citation omitted]).

The mother also challenges the judge's finding that the mother denied accountability for her dysregulated behavior, and she points to her testimony about her anxiety-related speech interruptions, forgetfulness, need for coping strategies, and acknowledgement of the children's autism diagnoses and her efforts to educate herself. The mother's arguments, however, “amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge's weighing of the evidence and credibility of witnesses.” Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 166 (2001). We see no basis for disturbing the judge's long and comprehensive “specific and detailed [findings] ․ demonstrat[ing] that close attention was given to the evidence.” Adoption of Georgia, 433 Mass. 62, 66 (2000).

2. Reasonable accommodations. The mother argues that the judge abused his discretion in terminating her parental rights and finding that the department made reasonable efforts toward reunification, where the department failed to hold a meeting with her, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or provide her with the necessary services to enable her reunification with the children. We are not persuaded.

Because the mother failed to raise the issue of reasonable efforts in the Juvenile Court, she “cannot raise a claim of inadequate services for the first time on appeal.” Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020). A parent who believes that the department is not reasonably accommodating a disability has the burden to “raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner so that reasonable accommodations may be made.” Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 124 (2001). See Adoption of Mattis, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 549 (2026) (“We see no reason why a reasonable efforts claim should not be subject to the same waiver rules that apply to all appeals”). To be timely, the claim should be raised “either when the parenting plan is adopted, when [the parent] receives those services, or shortly thereafter.” Adoption of Gregory, supra at 124. The failure to make a timely claim bars the parent from raising the department's noncompliance with the ADA or other antidiscrimination laws for the first time at a termination proceeding. Id.

Even if we were to consider the mother's argument, we would conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the department's efforts to reunify the mother with the children were reasonable. “Where a parent, as here, has cognitive or other limitations that affect the receipt of services, the department's duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the natural family includes a requirement that the department provide services that accommodate the special needs of a parent.” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61. “What constitutes reasonable efforts ․ must be evaluated in the context of each individual case ․” Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. 212, 227 (2017).

Here, the evidence demonstrated that the department made significant efforts to assist the mother, but she did not seek or utilize services recommended by the department. Not only did the mother fail to request any accommodation from the department, but she rejected the possibility of engaging with DMH and the Department of Developmental Services when a social worker discussed it with her. The social worker also offered referrals to clinical services for the mother, but the mother refused those services. The department's “obligation to work with the mother was contingent upon her own obligation to fulfill various parental responsibilities, including seeking and utilizing appropriate services and maintaining regular contact with [the department] and [the child].” Adoption of Serge, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2001). We conclude the judge did not abuse his discretion. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 242 (“A judge's determination that the department made reasonable efforts will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous”).

3. Negative inference for the mother's failure to testify on the last day of trial. The mother's contention that the judge erred in drawing a negative inference for the mother's failure to testify on the last day of trial lacks merit.³ Here, the mother refused to testify because she had a pending competency evaluation in her criminal case in the District Court; her trial counsel told the judge that he did not believe the mother was competent to testify that day. The judge responded that he was “going to take a negative inference about [the m]other's refusal to take the stand.”

We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in drawing a negative inference from the mother's failure to testify. See Care & Protection of Quinn, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 123 (2002) (proper to draw appropriate inferences from fact that father presented no testimony). See also Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 616 (1986) (“The unique characteristics of child custody proceedings do not require alteration or modification of the rule permitting inferences from a party's failure to testify in a civil case”).

Moreover, the evidence of the mother's unfitness was overwhelming, and the negative inference drawn by the judge was just one factor among many that supported the judge's conclusion that the mother was unfit and that it was in the children's best interests to terminate parental rights. See Adoption of Cecily, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 719, 727 (2013) (“It is clear from the judge's findings that while he drew a negative inference against the mother, the inference was merely one of several factors considered by the judge”). Under these circumstances, we discern no error.

4. The adoption plans. We find unavailing the mother's argument that the department's adoption plans for the children were not sufficiently individualized. The mother contends that the adoption plans lacked sufficient detail and did not “meaningfully address[ ] [Tommy]’s autism and residential placement, [Caspian]’s autism, or [Agnes]’s feeding disorder and medical needs.”

At trial, the mother did not object to the department's adoption plans, nor did she present alternative plans. Because the mother failed to object to the permanency plans, the claim is waived. Care & Protection of Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 787 (2022).

Even if we were to consider the mother's argument, we would discern no error. “The law does not require that the adoption plan be fully developed in order to support a termination order, but it must provide sufficient information about the prospective adoptive placement so that the judge may properly evaluate the suitability of the department's proposal” (quotations and citation omitted). Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 770 (2019). “[T]he department must submit to the judge an adoption plan that is sufficiently detailed to permit the judge to evaluate the type of parents and home environment proposed and consider whether the proposal is best suited to meet the specific needs of the child.” Id. at 770-771.

Here, the adoption plans submitted by the department contained sufficient detail to permit the judge to determine whether the proposals met the specific needs of each child. The written plan for Tommy detailed his numerous medications and mentioned his diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The plan also stated that Tommy has an individualized education plan (IEP) and receives applied behavioral analysis (ABA) services. The written adoption plan for Caspian mentions his ASD diagnosis, his prescribed medication, and the services he receives. Agnes's adoption plan described the services she received.

Moreover, the judge was not limited to considering only the written adoption plans. The judge also heard detailed testimony from the children's adoption social worker, who testified about Tommy's placement at a residential program, the program's recommendations, his behavioral issues, the treatment and services he receives, and the level of care his ASD diagnosis requires. The judge heard details about Tommy's IEP, speech services, occupational therapy services, ABA services, and extended school year.

The social worker described in detail Caspain's preadoptive home and her observations of his interactions with the preadoptive parent. The social worker testified about Caspian's multiple diagnoses and the preadoptive parent's ability to ensure that he receives the necessary services and meet his needs. The adoption social worker also provided details about Caspian's IEP and ABA services.

The social worker also provided detailed testimony about Agnes's preadoptive placement. She testified that Agnes's behavior escalated during a home visit, and the worker described the preadoptive parent's ability to handle the situation by giving Agnes her “space” and “time.” The social worker described how well Agnes responded to the preadoptive parent and that Agnes was able to process her feelings and emotions and “easily calm[ ] down.” The social worker testified that Agnes's preadoptive parent ensured that Agnes has all her services “in place,” including seeing specialists for diagnoses of “avoidant restrictive food intake disorder, ․ a sensory processing disorder, an adjustment disorder, and reactive airway disease.” The preadoptive parent provided detailed testimony about Agnes's physical and behavioral challenges and the progress she has made through the different services she receives. We discern no error.

Decrees affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   On September 5, 2025, the father of the children stipulated to termination of his parental rights; he is not a party to the appeal.

3.   In her brief, the mother contends that the judge erred in denying her request to continue the trial because the mother was unable to attend as a result of her detention by the District Court for a competency proceeding. At oral argument, however, the mother's counsel conceded that the mother was in fact present at trial.