IN RE: THE MONICA KING 2020 IRREVOCABLE TRUST. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The petitioner is the former husband of the decedent, Monica King (Monica), and a beneficiary of her trust. He asserts that an attorney who served as Monica's conservator and the trustee of the trust violated her fiduciary duty by transferring money from the trust to the conservatorship bank account. A judge of the Probate and Family Court allowed summary judgment in favor of the trustee. We affirm.

Background. “We summarize the findings set forth in the order on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, supplemented by other uncontroverted facts in the summary judgment record and viewing ‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered,’ ” -- here, the petitioner (citations omitted). Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 685 (2022). This matter began with competing petitions for guardianship and conservatorship of Monica, one set filed by her sister and the other by the petitioner. In October 2020, after the sister and the petitioner reached a stipulation that a guardian and conservator be appointed, a judge entered decrees on the sister's petitions and appointed the attorney as Monica's guardian and conservator. The petitioner's petitions were dismissed. The decree of conservatorship empowered the conservator, among other things, to create an irrevocable trust for Monica's benefit and to transfer her assets, including interest in real property, to the trust.

In December 2020, the Monica King 2020 Irrevocable Trust (trust) was created with the attorney as trustee. The trust was “for the sole support and benefit of” Monica. The petitioner and the sister were named remaindermen and were to take equal shares of the trust after Monica's death. The trustee was empowered to “pay on Monica's behalf as much of the income or principal of the trust as it shall determine in its sole and nonreviewable discretion to be necessary for Monica's care and well-being.” She was also “directed to conserve and accumulate the trust estate to the extent feasible, due to the unforeseeability of Monica's future needs,” but “accumulation or use of the trust [was] to be determined solely on the basis of Monica's needs without regard to the interests of the remaindermen.” The trust further specified that the trustee “shall spend as much of the net income and principal of the trust as the Trustee shall deem necessary and reasonable to provide Monica the highest quality of life” and afford her “the maximum level of medical, nursing, rehabilitative, or comfort care.” Additional provisions of the trust emphasized the goals of keeping Monica in “the most home-like setting for as long as it is reasonable” and providing her the highest level of care.

Monica eventually needed a higher level of care than could be provided in her home, and she moved into an assisted living residence. In June 2024, following Monica's hospitalization and anticipating that Monica would need more care, the trustee transferred $250,000 from the trust account to the conservatorship account. The transfer was done for Monica's benefit; the trustee explained that it was designed to make Monica a more competitive candidate for admission to a high-quality skilled nursing facility. Because Monica's health stabilized, she was able to remain in her assisted living facility and did not need to move. She died four months later.

Discussion. “We review the judge's allowance of summary judgment and questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” Matter of the Trusts Under the Will of Kline, 495 Mass. 1, 4 (2024). “Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id., citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

“The interpretation of a written trust is a matter of law to be resolved by the court.” Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 476 Mass. 651, 654 (2017). “The rules of construction of a contract apply similarly to trusts; where the language of a trust is clear, we look only to that plain language.” Id.

The petitioner asserts that the trustee had a fiduciary duty to him (and to Monica's sister) as a contingent beneficiary of the trust, which she breached by prioritizing Monica's needs. He grounds this argument in G. L. c. 203E, § 105 (b) (2), of the Massachusetts Uniform Trust Code (MUTC), which requires that the “terms of a trust shall prevail over any provision of this chapter except ․ the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.” Stretching this language to its breaking point, the petitioner maintains that it obligated the trustee to act in the best interests of the qualified beneficiaries and not only in Monica's best interests.

Like the motion judge, we are not convinced. While the petitioner accurately identified the trustee's legal obligation under G. L. c. 203E, § 801, and the judge erred in ruling that the trustee's fiduciary duty ran only to Monica during her lifetime, the error was harmless. The trustee was bound to follow the language of the trust. See Hillman v. Hillman, 433 Mass. 590, 593 (2001). See also Groden v. Kelley, 382 Mass. 333, 335 (1981). The unambiguous language of the trust required the trustee to prioritize Monica's health and comfort during her lifetime, “without regard to the interests of the remaindermen.” The petitioner failed to grapple with the import of this provision, as well as those that (1) required that the trust be administered “for the sole support and benefit of” Monica during her lifetime, and (2) required that the trustee “shall spend as much of the net income and principal of the trust as the Trustee shall deem necessary and reasonable to provide Monica the highest quality of life” and to afford her “the maximum level of medical, nursing, rehabilitative, or comfort care.” These unambiguous terms evidence that the settlor's “dominant purpose was to provide for [Monica's] lifetime support and housing needs,” and the remaindermen's interests were secondary. Gershaw v. Gershfield, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87 (2001). Pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 803, the trustee had a duty of impartiality, to be sure, but that duty must give way when, as here, “the terms of the trust direct or authorize the trustee to favor one beneficiary over another.” 3 A.W. Scott & M.L. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 17.15, at 1401 (6th ed. 2021).

The petitioner also asserts that the trustee breached her duties under the MUTC by transferring trust funds to the custodial account and that the judge erred in not ordering those funds be returned to the trust account after Monica's death. The nub of this argument is a disagreement with the trustee's determination that transferring assets out of the trust put Monica in a more competitive position for admission to a high-quality facility of the type contemplated by the trust terms. As we concluded above, the trustee acted in good faith and did not violate the terms of the trust in making this transfer. The judge did not err in concluding that a hearsay statement in the petitioner's affidavit did not create a material dispute of fact about the trustee's adherence to the trust terms.¹

Decree of dismissal affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Even were we to consider the petitioner's assertion that, when he called one of the facilities under consideration, he was told by someone that “generally ․ trust funds could be used to pay for skilled nursing placement,” that assertion has only a glancing relationship to the trustee's reasoning. The trustee averred that putting the money in the conservatorship account made Monica a “more competitive” applicant for a quality facility, not that trust funds could not be used to pay for such a facility after she was admitted.