CARE AND PROTECTION OF ZION v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A Juvenile Court judge found the child (now seventeen years old) in need of care and protection, and a second judge approved a permanency plan of reunification proposed by the Department of Children and Families (department). On appeal, the child challenges the permanency plan and, for the first time, claims that the trial court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901. We conclude that the claim related to the permanency plan is moot, and we further conclude that the Juvenile Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

The challenge to the permanency plan is now moot. In his appeal, the child argues that the approval of the permanency plan should be vacated because the department should not have pursued reunification and should have taken steps to implement “another permanency planned living arrangement” (APPLA) as provided by G. L. c. 119, § 29B (a). While this appeal has been pending, the department changed the child's permanency plan from reunification to APPLA. Because the child has now obtained the relief that he concedes had been sought in the trial court, the challenge to the permanency plan is moot. See Guardianship of Tara, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 11, 13–14 (2020) (court ordinarily does not adjudicate case where no further effective relief available). The appeal is not moot, however. The child, who remains in the department's custody, maintains a personal stake in the legal question of subject matter jurisdiction. See Troila v. Department of Correction, 490 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2022).

As to the child's ICWA claim, we discern no reason to conclude that the Juvenile Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We are aware of no evidence that exclusive tribal jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) and (b) has displaced State court jurisdiction. There is no evidence that the child is “an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of [an Indian] tribe,” or that anyone has petitioned for the transfer of State court proceedings to a “tribal court of such tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), (b). There is also no evidence of any agreement between Massachusetts and an Indian tribe regarding jurisdiction in this case. See 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a).

Moreover, the Juvenile Court docket entries expressly state that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) “cannot identify the child's affiliation with a federally recognized Tribe.” The child contends that subject matter jurisdiction is now in doubt because the BIA notice contained the wrong date of birth for the child, and the department failed to file a copy of its inquiry sent to the BIA (suggesting that a department error as to the date of birth must have misled the BIA). Beyond our unwillingness to speculate about facts not established by the record, we note that even if the child is an Indian child, apart from the exceptions for exclusive jurisdiction previously noted, State courts have concurrent jurisdiction under the ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Thus, based on the record before us, we discern no impediment to subject matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion. So much of the appeal as challenges the permanency plan is dismissed as moot. With respect to the portion of the appeal challenging the Juvenile Court's subject matter jurisdiction, we hold that the Juvenile Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

So ordered.