ADOPTION OF YAEL v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother and the father appeal from decrees issued by a Juvenile Court judge terminating their parental rights to their children, Yael and Mary. The parents assert that the judge abused her discretion in approving the Department of Children and Families’ (DCF) permanency plans and in declining to order posttermination visitation. We are not persuaded and accordingly, affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the judge's findings, reserving certain details for later discussion. The parents had unaddressed domestic violence in their relationship, untreated mental health conditions, and demonstrated lack of improvement in parenting capability and insight. The mother had a history of denial, resisting treatment for mental illness, and poor decision-making skills. Despite routinely presenting with symptoms like disorganized thinking, paranoia, and mania, the mother denied any history of mental illness. The mother was psychiatrically hospitalized in May 2025 and refused to take medication as prescribed. The mother's unaddressed mental illness frequently caused her to misconstrue situations and become aggressive.

The father was the subject of a G. L. c. 119, § 51A report alleging that he was masturbating in a car while Mary was in the backseat. The judge noted that the court “maintains concerns for [the f]ather's nudity in public in the presence of [Mary].” Additionally, the father minimized concerns regarding the mother's mental illness and would not take measures to protect the children from repeated exposure to dangerous symptoms like suicidal statements.

The goal of the DCF permanency plans for both children was adoption. The foster home where the children have resided since August 2023 was not available as an adoptive resource. The parents do not challenge any of the judge's factual findings as clearly erroneous.²

Discussion. We review the judge's findings “with substantial deference and will not disturb those findings unless clearly erroneous.” Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 166 (2012). We “defer to the judge's determinations regarding the best interests of the child, and reverse only where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.” Id.

1. Waiver of father's claims. Generally, issues not raised by a party in the trial court are not addressed on appeal, absent exceptional circumstances. Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 712 (1993); Adoption of Mattis, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 549-550 (2026). “Underlying the purpose of the waiver doctrine is the need to give other parties —- and the courts —- fair notice that a claim or defense is being raised.” Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 579, 584 (2019). See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000) (“[waiver] principle does not demand the incantation of particular words ․, it requires that the lower court be fairly put on notice as to the substance of the issue”).

Here, both parents had the opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the permanency plans and to seek posttermination visitation with the children; however, only the mother did so, and thus only the mother properly preserved these issues for appeal. At no point during trial did the father discuss posttermination visitation or challenge DCF's permanency plans. The only issue raised by the father at trial was that termination of his parental rights was unwarranted. As such, the father failed to give adequate notice to DCF and the judge that he sought posttermination visitation with the children or challenged DCF's plans. Additionally, the father failed to detail any relevant exceptional circumstances that would excuse his waiver of these issues. Accordingly, we decline to review the arguments presented by the father.³ Therefore, we consider only the mother's arguments regarding these issues on appeal.

2. Approval of permanency plans. The mother argues that DCF failed to provide sufficiently detailed permanency plans and that the judge's decision to approve the proposed plans was not in the best interests of the children.

Although DCF must present and the judge must consider a permanency plan, G. L. c. 210 § 3 (c), that plan need not be “fully developed” at the time of trial, Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 722 n.7 (1995), but rather need only provide enough information “that the judge may properly evaluate the suitability of [DCF]’s proposal” (citation omitted). Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652-653 (2001). Here, the plans provided sufficient detail as to what permanency-related steps DCF had already taken and the subsequent steps that would occur to place the children in a suitable adoptive home. Specifically, the plans stated that DCF explored using the children's paternal grandmother as an adoptive resource; however, the children could not be placed with her provisionally due to concerns regarding apartment size and income. Cf. Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 771 (2019) (plan inadequate where DCF had not reviewed suitability of kinship placement with aunt). Notably, neither parent suggested another viable kinship alternative. See Adoption of Paula, supra.

Placement with the paternal grandmother could only occur upon completion of an approved home study, which had not occurred at the time of trial. Alternatively, if the home study was not approved, the plans said that DCF was prepared to seek permanency for the children through recruitment.

Accordingly, the judge considered each plan's attempt to place the children with a family member, pending the findings of the home study. Furthermore, to assess the suitability of the plans, the judge thoughtfully reviewed the details of the plans while balancing her findings that the parents “are unable to provide for the care and protection of [the children], and this inability is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.” See Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. at 652-653. The plans were sufficiently detailed, calling for “a home that will adopt as a sibling group”; stressing the need “to find a family, either one parent or two, who can provide safety, consistency, and engagement in the various services that will support their ongoing development and healing”; noting that the children “have done well with the other youth in the foster home and could be placed with or without other children both older and younger than them”; and stating that “[t]he pre-adoptive home must be able to provide trauma-informed frameworks of nurture and structure in order to create an environment that will allow the children to continue flourishing and healing.”

In summary, the factual findings provide an adequate basis for the judge's ultimate conclusions. Contrary to the mother's assertion, the fact that the adoption worker did not testify at trial does not change this outcome. Nor were the plans required to address what the mother characterizes as hostility between her and the paternal grandmother; the point of the plans was to find a suitable permanent placement for the children, ideally with a relative, not to preserve their relationship with a parent who the judge had found unfit. Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in approving the plans.

3. Posttermination visitation. The mother also contends that the judge erred in refusing to order posttermination visitation between her and the children.

To determine whether to order visitation, a judge must ask the following questions: “First, is visitation in the child's best interest? Second, in cases where a family is ready to adopt the child, is an order of visitation necessary to protect the child's best interest, or may decisions regarding visitation be left to the judgment of the adoptive family?” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 63 (2011). The purpose of posttermination visitation “is not to strengthen the bonds between the child and [their] biological mother or father, but to assist the child as [they] negotiate[ ], often at a very young age, the tortuous path from one family to another.” Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 564-565 (2000). Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the type of bond that justifies a visitation order necessitates a quantum of proof beyond “some evidence” that visits with the children were generally positive experiences. Adoption of Douglas, 473 Mass. 1024, 1028 (2016).

Here, the judge acted within her discretion in declining to order posttermination visitation with the mother. The factual findings demonstrate that the judge considered, among other things, that during visits, the children were “emotional” and “dysregulated,” and that the mother's visits were often stressful for the children. These facts were considered alongside other findings that the “[m]other's problematic behaviors stemming from her mental deficiencies creates a major risk to [Yael's] and [Mary]’s well-being.” As such, the judge found that the mother had not “formed a significant existing bond with the subject children.”

Thus, the judge's factual findings detailed: (1) the absence of a significant existing bond between the mother and the children; and (2) that the mother's unaddressed mental health issues contributed to stressful and emotionally volatile visits, and this trend was likely to persist. Accordingly, the record provides adequate support for the judge's determination not to order posttermination visitation. Therefore, the judge did not abuse her discretion.

Decrees affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Instead, the parents assert that improper weight was afforded to certain factual findings regarding whether there was a significant bond between the parents and the children.

3.   However, even if the father's claims had not been waived, we would have deemed the father's arguments unavailing for the reasons set forth infra regarding the mother.