B.R. v. R.A. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, R.A., appeals from the extension of a harassment prevention order issued in favor of the plaintiff, B.R.¹ See G. L. c. 258E, § 3.² Concluding that the evidence supported the judge's conclusion that the defendant committed three or more qualifying acts of willful and malicious conduct against the plaintiff, and that such evidence is sufficient to permit the extension of a harassment prevention order, we affirm.

Background. The parties live in a single-home condominium with two units. The defendant occupies the first-floor unit, the plaintiff the basement unit, and the parties share common areas.³ In 2023, when the plaintiff moved into the building, he and the defendant met to discuss shared condominium responsibilities. Following this initial meeting, the plaintiff averred in an affidavit supporting his complaint for a harassment prevention order that the defendant harassed him at various times over a fifteen-month period.

The plaintiff stated first that in August 2023, he invited a contractor to the condominium, at which time the defendant “launched into an aggressive, hostile tirade” and “loudly proclaim[ed” that neither the contractor, who was wearing a hat with a Freemason insignia, nor the plaintiff should be Freemasons and that “the only path to salvation was exclusive faith in Jesus Christ.” The plaintiff felt “intimidated and unsettled” by this encounter and believed the defendant's comments “were clearly aimed at undermining my identity and disparaging my beliefs.” The plaintiff also stated that in September 2023, he slid a note under the defendant's door, which was his way of contacting her since she refused to give him her contact information. As the plaintiff slid the note, the defendant “burst” out of her apartment and hit the defendant with a snow scraper and shoved him twice. The plaintiff averred that this interaction left him “fearful for my safety.”

The plaintiff further stated that the following year, in April 2024, the defendant made loud, crashing noises above his unit. Subsequently, in May 2024, the defendant “physically confronted” the plaintiff and his wife while they were in the condominium's outdoor common area. The defendant and her daughter “block[ed] our attempts to mow the lawn and remove debris” and “aggressively claimed ownership of the common area, asserting that we could not touch anything without her written permission.” The plaintiff also stated that in August 2024, when the plaintiff was moving a washer and dryer at the condominium, the defendant “began screaming at me in a rage” and “shouted repeatedly” at him, “Shut up! Shut up! Shut up! No one cares what you say! No one cares what you think! Get out!” The plaintiff stated that this interaction left him “shaken, scared and humiliated.” Finally, the plaintiff stated that in November 2024, the defendant “physically tried to wrest [a recycling bin] from [the plaintiff's] grasp” and accused him of hurting her, which left the plaintiff “feeling targeted, unsafe, and deeply alarmed.” The defendant disputes the plaintiff's recounting of these events.

In early December 2024, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte harassment prevention order against the defendant, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3. On December 17, 2024, the judge extended the harassment prevention order for one year after a two-party hearing at which both parties were present.

Discussion. The defendant contends that there were not three or more qualifying acts constituting harassment as defined by G. L. c. 258E, § 1, and that the judge improperly relied on the plaintiff's statements about the interactions between the parties in extending the harassment prevention order. We disagree.

In reviewing a c. 258E harassment prevention order, “we consider whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the defendant committed acts that constitute one of the enumerated forms of harassment.” A.S.R. v. A.K.A., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 274 (2017). As relevant here, harassment is defined as “[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.” G. L. c. 258E, § 1. We review the judge's factual findings for clear error. C.E.R. v. P.C., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 126 (2017).

The defendant argues that the judge believed “false accusations” from the plaintiff against her, and “incorrectly excluded” her testimony. However, credibility determinations are exclusively reserved for the trial judge, who serves as the fact finder at a bench hearing. G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 394 (2018). Since the judge observed and heard the witnesses and their testimonies, we defer to such credibility determinations.

As outlined supra, the plaintiff alleges multiple incidents of conduct falling within c. 258E's purview. We agree that there were at least three incidents sufficient to meet the statutory definition of harassment: the September 2023 incident where the defendant struck the plaintiff with a snow scraper and shoved him twice; the May 2024 interaction in the shared outdoor space where the defendant “block[ed]” the plaintiff and his wife; and the November 2024 incident where the defendant tried to wrest a recycling bin from the plaintiff's grasp. We turn next to whether the defendant willfully committed each of these acts with the requisite intent and whether the acts caused the plaintiff to be intimidated or afraid.

“[A]n essential element of civil harassment is intent.” Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 63 (2014). Chapter 258E's definition of harassment requires the plaintiff to show, first, that each act was “committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property,” G. L. c. 258E, § 1, and second, that the acts, “considered together, did in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.” O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 426 (2012), abrogated on another ground by Seney, supra at 60. “Case law has limited the meaning of ‘fear’ to ‘fear of physical harm or fear of physical damage to property.’ ” C.E.R., 91 Mass App. Ct. at 125. “Abuse” is defined as “attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another or placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm.” G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Likewise, “intimidation” requires “placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” O'Brien, supra at 425, quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). Thus, to qualify as harassment under c. 258E, the actor's conduct must be intended to cause, and considered as a whole must actually cause, fear of either physical harm or damage to property. See O'Brien, supra.

With regards to the defendant's intent, her repeated physical and verbal confrontations with the plaintiff would reasonably support an inference that she intended to cause the plaintiff fear, intimidation, or abuse. See A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 538 (2015). In determining whether acts caused “fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property,” the fact finder “must look to the cumulative pattern of harassment, and need not find that each act in fact caused fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property.” O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 426 n.8. Here, the judge could find that the defendant's act of hitting the plaintiff with a snow scraper and pushing him was an act of abuse. See G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Following this incident, the defendant's acts of “blocking” the plaintiff and his wife and trying to wrest a recycling bin from the plaintiff's grasp were heightened and could have, considering the incident with the snow scraper, caused the plaintiff to fear serious physical harm. See Ilan I. v. Melody M., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 646 (2019) (judge could permissibly find that plaintiffs’ “actual fear of physical harm or harm to property was prompted by malicious and intentional conduct” by defendant). In fact, the plaintiff stated in his affidavit and during his testimony that he was “concerned on a daily basis about ․ our safety and our sanity moving around our condominium” and that he avoided going into the condominium's common areas alone because he was concerned that he would encounter the defendant. See J.C. v. J.H., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 228 (2017) (fear judged by subjective standard under G. L. c. 258E, § 1).

Further, the judge explicitly stated her concern with the defendant's act of pushing the plaintiff, noting, “Someone could fall over, ․ someone could hit their head on the concrete or on the corner of the porch or on the steps or on a door. So many things could happen when people get pushed.” Given the history of physical confrontations and the defendant's ongoing hostility toward the plaintiff, we cannot say that the judge erred by extending the order. On the record before us, we discern no error in the allowance and extension of the harassment prevention order in this case.

The defendant also claims the judge erred by crediting “false accusations” from the plaintiff. However, we defer to the judge's assessment of credibility. S.T. v. E.M., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 429 (2011) (“Credibility determinations and an evaluation of the sufficiency of all the evidence are matters for the hearing judge to decide”). Here, we see no reason to disturb the judge's implicit assessments of credibility.⁴

Finally, we find no merit in the argument implicit in the defendant's brief that her conduct did not rise to the level of harassment because her behavior was in response to, and justified by, the plaintiff's conduct. General Law c. 258E does not carve out exceptions for acts that qualify as harassment but were done reactively or in retaliation for a plaintiff's conduct. Rather, harassment in response to the plaintiff's behavior, such as incessantly leaving notes underneath doors or breaking vases, is treated in the same manner as all other harassment claims. Whether the defendant acted in response to the plaintiff's behavior is largely irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant's conduct constituted harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 3. See V.J. v. N.J., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 22, 24 (2017) (affirming harassment prevention order extension when the defendant was behaving in such a manner to “inconvenience her as she had done to him”).

Order issued December 17, 2024, extending harassment prevention order, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note at the outset that the defendant, as a self-represented party, is required to abide by the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure and is held to the same standard as litigants represented by counsel. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 719-721 (1995). Although the defendant's arguments are unsupported by references to relevant legal authority, see Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), in our discretion we reach the merits of her claim that the judge erred in extending a harassment prevention order.

2.   While the extension order indicates that the order would expire (unless extended) on December 16, 2025, we do not dismiss this appeal as moot and proceed to review the harassment prevention order at issue. See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 62 (2014) (“appeals from expired harassment prevention orders, like appeals from expired abuse prevention orders, should not be dismissed as moot where the parties have a continuing interest in the case”).

3.   The plaintiff and defendant are trustees with proportionate interests of forty percent and sixty percent, respectively.

4.   There is no indication that the judge relied on the plaintiff's testimony in any way that was improper. The judge had the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses’ demeanor and credited the plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's acts of harassment. See Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020) (“We accord the credibility determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the parties ․ [and] observed their demeanor ․ the utmost deference” [quotations and citation omitted]). Also, the defendant's additional claim that the judge excluded “recordings and testimony” is not supported by record citations and not adequately briefed for our review. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9).