COMMONWEALTH v. LEONARD ADAMS JR (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant, Leonard L. Adams, Jr., was convicted of negligent operation of a vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, third offence, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); and leaving the scene of an accident, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1).¹ On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the motion judge erred by denying his motion to suppress statements made without Miranda warnings before and during the field sobriety tests, and (2) the trial judge erred by denying his motion for required findings of not guilty on the first three charges. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts elicited at the motion hearing and the trial, supplemented in part by our independent review of the body-worn camera footage.² See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 517, 518 n.2 (2024). On October 7, 2023, at approximately 3:10 P.M., Brian Hale was in his yard when he observed a blue truck with a black ladder rack “creeping up” his street. The truck struck a fire hydrant on the corner, backed up, and drove away. From Hale's vantage point, he could not see the truck's license plate, driver, or make -- although he believed the truck to be a GMC or Chevrolet. He testified at trial that it was not a Ford or Dodge because those models have different tailgates. But he also admitted that he did not see the tailgate of this truck. Following the collision, Hale went inside his home, and his wife called 911. While on the telephone with an operator, the Hales reported seeing the blue truck return, stopping by the fire hydrant before driving up the street.

Officers Victor Placinta and Jedadiah Henry arrived on scene shortly after 3:40 P.M. Placinta saw tire tracks leading up to the fire hydrant, which was tilted. Henry noted the fire hydrant was leaning at a forty-five degree angle. Neither officer found any notes containing identifying information from a driver around the fire hydrant.

At 3:47 P.M., Micheal Benedetti called 911 to report that, about three houses down from his home, a woman was screaming that the driver of a blue Ford truck with a black ladder rack had hit her parked car. Benedetti saw the truck on the lawn but could not see the driver.

Placinta and Henry left the street with the damaged fire hydrant and drove less than one mile to Benedetti's location, where they met two other officers. A blue truck resembling that which both Benedetti and Hale described was parked on the front lawn of a home with some tire tracks in front of it. The tire tracks ran behind a parked white car, perpendicular to the trunk. The truck's bumper had a small dent with yellow paint marks in and around it. Photographs of the fire hydrant and bumper were admitted in evidence. Henry testified that the paint color was consistent with the color of the fire hydrant. The officers ran the truck's license plate and determined that the defendant was the registered owner.

Having identified the defendant as the owner of the truck and the home where the truck was parked as the defendant's, Placinta and another officer knocked on the front door of the defendant's home. His wife answered. When the officers asked the wife if the defendant was inside, she led them to the defendant, who was in the basement leaning on a table. The officers asked him if he hit the fire hydrant and the white car. The defendant replied in the negative. The officers then asked the defendant for his driver's license, which the defendant's wife helped him retrieve from his back pocket.

In light of the odor of alcohol coming off the defendant and the safety concerns posed by the tools in the basement, Placinta asked the defendant to move upstairs. Placinta further noted the defendant had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and appeared to have difficulty processing the officer's words. As Henry saw the defendant coming up from the basement, he immediately noticed the defendant's lack of balance, slurred speech, glossy eyes, and the strong odor of alcohol coming off him. The defendant's statements and demeanor during the interaction in the basement were captured by the body-worn camera footage that was admitted at both the motion hearing and trial.

Once outside, Placinta pat frisked the defendant, during which the defendant repeatedly failed to keep his arm against the garage as directed. Four other officers were present in the driveway at this time. Henry asked the defendant if he remembered hitting the fire hydrant and the white car, and the defendant responded in the negative. The defendant then asked the officers what was going on, and Placinta explained the collisions again.

Upon the wife's request, the officers and the defendant moved into the open garage to conduct field sobriety tests (FSTs). When asked about his medical history, the defendant mentioned that his motorcycle burned his leg a few days prior and that it might impact his ability to balance. Based on the defendant's poor performance on the FSTs and the other indicators, Henry concluded that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and placed the defendant under arrest. As with the interaction in the basement, the body-worn camera footage captured the defendant's demeanor the garage.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. “In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous․ However, we independently review the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 48, 50 (2014). The motion judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress the body-worn camera footage and all statements. We agree that the defendant was not in custody, so Miranda warnings were not required.

It is settled that “a motorist who is temporarily detained after being stopped on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not held in custody” for purposes of Miranda. Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327, 331 (1997). Even considering that this encounter differed from a typical motor vehicle stop because the defendant was already in his house and a number of police officers were present, we nonetheless agree that the defendant was not in custody and Miranda warnings were not required.

The need for Miranda warnings “are triggered only when interrogation takes place in a custodial setting.” Commonwealth v. Becla, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 142, 145 (2009). “Custodial interrogation is ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 309 (2007), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

In assessing custody, “the crucial question is whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was in custody.” Commonwealth v. Earl, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 670 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996). To make that determination,

“the court considers several factors: (1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave ․”

Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001).

a. Place of interrogation. The defendant first spoke with the officers in his basement, suggesting a noncoercive environment. See Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 302 (2020), quoting United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) (questioning at defendant's residence “tends to be significantly less intimidating than questioning in unfamiliar locations”). Moreover, the defendant's wife consented to the officers’ entry. Cf. Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 800 (2016) (finding no custody where defendant's mother, “and not the defendant, invited the detectives into their home and permitted them to conduct the interview”). And after the interaction moved outside, the defendant and Henry, at the wife's request, moved into the open garage to conduct the FSTs. See Medina, supra (noncoercive setting where officers did not “meaningfully restrict[ ] the defendant's freedom of movement within his home”). In sum, the officers’ entry with the wife's consent and their movement to the garage at the wife's request suggested an “absence of police domination” such that “the defendant's home remained an inherently noncoercive setting.” Id.

b. Conveyance of suspicion. “If the [officers] had conveyed to the defendant[ ] that [he was a] suspect[ ], that might support a determination that the defendant[ ] w[as] in custody before [he] made the incriminating statements.” Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 619 (2018). Here, some of the officers’ statements suggested that they believed the defendant was involved in the two collisions. For example, Henry asked the defendant if he recalled hitting the fire hydrant or the white car, to which the defendant responded in the negative. Contrast Cawthron, supra (no suggestion of suspicion that defendants were suspects where detective's “question could have referred to many types of innocent activities”). Shortly after, Placinta told the defendant that he hit his wife's car and was observed hitting a fire hydrant and leaving the scene. Cf. Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 287-288 (2010) (concluding defendant was in custody where officers began conversation by stating defendant was suspect in shooting).

c. Nature of the interrogation. Throughout the interaction, officers remained calm and cooperative. See Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 622 (nature of interrogation not coercive where officers’ “interactions with the defendants occurred in a ‘regular tone’ and were ‘very cooperative’ ”). Furthermore, as noted supra, none of the officers present during the interaction “meaningfully restricted the defendant's freedom of movement within his home.”³ Medina, 485 Mass. at 302. The officers did not physically restrain the defendant until the time of his arrest, the defendant only interacted with a few officers at a time, and those interactions were relatively brief. See id., citing Crooker, 688 F.3d at 11-12 (“no custody despite presence of numerous armed officers in home, due to lack of physical restraint and cooperative interactions”). Therefore, the nature of the interaction suggests it was noncustodial.

d. Whether the defendant was free to ask officers to leave. The “pertinent question is whether an officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce that person to stay.” Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 (2019). A defendant's inability to terminate the interaction may be “evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an arrest.” Groome, 435 Mass. at 212. Freedom to leave “may be a critical factor,” but “it cannot be the determinative factor.” Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 623.

Here, because the officers were in the defendant's home with the consent of his wife, a reasonable person would have known that consent was revokable and, thus, that the defendant or his wife could have asked the officers to leave. See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 222 (2003) (even where defendant “might have believed that she was a suspect in the investigation,” a reasonable person “would have known that she was free to terminate the interview and to ask the [detectives] to leave her home”). Thus, while the interaction ended in the defendant's arrest, the officers’ consensual entry suggested that the defendant was free to ask the officers to leave his home.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officer's interaction with the defendant was noncustodial. Given that the officers were in the defendant's home with permission, respected the wife's request to move inside the garage, and did not physically restrain the defendant until his arrest, a reasonable person would likely have felt free to terminate the interaction by asking the officers to leave their property. Contrast Weaver, 474 Mass. at 799 (“Although the detectives informed the defendant that they believed he was involved in the crime being investigated, they did not coerce or threaten the defendant during the interview, and the defendant and his mother were free to terminate the interview at any time”), with Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 154-155 (2000) (defendant effectively unable to terminate interaction where officers questioned defendant in small room of defendant's house and told him he was their main suspect and that he would be arrested if he kept denying his involvement in crime). Thus, the motion judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to establish the elements of (a) operation of a vehicle, (b) operation on a public way, and (c) operation under the influence of intoxicating liquor.⁴ While it is true that there was no direct evidence that the defendant drove a vehicle on a public way, we nonetheless conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that he did.

When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “The Commonwealth's evidence may be entirely circumstantial, and ․ the inferences a jury may draw from the evidence need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable” (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 392 (2012).⁵

a. Operation. To prove operation, “the evidence must be such as to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, and no one else, committed the offences charged.” Commonwealth v. Shea, 324 Mass. 710, 713 (1949). “Proof of operation of a motor vehicle may ‘rest entirely on circumstantial evidence.’ ” Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 438 (2002).

Here, there was sufficient evidence of operation. When the wife answered the officers’ knock, they asked where the operator was and she led them to the defendant. The evidence shows that the defendant owned the truck, showed officers his license upon their request, and complied with the request to perform FSTs. See Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 52 (sufficient evidence of operation where defendant was registered owner of vehicle, had keys to vehicle, cooperated with FSTs, and no other person had access to vehicle). Furthermore, the defendant's wife did not object to the officer's request to see the defendant's license or to conduct the patfrisk and FSTs. See Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 439 (“lack of bystander reaction to the police treating the defendant as the operator” is relevant circumstantial evidence of operation).

The evidence also shows that a witness saw a truck, which was similar in appearance to the defendant's, strike a fire hydrant less than a mile away from the defendant's home shortly before officers arrived.⁶ Furthermore, the defendant's truck had yellow paint and a dent on the front, which was consistent with the fire hydrant's color and approximate height.⁷ See Commonwealth v. Smith, 368 Mass. 126, 127-128 (1975) (sufficient evidence of operation where defendant's vehicle was located in driveway of house where officers found defendant and had damage consistent with accident, including paint chips similar in color to car that was struck). Therefore, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant had recently operated his truck and collided with the fire hydrant.⁸

b. Public way. “A public way or place is defined as ‘any way or ․ any place to which the public has a right of access, or ․ any place to which members of the public have access as invitees or licensees.’ ” Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 217 (2019), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). It is uncontested that the corner of the streets where the fire hydrant was located and the street where the defendant's house was located are public ways. They are all open to the public and maintained by the city. Given that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant operated the vehicle and struck the fire hydrant at the intersection two streets, there was also sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant operated his truck on a public way.

c. Impairment. To show a defendant was under the influence of alcohol while operating a vehicle, the Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.” Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985). The Commonwealth need not prove the defendant was intoxicated. See Commonwealth v. Stathopoulos, 401 Mass. 453, 458 (1988). Impairment may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 464 (2010).

Here, the defendant “exhibited classic symptoms of alcohol intoxication” -- his eyes were glassy and red, the smell of alcohol emanated from his person, his speech was slurred, and he performed poorly on the FSTs. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017). Additionally, the witness testimony and the damage to both the defendant's vehicle and the fire hydrant could support an inference that the defendant was involved in a collision. See Commonwealth v. Marley, 396 Mass. 433, 442 (1985) (car accident corroborated other evidence of driving while intoxicated). This evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he operated his vehicle.

In sum, the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could reasonably support the challenged elements for negligent operation, operation under the influence, and leaving the scene of an accident. Therefore, the trial judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty on those charges.

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After the jury verdict, the judge found the defendant responsible for a marked lanes violation under G. L. c. 89, § 4A.

2.   The defendant identified no material differences between the facts elicited at the suppression hearing and those elicited at trial and relied solely on the facts from the trial in his brief. Therefore, “[t] here are no material differences between the trial testimony and testimony provided at the motion hearing” with regards to the suppression issue. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 458 Mass. 684, 687 n.6 (2011).

3.   We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that Placinta used excessive force when he moved the defendant's arm into the correct position for the patfrisk after the defendant failed to get into that position. The body-worn camera footage shows that the officer gently guided the defendant into the correct position after repeatedly asking the defendant to do so, and that the defendant appeared confused by the officer's request. There was no force or aggression in the officer's conduct, and his tone remained calm.

4.   While the charges of negligent operation and leaving the scene of an accident have elements unique to each other and to operating under the influence, the defendant focused his challenge on the elements common to operation under the influence. As to negligent operation, the defendant challenged the elements of operation and public way. As to leaving the scene of an accident, the defendant challenged the element of operation.

5.   The defendant rested without presenting any evidence, so we need not consider whether the Commonwealth's case deteriorated after the close of its case. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wurtzberger, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 565-566 (2024), S.C., 496 Mass. 203 (2025).

6.   The defendant argues that this testimony was insufficient to link the defendant's truck to the fire hydrant because the witness reported seeing a GMC or a Chevrolet truck hit the hydrant, but the evidence showed that the defendant owned a Ford truck. We are not convinced. The witness admitted that he could not see the truck's tailgate, which would have confirmed the make for him. Moreover, “[i]nconsistencies in testimony ․ do not render it insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 589 (1983). Witness “[c]redibility is a question for the jury to decide; they may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony presented to them.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 411 (1978). Here, the jury could have reasonably found that the witness was mistaken as to the make of the truck but was otherwise able to recall enough of the truck's defining characteristics to infer that the defendant operated the truck that hit the fire hydrant.

7.   To the extent the defendant contends that an expert was required to testify that the yellow paint on the defendant's car was consistent with the yellow paint on the fire hydrant, we disagree. First, the testimony was rationally based on the officer's perception and not on scientific or technical knowledge. See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013). Second, the jury could have used the photographic evidence to compare the paint on the car and fire hydrant themselves. See Coyle v. Cliff Compton, Inc., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 749-750 (1992) (“Where a matter may easily be comprehended by jurors the testimony of an expert has no place” [citation omitted]).

8.   We decline to adopt the defendant's theory that a license plate number is required to identify a particular vehicle.