STATE POLICE ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, the State Police Association of Massachusetts (SPAM), filed a demand for arbitration related to the termination of thirteen of its members by the defendant, the Massachusetts Department of State Police (MSP). The arbitrator found that the termination was not subject to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties and thus was not substantively arbitrable. SPAM filed a “complaint to vacate arbitration award” in the Superior Court challenging the arbitrator's decision. A Superior Court judge upheld the arbitrator's decision and allowed the MSP's motion for judgment on the pleadings. SPAM appeals therefrom. We affirm.

Background. In August 2021, because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker issued Executive Order No. 595 requiring all executive department employees to demonstrate by October 17, 2021, that they had a COVID-19 vaccination or had received an exemption for religious or medical accommodation.¹ In November 2021, thirteen State troopers were notified of “charges” against them for failure to comply with the order. All thirteen troopers were found guilty by a MSP trial board, and on April 8, 2022, the MSP terminated their employment.

On April 12, 2022, SPAM filed a grievance contending that the MSP lacked cause to discharge the troopers. SPAM moved through the grievance procedure outlined in the CBA and filed a demand for arbitration on April 11, 2023. On November 17, 2023, the arbitrator issued an award finding the grievance substantively inarbitrable based on G. L. c. 22C, § 13, which states in part:

“A uniformed member of the state police who has served for at least 1 year and against whom charges have been preferred shall be tried by a board to be appointed by the colonel or, at the request of the officer, a board consisting of the colonel. A person aggrieved by the finding of the trial board under this subsection may appeal the decision of the trial board under sections 41 to 45, inclusive of chapter 31.”

The arbitrator found that this language sets forth the only avenue of appeal open to members of the State police who are aggrieved by a decision of a trial board -- an appeal to the Civil Service Commission -- and canceled the hearing on the merits.²

On December 18, 2023, SPAM commenced an action in the Superior Court seeking an order to vacate the award pursuant to G. L. c. 150C, § 11, claiming that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in refusing to arbitrate the troopers’ discipline. The parties filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. A Superior Court judge concluded that the discipline was not arbitrable, and thus the arbitrator did not exceed her authority. Accordingly, the judge denied SPAM's motion and entered an order dismissing SPAM's complaint. Judgment entered for the MSP and SPAM appealed therefrom.

Discussion. SPAM argues that the judge erred because the CBA expressly makes disciplinary matters arbitrable and nothing in G. L. c. 22C, § 13, removes those disputes from arbitration. We disagree. General Laws c. 22C, § 13, at least in the present context, confers authority that cannot be delegated through collective bargaining.

We decide the case against the backdrop of the “strong public policy favoring collective bargaining between public employers and employees over certain conditions and terms of employment․ This policy is codified in the broad statutory language of G. L. c. 150E, § 6,” Somerville v. Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, 451 Mass. 493, 496 (2008), which protects the rights of public employees to collectively bargain “with respect to wages, hours, standards [of] productivity and performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment.” Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 564 (2015), quoting G. L. c. 150E, § 6. General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (d), further provides that, “where there is a conflict between a statute and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the collective bargaining agreement ‘shall prevail’ if the statute is one that is enumerated therein.” Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, supra. General Laws c. 22C, § 13, is not among those statutes enumerated in § 7 (d).

Thus, we must address the “tension between the statutory right of public employees to bargain collectively the terms and conditions of their employment with public employers and the Legislature's intent to bestow upon those employers nondelegable managerial responsibilities.” Board of Higher Educ. v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 483 Mass. 310, 310 (2019). Where “a negotiation requirement would unduly impinge on a public employer's freedom to perform its public functions, G. L. c. 150E, § 6, does not mandate bargaining over a decision directly affecting the employment relationship” (citation omitted). Worcester v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002). Rather, there are “circumstances where public policy requires that a public employer reserve certain personnel matters to its sole discretion in order to preserve accountability to the public in the performance of the essential functions of government.” Dracut v. Dracut Firefighters Union, IAFF Local 2586, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 379 (2020). The nondelegability doctrine limits the reach of G. L. c. 150E, §§ 6-7, and applies whenever an “employer acts under the authority of a statute or law authorizing the employer to perform a specific, narrow function or, alternatively, [where the employer] acts with reference to a statute specific in purpose that would be undermined if the employer's freedom of action were compromised by the collective bargaining process” (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 380.

In this case, contrary to SPAM's assertion, G. L. c. 22C, § 13, grants to the colonel an authority that is a specific narrow function. The Legislature, in enacting § 13, established a precise disciplinary process for uniformed members of the MSP. Section 13 mandates that members are to be tried before a board appointed by the colonel or, at the officer's request, before the colonel, and that the officer may seek review from the civil service commission. The statute identifies the body charged with adjudicating discipline, prescribes the process by which that discipline is imposed, and provides a statutory mechanism for review. Therefore, under this explicit framework, the colonel is without authority to agree to any provisions of a CBA allowing any appeal other than that to the Civil Service Commission. See Board of Selectmen of Ayer v. Sullivan, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932 (1990) (where statute explicitly authorized board of selectmen to appoint and reappoint police officers, CBA provisions establishing procedures for reappointment would be unlawful). Neither could an arbitrator issue an award that would circumvent this explicitly defined procedure. See Department of State Police v. Massachusetts Org. of State Eng'rs & Scientists, 456 Mass. 450, 455 (2010).³

We disagree with SPAM's contention that the language of § 13 is too broad to define a narrow function. While the language of § 13 itself is broad, this is no bar to applying the nondelegability doctrine. The doctrine applies to statutory grants, including those that are broadly worded, concerning authority core to the employer's mandate. See Framingham v. Framingham Police Officers Union, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 542 (2018). In choosing not to enumerate in § 13 every permissible decision the colonel could make in the public interest, the Legislature has conveyed that disciplinary decisions are left to the province of the colonel. In any event, § 13 is unambiguous as to the appeals process at issue here.

Nor do we agree with SPAM's argument that, because § 13 states that a disciplined trooper “may appeal” the trial board's decision, that permissive language creates a discretionary choice between appealing to the Civil Service Commission or arbitration pursuant to the CBA. That interpretation conflicts with the plain language and legislative intent of the statute. See Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 494 (2020) (in amending G. L. c. 22C, § 13, “the Legislature redirected appeals of department discipline from the District Court to the commission”). Had the Legislature, as SPAM suggested, used the word “shall” rather than “may,” the resulting language would mandate an appeal, a conclusion we find unpersuasive. See, e.g., Brennan v. Election Comm'rs of Boston, 310 Mass. 784, 786 (1942). Indeed, rather than requiring a trooper to appeal from their hearing, § 13 makes the appeal to the Civil Service Commission permissive.

Furthermore, in the circumstances presented here, § 13 implicates the colonel's managerial authority to terminate troopers which cannot be compromised by the bargaining process. See Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 180-181 (1997). The colonel is the “executive and administrative head of the department [of the State police],” and thus, “shall have charge of the administration and organization thereof.” G. L. c. 22C, § 3. In Andover v. Andover Police Patrolmen's Union, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 170 (1998), we held that a police chief's statutory authority to order mandatory overtime was a core managerial function and thus nondelegable. Here, G. L. c. 22C, § 13, provides authority for a core managerial function -- the termination of troopers. As presented in this case, the nondelegability doctrine mandates that the colonel be able to make disciplinary decisions (including termination) as necessary for public safety without interference from the collective bargaining process.

Our conclusion is bolstered by the ruling in Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Boston, 491 Mass. 556 (2023). There, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Executive Order No. 595, the same order at issue here, “constituted a nondelegable policy decision that could not be the subject of decision bargaining because any such requirement would have impinged directly on the defendants’ ability to provide essential public safety services to city residents.” Id. at 564. See Executive Order No. 595 (Aug. 19, 2021) (“achieving full vaccination among the executive department workforce is necessary to ensure that the executive department can provide the full measure of public services due to the residents of the Commonwealth”). The same reasoning and circumstances are at play here, as the colonel must not be restricted from providing essential public safety services to Commonwealth residents. While Executive Order No. 595 establishes the underlying policy, G. L. c. 22C, § 13, vests the colonel with the authority to enforce that policy through the exercise of managerial prerogatives, including the discipline and termination of employees who fail to comply. In this particular circumstance, those enforcement decisions were an exercise of the colonel's managerial authority to maintain an effective public safety workforce and, accordingly, are not subject to decision bargaining.⁴ ,⁵

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   SPAM does not dispute that MSP is part of the executive branch.

2.   General Laws c. 31, §§ 41-45, designate the Civil Service Commission as the reviewing body for trial board decisions.

3.   SPAM argues that G. L. c. 150E, § 8, contemplates that the Civil Service Commission is divested of authority if a grievance is filed. Given that we hold that SPAM did not have the authority to bargain over discipline, we need not address this argument.

4.   Our conclusion does not leave troopers without recourse for the appeal of terminations. To the contrary, the troopers could have followed the avenue of appeal as prescribed by G. L. c. 150E, § 13. See Doherty, 486 Mass. at 484.

5.   Because we conclude that the authority granted to the colonel in G. L. c. 22C, § 13, is nondelegable, we need not reach SPAM's arguments regarding whether discipline is arbitrable under the terms of the CBA.