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CITY OF WATERTOWN v. WATERTOWN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1347.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, the city of Watertown (city) brought this action, pursuant to G. L. c. 150C, § 11, in the Superior Court seeking to vacate the arbitration award entered in favor of the defendant (union). The union counterclaimed to confirm the award. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the judge denied the city's motion and confirmed the arbitration award. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to vacate the arbitration award.
Background. In 2018, after the city fire chief received information that a particular firefighter may have been in violation of the residency requirement of his position, the city began investigating whether the firefighter actually resided at the address he represented to the city. Since October 2009, the firefighter had been representing that his residence was the home of his sister, who lived with her husband in Hyde Park (within the firefighter's residency requirement). The city's preliminary investigation, which included surveillance as well as review of public records, concluded that the firefighter likely lived with his wife out-of-State and outside the residency requirement.
The firefighter was placed on paid leave in March 2019 pending a full investigation. In April 2019, the firefighter was interviewed by a city representative in the presence of union representation. At that time, the firefighter maintained that he resided at his sister's house. The city requested that the firefighter provide records concerning his residency. After the city had received some records, the firefighter was again interviewed in February 2020. He again maintained that he resided at his sister's house and had for years.
In August 2020, the city conducted a hearing, pursuant to procedures pertaining to civil service employees, to determine whether there was just cause to terminate the firefighter for violating the residency requirement of his position. After a hearing where the firefighter declined to testify, the hearing officer found that the firefighter lived with his wife out-of-State and outside the residency requirement of his position, providing just cause for termination.1 In light of the outcome of the termination hearing, the city manager terminated the firefighter's employment for “conduct unbecoming a firefighter” in September 2020.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, the union filed a grievance, leading the parties to arbitration. In anticipation of that proceeding, the city requested and obtained from the arbitrator a subpoena for the firefighter's cellular telephone records for a few years prior to the time he was placed on leave. Additionally, the city engaged an expert to analyze the records. The arbitration hearing took place over two nonconsecutive days in August 2021 and December 2022. The city sought to call the firefighter, who was present, as a witness but the arbitrator denied the request, and the firefighter did not testify. Although the arbitrator allowed the city to present the testimony of its expert witness, she ultimately ruled the cell phone evidence inadmissible and excluded it.2
In April 2023, the arbitrator issued her decision, finding that the city did not have just cause to terminate the firefighter and ordering the city to reinstate the firefighter to his former position.
Discussion. A reviewing court obtains limited review over arbitration awards, as they are final and binding legal decisions. Chaloff v. Westwood Pub. Sch., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 13, 15 (2024). Thus, a court may only vacate an award under the limited provisions of G. L. c. 150 § 11 (a), despite any potential factual or legal errors. Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61 (2001). “We review the trial judge's decision to uphold the arbitration award de novo, but our examination of the underlying award is informed by the strong public policy favoring arbitration” (quotation and citation omitted). Pittsfield v. Local 447 Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass. 634, 637 (2018). Where, as here, the arbitration is part of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, “we defer to that election and are ‘strictly bound by an arbitrator's findings and legal conclusions, even if they appear erroneous, inconsistent, or unsupported by the record.’ ” Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 477 Mass. 434, 439-440 (2017), quoting Lynn, supra.
“An arbitrator enjoys wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing.” Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Center v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985). Notwithstanding, parties to arbitration “have the right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.” G. L. c. 150C, § 5 (b). Therefore, despite our deference to the arbitrator's decision, we may vacate an award if an arbitrator “refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of [G. L. c. 150C, § 5] as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party” or if the “arbitrator[ ] exceeded [her] powers.” G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3)-(4), inserted by St. 1959, c. 546, § 1.
Here, the arbitrator refused to allow the city to call the terminated firefighter as a witness, reasoning that he had been interviewed previously and was entitled to decline to testify. Though this may explain the arbitrator's decision not to apply an adverse inference to the firefighter's failure to testify, it provides no reason to deny the city the ability to present him as a live witness. The firefighter's testimony regarding his own residency, and his credibility as to that issue, was undoubtedly “material to the controversy.” G. L. c. 150C, §§ (5) (b), 11 (a) (4).
Likewise, the city's expert witness also provided evidence “material to the controversy,” where his data analysis tended to show the firefighter's physical presence during the relevant time period and therefore had a direct bearing on the firefighter's claim of residency. The arbitrator excluded this evidence, reasoning that since the evidence was acquired after the firefighter's termination, it could not be used to retroactively justify it. But this rationale misperceives the nature of the proceeding. An arbitrator does not sit as an appellate body reviewing the termination hearing and determining whether it was supported by sufficient evidence.3
Rather, the arbitration hearing is a de novo proceeding, at which the city has the burden to establish just cause for termination and is not confined to evidence that was presented at the city's termination hearing. See Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 572 (1948) (whether discharge of police officer for conduct unbecoming was justified was reviewed by civil service commission de novo without limitation on evidence before appointing authority); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727 (2003) (civil service commission reviews whether there was just cause for termination de novo and is not limited to evidence before pretermination hearing officer).4
Denial of the city's ability to call the firefighter as a witness and exclusion of the data analysis from the expert witness substantially prejudiced the city's rights. See G. L. c. 150C, §§ 5 (b), 11 (a) (4). The firefighter was able to assert that he resided in Hyde Park at his sister's address, without corroboration and through transcripts of his prior interviews. Yet, he was shielded from cross-examination altogether since he did not testify at either the termination hearing or the arbitration. The city was unable to confront him with the significant evidence supporting his residency violation. Moreover, the city was unable to affirmatively present this evidence of the violation for consideration by the arbitrator. See Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Center, 763 F.2d at 40 (arbitrator's refusal to consider relevant evidence central to issue was so destructive of company's ability to present its case that it warranted vacation of arbitration award).
Because the judgment must be reversed, we need not reach the city's additional argument that the judge erred in denying the city's motion to file a verified supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings.5
We reverse the judgment confirming the arbitration award and remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment vacating the arbitration award.
So ordered.
FOOTNOTES
1. The notice of termination recounted that the firefighter's name was on the deed of an out-of-State residence, along with his wife, that property records listed the firefighter as a co-owner of the property, that income tax records showed that the firefighter took a mortgage interest deduction for the property and that surveillance found the firefighter's vehicle regularly parked at that address. In contrast, there was no evidence of the firefighter residing with his sister in Hyde Park, other than his own assertion.
2. The expert witness testified that he analyzed the firefighter's cellular telephone records from December 2015 through March 2019 and that, out of the thousands of calls listed, there were only eight calls where the origination or destination of the call was Hyde Park. The data also reflected a consistent pattern of the firefighter traveling to and from the out-of-State address and his workplace. Additionally, when the firefighter called in sick for a shift, the calls were placed from a location consistent with the out-of-State address. It also appeared that, when the firefighter accessed his credit union through his cellular telephone, more than ninety percent of the logins were through an Internet protocol address associated with the out-of-State address.
3. If that were the case, there would have been no need for the arbitrator to have issued subpoenas to the parties to obtain additional evidence, since they would have been limited to the evidence already presented at the termination hearing.
4. The collective bargaining agreement between the parties provides that the parties “shall recognize and adhere to all Civil Service Rules and Regulations wherever applicable, including but not limited to seniority, promotions, transfers, discharges, removals and suspensions.”
5. The verified supplemental memorandum alleged that the firefighter's sister had sold her Hyde Park house in 2022 and that the purchasers had never met the firefighter, tending to show that the firefighter did not live there as of the time period of the arbitration proceeding, despite representations to the contrary.
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Docket No: 25-P-1135
Decided: September 17, 2026
Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
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