COMMONWEALTH v. CHARLES SHANLEY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, subsequent offense, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b), and one count of indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H. All three indictments were under the habitual criminal statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25. After a sentence-enhancement bench trial, a judge of the Superior Court found the defendant guilty of the subsequent offense portions of the rape indictments and as a habitual offender. The defendant filed an appeal, which was stayed pending the defendant's motion for postconviction forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A. The defendant's posttrial motion was denied after a hearing, and the appeal from that denial has been consolidated here with the defendant's direct appeal.

We conclude that the cumulative effect of the admission of multiple complaint evidence and unredacted statements in medical records, indicating the charged crime occurred, created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 219 (2005); Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 396 (2010). The judgments therefore must be vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial should the Commonwealth choose so to proceed.¹

Background. Because the facts are well known to the parties, they need not be repeated in detail. In brief, the Commonwealth alleged that, on May 23, 2013, the defendant picked up the victim in Lowell and drove her to a motel room in Tewksbury, where he forced her to undress and raped her. The victim was in recovery from drug use and previously had a nonsexual relationship with the defendant since February 2013. The first complaint witness was the victim's best friend, and the first complaint was a phone call the victim made to this friend shortly after the assault, telling her what happened and asking the friend to pick her up.

The defendant's theory was that the victim's allegations were false and in retaliation for the defendant's conduct. The defendant claimed that the victim was in fact a prostitute who the defendant had intentionally picked up, and that they had agreed to a price he would pay her for sex. After reaching the motel in Tewksbury, the defendant had thought better of his idea of having sex with her and left her at the motel. According to the defendant, the victim “flipped out” after he refused to pay her and told him that she would “make him pay.”

On appeal, the defendant argues that evidence of many subsequent complaints was wrongly admitted. See King, 445 Mass. at 246; Commonwealth v. Espinal, 482 Mass. 190, 204 (2019). He contends that some of the subsequent complaint evidence improperly indicated belief in the victim's credibility by police or medical personnel. See King, supra at 246; Dargon, 457 Mass. at 395-396 (“An unqualified statement with a cloak of professional and institutional authority, that the very crime which the prosecution is bound to prove has occurred, acquires considerable potency” [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998).

Specifically, the defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting the following subsequent complaint evidence:

1. Later conversation with the friend. The victim and her friend also testified that they spoke for about twenty minutes in the friend's car after the friend picked up the victim, that “[the friend] tried to comfort [the victim],” and during that conversation, the victim “was crying and very, very upset.” The defendant argues that the testimony about the later conversation was not admissible, because when “ a complainant makes successive complaints to the first complaint witness, the initial complaint is the only evidence admissible as first complaint” (citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 388 (2020).

2. The report to the Lowell police. The victim testified that the day after the assault, “she reported it to the police.” Specifically, she reported it to Lowell police Officer Kevin Garneau, who then called an ambulance to take her to the hospital, where “they did a rape kit.” Officer Garneau testified that when the victim spoke to him about the defendant, she was “upset and visibly crying.” Officer Garneau then went to the hospital to follow up, where he spoke to the victim and Tewksbury police.

3. The EMS Report. The Trinity Emergency Medical Service (EMS) report, admitted in evidence as exhibit no. 3, confirms that “[the victim] states she reported it to police.” The EMS report also showed that the victim reported the assault to the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). The narrative section of the report notes that “[the victim] states she was sexually assaulted,” that EMTs were “dispatched for the past assault,” that the “Chief Complaint” was “Sexual Abuse/Rape,” and that the “Primary Impression” was “Sexual Assault.”

4. The nurse's testimony. Karen Sawyer, a registered nurse (RN) in the emergency department at the Lowell General Hospital Saints campus, testified that she and Dr. Barry Fisher treated the victim at the hospital after she was transported there by Trinity EMS. RN Sawyer testified extensively about what the victim told her about the sexual assault.

5. Hospital records. The hospital records, entered in evidence as exhibit no. 4, noted that the “Reason for Visit” was “Assault;” that the “Complaint” was “Assault”; that “Triage: Complaint” was “Assault.” Another hospital form noted that the “Assault” occurred on May 23, 2013, at around 2 P.M., in room 253 of the Motel 6 in Tewksbury, and was perpetrated by one male “Assailant” who penetrated the victim's vagina and mouth with his penis and tongue.

Furthermore, RN Sawyer's “Nurse Notes” stated that she called the Center for Hope and Healing, and that they were sending a van to the hospital to help. The records also reflect that RN Sawyer or Dr. Fisher instructed the victim to “seek counseling.” The defendant argues that these records impermissibly suggested that RN Sawyer and Dr. Fisher believed the victim.

6. The report to the Tewksbury police. The victim testified that she reported the assault to the Tewksbury police at the hospital, which was confirmed by the hospital records. Tewksbury police Officer Michael Donovan testified that he spoke with Lowell police Officer Garneau at the hospital, and he eventually arrested the defendant. Tewksbury police Sergeant Brian O'Neill also testified that the victim identified someone in a photo with the letter “C” or “Charlie.”

Discussion. To begin with, the Commonwealth argues that evidence of the car ride the first complaint witness gave to the victim later that day is not complaint evidence at all. At trial, the prosecutor took great care not to elicit anything that was said between the victim and the witness. Rather, the prosecutor asked only about the demeanor of the victim, which the witness described as “crying and very, very upset.” The witness also testified that when she tried to give the victim a hug, the victim would not let her. We agree with the Commonwealth that this was not additional complaint evidence but evidence of the demeanor of the victim after the alleged crime. As it was relevant to the question of fabrication, it was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass 214, 225 (2009).

Most of the remaining evidence, however, stands on a different footing. The Commonwealth acknowledges that it would have been better for the victim not to have stated that, “The next day, I reported it to the police.” This is prohibited testimony about an additional complaint. See King, 445 Mass. at 243. The prosecutor also solicited testimony that Officer Garneau, to whom the victim reported the crime, told her to go to the hospital and called an ambulance for her. This bolsters the credibility-enhancing aspect of the complaint testimony by indicating that the officer found her report credible. See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008).

As to Officer Donovan, the victim said that she spoke with him at the hospital, although the testimony did not specify what she said. Donovan testified that after having spoken with both the victim and Officer Garneau, he eventually went to the defendant's home and arrested him. Whether or not a complaint was implicit in the evidence, even if Donovan had heard from Garneau about the allegation, the testimony about the arrest further creates the impermissible inference that the police department believed the allegations sufficiently to bring its substantial resources to bear.² See Stuckich, 450 Mass. at 457.

The EMT and hospital records, too, contain inadmissible additional complaint evidence, including evidence that the complaints were believed. Of course, as the Commonwealth notes, statements made for the purpose of obtaining treatment, as well as fact-specific references to the cause of injury, are admissible. See Dargon, 457 Mass. at 395 & n.10; Commonwealth v. Hoime, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 275 (2021). By contrast, ultimate conclusions concerning the charged crime must be redacted. See DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 242.

Turning first to the EMS report, it lists the nature of the call as “assault,” and the chief complaint as “Sexual Abuse/Rape.” At least this second reference amounts to a subsequent complaint. Under “impressions” -- presumably the impressions of the responding EMT -- the “primary impression” is listed as “Sexual Assault.” This is exactly the kind of conclusory assertion prohibited by Dargon, which would provide the imprimatur of institutional belief in the credibility of the victim's allegations. 457 Mass. at 394-395.

The report contains a narrative that describes, in some detail, the victim's subsequent complaint. “PT states she was sexually assaulted at 4PM ast night in Tewksbury. PT states she did not report it then because she was afraid nothing would happen. PT denies any pain/discomfort today. PT states she reported it to police, [and] they suggested she be evaluated at the hospital.” These are not primarily fact-specific explanations of her medical issue, but a repetition of the fact of the subsequent complaint to the police, with a defense of its timing. The report also notes that “PT states she is still wearing clothing from last night when the assault happened.” At the least, almost all of this should have been redacted.

The hospital records, too, are replete with references to assault. The reason for the visit listed as “assault.” The complaint was also listed as “assault.” The records indicate that the Tewksbury police were called and were at her bedside per her request. The victim's discharge instructions included, “Seek counseling as instructed,” another indication of institutional belief in her allegation. Again, all of this should have been redacted.³

At the end of the day, although not every complained-of piece of evidence was a subsequent complaint, or evidence that enhanced the credibility of that complaint, a great deal of it was. None of this should have been admitted.

We have previously said that where credibility of the witness is critical to the Commonwealth's case, the seriousness of the risk presented by multiple complaint testimony is greater. See Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 497 (2009). In this case, although no objection to the admission any of this evidence was preserved, we conclude that cumulatively, the “piling on” of multiple complaint evidence created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See id.

Consequently, the judgment must be vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court, where the defendant may have a new trial should the Commonwealth decide to proceed with one. Our conclusion obviates the need to address the defendant's other claims of error, including those raised in his consolidated appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial.

Conclusion. The judgments are vacated. The verdicts and the subsequent offense and habitual criminal findings are set aside. The case is remanded to the Superior Court to allow for a new trial if the Commonwealth so chooses.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the convictions must be vacated under our ordinary standard for reviewing unpreserved claims of error, we need not determine whether the defendant is entitled to the more searching plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, of a third conviction of a habitual offender under G. L. c. 279, § 25(b), Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 623 (2020), a question the parties contest.

2.   The testimony from Officer O'Neill about the victim identifying a photograph labeled with the letter “C” or with “Charlie” does not amount to complaint evidence.

3.   The potential for these statements to cause undue/unfair prejudice increased due to the lack of any limiting instruction, as the jury were allowed to consider these statements as additional evidence the defendant assaulted/assailed the victim. Cruz, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 390. And, adding to the potential for unfairly corroborating the victim's account, the prosecutor relied on some of these statements in closing argument. See Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 586 (2019).Much of the testimony of the RN described answers given by the victim to questions about what had happened that appear to have been relevant to determining the proper procedures in her case for undertaking the collection of evidence for the rape kit. We do not think it was a first-complaint-defying recounting of the victim's complaint.