ARAGON CIPRIANO v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The petitioner, Aragon Cipriano, filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, seeking to be discharged from his civil commitment to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) as a sexually dangerous person. Following a trial in the Superior Court, a jury found that he remained sexually dangerous, and his commitment was continued. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty because the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that, if released, he “is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on” others “because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires.” G. L. c. 123A, § 1. We affirm.

Background. The jury could have found the following facts. At the time of trial, the petitioner was a seventy-one year old man diagnosed with pedophilic disorder. He was convicted of crimes relating to his sexual assault of three girls, ages seven to eleven, which occurred on three separate occasions between 1984 and 2007. All three victims were known to him. In 1984, the petitioner sexually assaulted a seven year old girl in California when he was thirty-one. He drove the victim and her brother to the factory where he worked, separated them, and forced her into the building, where he forcibly removed her “panties” and digitally penetrated her vagina. When she began screaming, he slapped her and “told her to shut up.” He threatened her and told her to not tell her parents or anyone else, or else she “would get into trouble.” He was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of fourteen, and sentenced to three years in prison.

In 1987, the petitioner sexually assaulted a three year old girl in New Jersey when he was thirty-six. The victim reported that the petitioner, who was babysitting her, “put his thing in hers and made her go up and down” “while she had no pants or underwear on.”¹ He was convicted of criminal sexual contact and endangering the welfare of a child, and sentenced to four years of probation.

In 2007, the petitioner sexually assaulted an eleven year old girl, his goddaughter, in Massachusetts when he was fifty-five. The petitioner took the victim and her sister out for pizza when he stopped at a factory building, separated them, and brought the victim inside. He forcibly removed her pants and underwear and made her lie down on the carpeted floor, where he “then got on top of her and put his penis in her vagina.” When the victim attempted to resist, he “held [her] hands down until he had completed the ․ rape,” at which time the victim had “blood and white stuff on her.” He “told the victim not to tell her mother what had happened because the mother would become angry at [her] if she did so.” The petitioner also told the victim that “he had assaulted girls younger than her.” He was convicted of enticing a child under the age of sixteen, kidnapping, and rape of a child with force. He was sentenced to twelve to thirteen years in prison and five years of probation from and after his release from State prison.²

Prior to the petitioner's anticipated release date in 2019, the district attorney for the middle district petitioned for him to be temporarily committed to the MTC as a sexually dangerous person, and following a jury trial in 2021, the petitioner was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person and civilly committed to the MTC in 2021. Since entering treatment, the petitioner has offered inconsistent descriptions of his offenses, including minimizing his offending behaviors and denying that they even occurred.³ He blamed his behavior on alcohol ⁴ as well as on the victims,⁵ and failed to acknowledge that it was driven by his paraphilic interests in female children. The petitioner has inconsistently participated in sex offender treatment programming, and failed to participate in particularized treatment for his deviant sexual interests.⁶

Prior to trial, the petitioner's risk of sexual reoffense was measured using the Static-99R. The Static-99R is an actuarial instrument that evaluators consult in predicting the recidivism rate of sex offenders who are released from confinement. While it is “useful” “as a baseline risk assessment tool,” the instrument does not account for all of an offender's possible risk factors and has “moderate predictive accuracy.” The petitioner's score of two corresponded with a three-to-five percent recidivism risk of sexual offense, which is an “average” risk.

Two qualified examiners, Drs. Alejandro Leguizamo, Ph.D., and Gregg Belle, Ph.D.,⁷ testified at trial and opined that despite the petitioner's Static-99R score, he remained a sexually dangerous person as of the time of trial based on, among other things, his pedophilic disorder, persistent history of sexual violence, lack of progress in treatment, and failure to take responsibility for his conduct. They testified that the petitioner does not have the ability to control his sexual impulses and is likely to reoffend if not committed to a secure facility.⁸

Discussion. The petitioner argues that the judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he is currently sexually dangerous. We disagree.

In assessing whether a judge erred in denying motions for a directed verdict, “we ask whether, after viewing the evidence (and all permissible inferences) in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements of sexual dangerousness, as defined by G. L. c. 123A, § 1” (quotation and citation omitted). Pariseau, petitioner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 76 (2023). As relevant here, the Commonwealth had to prove that (1) the petitioner was “previously adjudicated” a sexually dangerous person, (2) his “misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression against any victim under the age of 16 years,” and (3) “as a result, [he] is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires.” G. L. c. 123A, § 1. See Hill, petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 156, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867 (1996). Only the third element is at issue in this appeal.⁹

Although past misconduct alone is inadequate to support a present finding of sexual dangerousness, see Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 15-16 (2002), the Commonwealth may nonetheless meet its burden without recent instances of sexual misconduct “where the individual's dangerous disposition is of a sort that there will be no occasion for that disposition to manifest itself in a secure environment,” Hill, 422 Mass. at 157. The Commonwealth may prove its case through evidence that “extrapolate[s] from earlier incidents which ․ did show dangerousness ․ to the present by considering whether as a general matter this type of dangerous disposition has a tendency to persist.” Id.

Here, the Commonwealth met its burden of proving that the petitioner remained sexually dangerous. Two qualified examiners -- and the five-member CAB -- concluded that the petitioner was likely to commit a future sex offense if released into the community based on, among other factors, his inconsistent treatment, failure to make meaningful progress in treatment, failure to take responsibility for his offenses, and his common pattern of violent and increasingly brutal sexual assault of young girls.¹⁰ This testimony was sufficient to prove that the petitioner was still sexually dangerous. See Souza, petitioner, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 169-172 (2015); Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 290-291 (2004). Although the petitioner's experts opined that the petitioner was not likely to reoffend if released, the jury was not required to credit these opinions. See Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 583 (2007), quoting Bradway, supra at 291 (“Weighing and crediting the testimony of witnesses during proceedings under G. L. c. 123A ‘are for the trier of fact, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact’ ”).

In large measure, the petitioner's argument is directed to the weight of the evidence, not its legal sufficiency, and we are not persuaded by the petitioner's argument that his average-to-low risk of reoffense, as evidenced by his age and Static-99R score, overwhelmed the Commonwealth's evidence. The petitioner's own experts acknowledged that the Static-99R's accuracy is imperfect, and one even testified that he “never” bases “a decision” or “a professional opinion” on the tool alone, but rather considers it in addition to other factors in a particular case. The jury was entitled to weigh the petitioner's Static-99R score against the other evidence presented and conclude that he would likely reoffend if released from a secure facility. See Sargent, 449 Mass. at 583.

In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Miller, petitioner, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 635 (2008), the testimony of the Commonwealth's experts coupled with their reports were sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person.¹¹

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim reported that it hurt for her to urinate after the assault.

2.   The conditions of the petitioner's probation included orders to have no contact with the victim, wear a global positioning system (GPS) monitor, participate in treatment and counseling, and register as a sex offender.

3.   In particular, the petitioner claims that he did not commit the 1984 assault and never served the sentence that was imposed.

4.   An expert testified that alcohol use does not cause people to rape young children.

5.   For example, the petitioner portrays himself as having been seduced by the eleven year old victim of his 2007 rape.

6.   The petitioner also did not seek treatment while incarcerated in State prison.

7.   Dr. Belle testified on behalf of the five-member Community Access Board (CAB), which unanimously opined that as of his June 12, 2024 annual review, the petitioner continued to meet the statutory criteria for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person; he meets the criteria for pedophilic disorder, a statutorily-defined mental abnormality; his sexual offenses were repetitive and compulsive beyond the ability of the legal system to place limits upon his behavior; and he is likely to reoffend if released from the MTC.

8.   The petitioner called three expert witnesses, Drs. Joseph Plaud, Ph.D., Kerry Nelligan, Psy.D., and Eric Brown, Psy.D., who opined that the petitioner does not currently meet the criteria for a sexually dangerous person.

9.   At trial, the parties stipulated that the petitioner was previously adjudicated a sexually dangerous person, and on appeal, the petitioner concedes that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that he suffers from a mental abnormality (pedophilic disorder) that predisposes him to commit sexual offenses.

10.   The petitioner did not have the opportunity to access his “victim pool” from his secured facilities during his commitment at the MTC.

11.   To the extent that the petitioner, quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997), argues that due process requires proof of “a volitional impairment rendering [him] dangerous beyond [his] control,” “neither that decision, nor due process, nor G. L. c. 123A requires such proof.” Pariseau, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 76, citing Dutil, 437 Mass. at 18.