MARGARET ZALESKAS v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following the death of her husband (decedent), a former State employee and member of the State's retirement system, the plaintiff sought an alternative survivorship allowance (option D) for the decedent's adult daughter. The Massachusetts State Retirement Board (board) denied the allowance, and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) affirmed. The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming CRAB's decision. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the board had a duty to inform the decedent that he could obtain option D survivor benefits for his daughter, and that CRAB erred in upholding the board's decision denying them. The plaintiff also argues that she did not receive all the process to which she was entitled by the board, and that the judge erred in dismissing her civil rights and quasi contract claims. We affirm.

Background. Eligible members of the State's public employee retirement system may elect to receive their retirement allowance in accordance with one of three options: options A, B, or C. See G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (a)-(c). With option A, the member receives their full retirement allowance until their death. Options B and C provide the member a reduced retirement allowance while also providing varying amounts of survivor benefits to a designated beneficiary after the member's death. Members also may request that, in the event the member dies before retiring, a designated beneficiary receive survivor benefits as a lump sum, see G. L. c. 32, § 11 (2) (c), or as a lifetime monthly allowance under option D, see G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (d).

The decedent was an employee of the Suffolk County Sherrif's Department (sheriff's department) for nearly eighteen years and a member of the Massachusetts State Employees’ Retirement System. In 2011, while on medical leave with terminal cancer, the decedent asked a colleague for assistance in obtaining information from the board on retiring from the sheriff's department and securing survivor benefits for his adult daughter. The colleague, who knew that the decedent was on a medical leave of absence but not that his illness was terminal, contacted the board and informed the employee with whom he spoke (board employee) that the decedent was on medical leave and sought to retire for medical reasons and secure survivor benefits for his daughter. The board employee relayed that the decedent should file applications for superannuation retirement, see G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (a)-(c), and ordinary disability retirement, see G. L. c. 32, § 6. The colleague then shared this information with the decedent and forwarded him the necessary forms. In speaking with the board employee, the colleague did not inquire about the alternative survivorship allowance under option D, and the board employee did not provide any information about it.

Based on the information he received from his colleague, the decedent filled out and signed the superannuation and ordinary disability retirement forms.³ The decedent passed away in June 2011 before filing the forms.

In March 2012, the plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate, sought from the board “the survivor benefits which [decedent] would have secured for his daughter had he been provided with information relating to the existence of an ‘Option D’ election form.” The board denied the request in April 2012. A Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) magistrate affirmed the board's decision in 2017 after a hearing. CRAB affirmed DALA's decision in November 2020 after finding that the decedent's daughter “is not entitled to survivor benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (d) because the member failed to file notice on a prescribed form with the [board] prior to his passing.”⁴

The following month, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking review of CRAB's decision, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the board (1) discriminated against the decedent on account of his disability, (2) violated the decedent's equal rights, (3) breached a “quasi-contractual duty” to the decedent by failing to inform him of the need to file an option D form to obtain survivor benefits, (4) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (5) was unjustly enriched. The board and CRAB moved to dismiss all counts on the pleadings, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), except for the G. L. c. 30A claim, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim and that her claims were time barred. A judge allowed the motion in August 2022.

In 2023, the parties cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings on the G. L. c. 30A claim. After a hearing on the cross motions, judgment entered in December 2024, affirming CRAB's decision, and a memorandum of decision issued, noting that the board neither had a duty to inform the decedent about the option D form, see G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5), nor did it act negligently in failing to notify the decedent about option D in the absence of a written request for information and without knowledge of the decedent's current medical condition.

Discussion. 1. Denial of option D survivorship allowance. The plaintiff first contends that the judge erred in allowing CRAB and the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the G. L. c. 30A claim because the board had a duty to inform the decedent about the option D survivor benefits but did not. We disagree.

“It is well established that judicial review of a CRAB decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow.” Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 344 (2012). “It is not our province to determine whether the CRAB decision is based on the weight of the evidence” (quotations omitted). Id., quoting Retirement Bd. of Salem v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 Mass. 286, 289 (2009). Rather, we consider only whether the decision was “legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Murphy, supra. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). “We accept the facts found by CRAB when there is substantial evidence to support them, and also accept the reasonable inferences CRAB draws from the facts” (citation omitted). Rockett v. State Bd. of Retirement, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 438 (2010).

General Laws c. 32, § 12 (2) (d), specifies that a public employee enrolled in a contributory retirement system, as the decedent was, may elect to provide a designated beneficiary with a lifetime allowance should the employee die before retiring. To secure the option D survivorship allowance, an eligible member must file with the board prior to their death, a “written notice on a prescribed form” designating an eligible beneficiary. G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (d).

The plaintiff, as the party seeking an option D allowance, bears the burden of proving that the decedent's daughter was entitled to the allowance. See Narducci v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 136 (2007). CRAB accepted the subsidiary facts found by the DALA magistrate and determined, as the DALA magistrate did, that because the plaintiff presented no evidence that the decedent mailed or delivered a completed option D form to the board, the decedent's daughter was not entitled to survivor benefits under G. L. c. 32, § 12 (2) (d). Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that CRAB's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Notwithstanding the state of the evidence, the plaintiff argues that the retirement board had a duty, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5), to inform the decedent about the availability of option D benefits. General Laws c. 32, § 20 (5), defines the duties and powers of retirement boards. As relevant here, G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (k), provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]pon the written request of any member or his authorized representative, each board shall provide such member or representative, within thirty days of such request, a written notice of the benefits to which such member is or may be entitled under the provisions of this chapter.” As an initial matter, neither the decedent nor his colleague made a written request for information on retirement or survivor benefits. Further, when the colleague contacted the board, he did not know that the decedent's illness was terminal and, consequently, could not share information he did not have with the board employee. Instead, the colleague conveyed what the decedent had told him -- that he wanted information on retiring for medical reasons and on survivor benefits. The board employee provided information that was responsive to the request and the specific circumstances shared, which did not concern preretirement benefits.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (b), imposes neither an express nor implicit duty on the board to provide information or materials not otherwise requested -- in writing. “Paragraph (b) of § 20 (5) authorizes retirement boards to adopt by-laws, make rules and regulations, and provide for payments.” Flanagan v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 862, 866 (2001). It also provides that retirement boards “shall have such other powers and shall perform such other duties and functions as are necessary to comply with such provisions.” G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (b). The plaintiff reads into this paragraph an express duty of retirement boards to provide their members with information relevant to “the payment of retirement allowances and other benefits” that the member did not request or that the board had no reason to believe would be applicable to the member. The statute's plain language does not support such a strained interpretation, and CRAB's affirmance of the DALA magistrate's conclusion was neither legally erroneous nor unsupported by substantial evidence. See State Bd. of Retirement v. Boston Retirement Bd., 391 Mass. 92, 94 (1984) (“we need not look beyond the words of the statute where the language is plain and unambiguous”).

2. Due process claims. The plaintiff next argues that the judge erred in affirming the decision of the board because the board denied her request for the option D allowance in violation of her due process rights. We disagree.

In denying the plaintiff's application for an option D allowance, the board explicitly stated that the plaintiff could appeal to CRAB if “aggrieved by the decision,” pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 16 (4). The plaintiff did just that. In her appeal, the plaintiff was entitled to and afforded a full evidentiary hearing, and thus “has no cause to complain of a denial of such a hearing before a lower agency.” Masiello v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 360 Mass. 856, 857 (1971). Indeed, “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that that test be made in one tribunal rather than in another, so long as there is an opportunity to be heard and for judicial review which satisfies the demands of due process, as is the case here” (citation omitted). Id.

Also, the plaintiff had a right of judicial review, which she exercised pursuant to G. L. c. 30A. The Superior Court has the equitable power to correct an administrative process that is fundamentally unfair. See Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 500 (1965) (“the broad, remedial purpose of [G. L. c. 30A is] ․ to provide comprehensively for procedural due process in administrative proceedings”). The judge did not find any such unfairness in the hearings, reviews, and appeals of this case.⁵

3. Dismissal of non G. L. c. 30A claims. The plaintiff also contends that the judge erred in dismissing all the non G. L. c. 30A counts in her complaint. The judge dismissed those counts on the grounds that each count failed to state a claim, and, in the alternative, that the counts were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. There was no error.

First, the plaintiff's challenge to the dismissal of her non G. L. c. 30A claims for failure to state a claim is conclusory at best.⁶ As such, the plaintiff's argument does not rise to the level of appellate argument and we do not consider it. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

Second, the judge did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's non G. L. c. 30A claims because the plaintiff failed to bring those claims within the three-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff does not contest that the statute of limitations is three years or that the actions set forth in the complaint took place more than three years before filing. Instead, the plaintiff contends that “the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies required the Plaintiff to await multiple decisions from the CRAB before seeking judicial review.” We disagree.

The latest date on which the plaintiff's claims could have accrued was April 27, 2012, the date the board denied the plaintiff's application for an option D allowance. The plaintiff was thus required to file her civil rights claims ⁷ and contractual claims ⁸ against the board by April 2015. See G. L. c. 260, § 5B (three-year limitations on civil rights claims); G. L. c. 260, § 3A (three-year limitations on breach of contract claims brought against Commonwealth); Cameron Painting, Inc. v. University of Mass., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 349 (2013) (“A plain reading of the text of G. L. c. 260, § 3A, conveys the explicit intent of the Legislature that all claims against the Commonwealth for breach of contract must be brought within three years of their accrual”). Thus any claims accruing more than three years before the complaint's filing date of December 2020 would be time barred. The judge properly determined that the exhaustion requirement applied only to the plaintiff's G. L. c. 30A appeal and not to her non G. L. c. 30A claims. “Equitable tolling is used only sparingly, and is generally limited to specified exceptions,” none of which apply here (quotation and citation omitted). Shafnacker v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 425 Mass. 724, 728 (1997). We conclude, as did the judge below, that the plaintiff's non G. L. c. 30A claims are time barred.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   In 1993, the decedent identified his daughter as the sole beneficiary of his annuity savings fund account and signed a document acknowledging that if he died before the commencement of his retirement allowance, his beneficiary would receive “the full amount” of the decedent's contributions with interest to the annuity savings fund “as provided by the retirement act.”

4.   In its decision, CRAB incorporated DALA's decision by reference and adopted its findings of fact.

5.   The board and CRAB argue that the plaintiff's due process claims are waived for failure to raise them before DALA or CRAB. We need not decide whether the plaintiff's due process claims are waived because we conclude that the plaintiff received all of the process to which she was entitled.

6.   The plaintiff does not sufficiently argue why the judge erred in dismissing her non G. L. c. 30A claims for failure to state a claim, asserting only that “it was improper for the court to dismiss the Plaintiff's non-30A claims for the failure to state a claim,” and that “[f]or each of the non-30A counts, the Plaintiff's complaint contained factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief, and the dismissals of those claims were improper.”

7.   The three-year limitations period for State civil rights claims begins “on the date of the allegedly wrongful acts, unless the wrong is ‘inherently unknowable.’ ” Pagliuca v. Boston, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 820, 823 (1994), quoting Flynn v. Associated Press, 401 Mass. 776, 781 (1988). For Federal discrimination and civil rights claims, “the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his claim” (quotation and citation omitted). Rodriguez-Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2004). The limitations period begins to run even if the consequences of the triggering injury are not yet felt. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981).

8.   A cause of action in contract cases generally accrues when the contract is breached. Flannery v. Flannery, 429 Mass. 55, 58 (1999).