COMMONWEALTH v. RASHAD PHILLIPS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop where the defendant was a front seat passenger, and the police reached into the window next to him. The judge determined that the reach into the interior of the car constituted a search requiring probable cause, which was absent. The Commonwealth appeals, arguing that the reach was a lawful attempt to remove the defendant from the car in order to diffuse a safety threat. Determining that the degree of intrusion was proportional to the degree of suspicion prompting it, we reverse and remand.

Background.¹ In April 2023, four plain-clothed police officers in a single unmarked cruiser were patrolling an area of Boston due to high firearm violence and drug distribution there, when a black sedan went by them from the opposite direction. The side and back windows of the sedan were heavily tinted, and both front visors were down at night, which led the police to believe that the occupants were attempting to conceal their identities. The officers turned around and followed the sedan, intending to pull it over for a window tint violation. The police activated the cruiser lights, and the sedan pulled over.

As the police approached, they saw the driver of the sedan reach into the back seat area of the car. Two officers approached the driver's side, while the other two officers went to the passenger side. The driver was a woman who was empty-handed at the time police reached the car. She provided her license and registration upon request. The police recognized the defendant in the front passenger seat as someone affiliated with a gang who had had narcotics and a firearm seized from him within the past couple of years. An officer knocked on the defendant's window, and the defendant lowered the window slightly. The officer asked the defendant to lower it further, which he did, lowering it a few inches more.

The officers noticed an unnatural bulge at the defendant's front waist or groin area, which he kept covered and pinned down with his right forearm and hand. Although the driver was relatively calm, the defendant was noticeably nervous, breathing so hard that his chest visibly rose and fell. One of the officers asked the defendant if he had a medical issue, commenting that he did not want the defendant's heart to explode. The defendant stared straight ahead, making close to no eye contact at all. Concerned that the defendant may be concealing a firearm, the officers signaled to one another a plan to remove the occupants from the car.

The driver was asked to shut off the engine and step out of the car. She did shut off the car, but she did not get out. An officer pulled on the defendant's door handle but could not open it. The officer then reached down into the defendant's partially open window to grab the interior handle, but the defendant grabbed the officer's arm. While one officer remained with the driver, who was still in the car demanding to know what was going on, the others went to aid the officer grappling with the defendant, who was hunching forward. During the struggle, one of the officers felt a firearm in the defendant's waist area. After managing to get the defendant out of the car, the officers pat frisked him but found no weapon. Subsequently, a firearm was located on the floorboard between the front and back seat, just inside the passenger side door area.

Discussion. “In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, except where those findings rest solely on documentary evidence, such as a video recording, which we review de novo.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 497 Mass. 156, 161 (2026). We likewise independently review the motion judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law. Id.

Here, the motion judge found that the police were justified in stopping the black sedan due to the suspected window tint violation. See Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016) (observed traffic violation warrants motor vehicle stop). The judge also found that the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant keeping “his right arm pinned over a noticeable bulge near his waist,” and “his recent history of unlawful firearm possession, ․ created an objectively reasonable safety concern by the officers that warranted an exit order.” See Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38 (2020) (exit order justified during traffic stop where police are warranted in belief that safety of officers or others is threatened). Noting that the defendant “was never ordered out of the car,” the judge ruled that the officer's entry into the car was a search requiring probable cause, which she found was lacking. The judge added that “the analysis would have been different had [the defendant] refused to comply with a lawful exit order.”

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the judge erred in focusing on the officer's reach into the car as a “search,” rather than effectuation of the exit order that was authorized. When viewed in this light, the Commonwealth argues, the officer's conduct was a proportional response to the safety threat posed and therefore lawful. We agree.

“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.’ ” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001), quoting N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989). Here, the collective aim of the officers was not to search the car but to get the occupants out of the car to perform a patfrisk due to a safety threat. The judge found, and the evidence supports, that the officer first tried to open the defendant's door, but finding it unyielding, reached into the car “to grab [the] interior handle.” Thus, the intrusion into the car was not for the purpose of looking for something; rather, it was to facilitate the removal of the defendant from the car consistent with the authorized exit order.

In characterizing the officer's reach for the interior door handle as a search, the judge concluded that any “physical intrusion into the interior of a car constitutes a search” and that even “when police have reasonable safety concerns, they may open a car door to conduct a visual inspection of the interior,” but they may not “breach” the “plane” of the surface of the motor vehicle, without probable cause. But our cases have never established such a rule.²

Rather, our cases have recognized that ordinary traffic stops are fraught with danger. See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 664 (1999) (“there is danger for a police officer inherent in any auto stop” [citation omitted]). The police are therefore entitled to take reasonable protective measures when interacting with motorists. See Commonwealth v. Limone, 460 Mass. 834, 840 (2011) (removing keys from ignition was reasonably prudent protective measure to maintain safety). When an ordinary traffic stop evolves into something more, however, the police may take additional measures. See Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at 38-39 (exit order justified upon reasonable suspicion of threat to safety while patfrisk justified upon “reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous”).

Due to the rapid pace in which ordinary traffic stops may escalate into life threatening scenarios, our cases have never dictated the precise manner in which police must proceed. See Commonwealth v. Stampley, 437 Mass. 323, 326 (2002), quoting Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 671 (Fried, J., dissenting) (“law enforcement officials may have little time in which to avert ‘the sometimes lethal dangers of routine traffic stops’ ”). See also Commonwealth v. Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 213 (2013) (rejecting argument that officer was first required to ask driver about item at driver's side door, suspected to be weapon, before opening door and taking it himself).

Rather, when reviewing the propriety of police conduct, “[t]he pertinent inquiry is whether the degree of intrusion is reasonable in the circumstances. The degree of intrusiveness that is permitted is that which is ‘proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion.’ ” Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 141 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 794 (1985). Here, the suspicion prompting the officer's conduct was not simply a generalized safety concern due to the time of night, the high crime area, and the defendant's nervousness, which were all present. This was a particularized suspicion that the defendant, who was known to be affiliated with a gang and had a recent history of unlawful firearm possession, was concealing a firearm in his lap. In other words, the police had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 753-754 (2021) (uncharacteristic, erratic behavior of another passenger in car, in context of defendant's known gang affiliation and prior firearms adjudication, warranted belief that defendant was armed and dangerous); Commonwealth v. Johnson-Rivera, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537-538 (2024) (defendant's attempt to shield officer's view of cross-body bag, in conjunction with open criminal charge involving firearm, warranted belief that he was armed and dangerous).

Under the circumstances, the police were entitled to remove the defendant from the car and conduct a patfrisk to diffuse the safety threat. See Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at 38-39; Commonwealth v. Clermy, 421 Mass. 325, 329 (1995), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (with reasonable grounds to believe defendant was armed and dangerous, “[i]t was necessary for the protection of [the officer] and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm [before] it materialized”).

Where police were warranted in removing the defendant from the car due to safety concerns, they were not required to announce their intentions if to do so would jeopardize their safety. See Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 794 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407 Mass. 147, 152 (1990) (when circumstances give rise to legitimate safety concerns, police need not “gamble with their personal safety”).

The police needed to act quickly to diffuse the safety threat. A verbal order may have further alerted the already nervous defendant that the police were interested in him, potentially causing him to fire his weapon. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407 (1974), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]n applying hindsight to the officers’ actions, we think it crucial to remember that, as shown by many tragic climaxes to threshold police inquiries, ‘the answer might be a bullet,’ ”).

Pulling on the defendant's door handle was a reasonable attempt to try to get quick access to the defendant to disarm him, before the defendant would be able to react with violence. See Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 213 (“Neither the Federal Constitution nor the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is so inflexible as to prohibit [the officer] from removing the weapon from the defendant's reach before ordering him to get out of the vehicle ․”). When the door did not open, the officer made a “split-second” decision to accomplish the same thing by reaching for the door handle through the partially open window. See Commonwealth v. Privette, 491 Mass. 501, 524 (2023) (Cypher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (“[T]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving”).

Although the defendant contends that a verbal exit order was the normal and less intrusive and therefore more reasonable method of removing the defendant, an officer's assessment of the safest manner of diffusing an armed and dangerous person in the moment, “is a matter of judgment that we will not second guess.” Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 213. The question is not whether, in hindsight, there were less intrusive measures the officers could have taken. See Commonwealth v. Famania, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 372 n.12 (2011) (“With the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, it is possible to identify less intrusive steps that the police could have taken․ [W]e are loath to second guess the snap judgments that police officers have to make in the field when their safety is at issue” [quotation and citation omitted]).

Rather, the question is whether the degree of intrusion was reasonable in the circumstances. See Moses, 408 Mass. at 141. Where the defendant was believed to be armed and dangerous and his door could not be opened from the outside, the officer's reach into the window to facilitate the defendant's exit without jeopardizing officer safety was a proportional response and therefore reasonable. See id., quoting Borges, 395 Mass. at 794 (degree of intrusiveness “permitted is that which is ‘proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion’ ”).

Conclusion. The orders allowing the defendant's motion to suppress and denying the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration are reversed. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We recite the facts as found by the motion judge following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, supplemented by undisputed testimony not inconsistent with those findings, see Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 487 Mass. 661, 662 (2021). Body-worn camera video footage from the incident was submitted into evidence, and provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 380-381 (2021).

2.   The cases relied on in the judge's findings, rulings and order are inapposite. For example, in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 107 (1986), the Court upheld police entry into a motor vehicle to search for the vehicle identification number, which was obstructed from view from the outside. In United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1169-1170 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the court upheld the police opening a car door where they sought to question the occupants about a reported shooting, but could not see through the heavily tinted window. In United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 988 (4th Cir. 1997), the court held that heavy window tint, obscuring the ability to see whether the car had other occupants, justified the police in opening the passenger side door. In United States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1993), the court upheld an officer opening a van door in order to see if any other passenger could lawfully drive the van after the operator was determined to be unlicensed. In United States v. Cotton, 721 F.2d 350, 351-352 (11th Cir. 1983), the court upheld the opening of a car door in order to ensure officer safety. None of the cases dealt with a situation where the police had reasonable suspicion that an occupant of a motor vehicle was armed and dangerous. In the one case cited where police entry into a motor vehicle was not upheld, the officer leaned into a car from the passenger side to speak with the driver but had no safety concern to justify his actions. See United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1288-1290 (9th Cir. 2020).