REGINALD MILLER v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Reginald Miller, brought an action against the defendant, the city of Springfield, alleging discrimination based on race, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1); discrimination based on disability, G. L. c. 151B, § 16; and retaliation, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4) and § 4 (4A).¹ After a trial in the Superior Court, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the discrimination claims but found the defendant liable for retaliation and awarded the plaintiff $38,326 for lost wages, $150,000 for emotional distress, and $250,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the retaliation verdict. The defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the jury's award of back wages, damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. We affirm.

Background. The plaintiff began working in the Springfield police department (department) in 1996 and worked his way up the ranks. After working as an officer for eighteen years, he received a promotion to the position of sergeant; three years later, he became a lieutenant. The plaintiff served as a lieutenant for five years until he was promoted to captain in May 2022.

The plaintiff was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer and was out on medical leave from September 2018 to May 2019. He returned to work in May 2019 and was assigned to “light duty” until February 2020. Around March of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic began, the plaintiff requested accommodations from the department because of concerns about his immune system and contracting COVID-19, and he asked to have as little contact as possible with other people. The department allowed the plaintiff's request for accommodations and created a separate office for the plaintiff so that he could have minimal contact with other people. The plaintiff was also allowed to begin working from home around April 2020. In November 2020, the plaintiff attempted to return to work in person and provided paperwork from his physician stating that he was able to return, but the department told the plaintiff that he could not return until he provided additional paperwork. Later that same day, the plaintiff sent an e-mail message to the human resources director asking what paperwork he needed to provide, but he never received a response.

In September 2020, a vacancy for a captain position opened when a captain, who worked as an assistant to then-Police Commissioner Cheryl Clapprood,² retired. The plaintiff was considered for the vacancy. The plaintiff was tied with another lieutenant for the highest score on the civil service exam and was at the top of the captain's list to get the job but ultimately did not receive the promotion. The position remained vacant until February 2021, when Clapprood filled the position with the other lieutenant. In the Spring of 2021, Clapprood made four promotions to captain. The plaintiff did not receive any of them.

In January 2021, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) alleging discrimination based on race and handicap. In a letter dated February 17, 2021, the department informed the plaintiff that it intended to file an involuntary retirement on his behalf unless he submitted medical documentation clearing his return to full duty. On February 22, 2021, the plaintiff sent Clapprood a letter stating that he intended to amend his MCAD complaint to include retaliation and harassment. In August 2021, the plaintiff filed the initial Superior Court complaint underlying this appeal. In November 2022, the plaintiff filed a second MCAD complaint alleging the defendant retaliated against him. On March 22, 2023, the department issued the plaintiff a letter of reprimand claiming that he “made statements that were later found to be unsubstantiated.” A letter of reprimand could hinder an applicant's ability to receive a promotion. This was the first time the plaintiff had ever been disciplined. In April 2023, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Superior Court alleging the department retaliated against him for requesting an accommodation by failing to engage in the interactive process, reassigning him to the midnight shift following his promotion to captain, not allowing him to return to work after his Family Medical Leave Act absence, and reprimanding him in March 2023 with no basis.

At trial, the judge denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict. The judge also denied the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of evidence. The defendant argues that the evidence failed to demonstrate any protected activity and adverse employment action that could sustain a finding of retaliation. We are not persuaded.

We review a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or for JNOV in a civil trial to determine whether “anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [nonmoving party]” (citation omitted). Motsis v. Ming's Supermkt., Inc., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 380 (2019).

Under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, a retaliation claim requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered some adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. See Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 591-592 (2004).

a. Protected activity. The defendant contends that no protected activity occurred prior to September 2020, when the plaintiff did not receive the promotion to the vacant captain's position. We disagree.

The jury heard evidence that the plaintiff asked for and received accommodations for his immunodeficiency prior to September 2020. The plaintiff testified that, in March 2020, he requested to work from home because he was immunocompromised from his chemotherapy and that the department granted his accommodation request. Moreover, Clapprood testified that, after February 2020, “[w]e made accommodations for Lieutenant Miller.” She described how the department created a separate office for the plaintiff so that he could work “without coming into contact with other officers or other personnel.” She also described how the department gave him a laptop computer and allowed him to work from home, although she “had never done it before with anyone.”

The judge explicitly instructed the jury that “the request of an accommodation for a handicap, ․ the filing of an MCAD complaint with the MCAD or the filing of a lawsuit are all protected activities.” The judge also instructed the jury that “the prohibition against retaliation is intended to protect individuals from adverse employment actions motivated, at least in part, by a distinct intent to punish or to rid the workplace of someone who has requested an accommodation for a handicap or who has engaged in other protected activity.”³ The defendant did not object to these jury instructions and conceded at oral argument that the instructions were correct.⁴ Because the defendant did not object to the retaliation instruction, the defendant has waived any argument that the plaintiff's requests for accommodations could not form the basis for a retaliation claim. See Cormier v. Pezrow New England, Inc., 437 Mass. 302, 311 (2002) (argument that jury instructions were erroneous was waived where defendant failed to object to instructions at trial).

Based on the evidence, including testimony from Clapprood herself, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity prior to September 2020 by making at least one reasonable accommodation request.

b. Adverse action. The defendant contends that, even if the plaintiff's request for reasonable accommodations constituted protected activity under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, the retaliation claim fails because the failure to promote the plaintiff in September 2020 was not an adverse action. We are not persuaded. An action taken by an employer is an “adverse employment action” where it is “substantial enough to have materially disadvantaged an employee.” See Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 707-708 (2011). As discussed above, it is undisputed that the department did not promote the plaintiff to the open captain position in September 2020. The jury could have reasonably found that there were material differences between a lieutenant and captain position, including a difference in compensation, as evidenced by their awarding the plaintiff backpay in the amount of $38,326, which was the difference in the amount of the plaintiff's wages as a lieutenant in September 2020 versus his wages as a captain in 2022. See Yee v. Massachusetts State Police, 481 Mass. 290, 297 (2019) (“where an employee can show that there are material differences between two positions in the opportunity for compensation, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the failure to grant a lateral transfer to the preferred position may constitute an adverse employment action under c. 151B”). See also Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 499, 507 (2001) (employer's decision not to promote employee is “adverse employment decision”).

c. Causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. We find unavailing the defendant's contention that there was no evidence of causation. The jury heard testimony from the director of human resources that “there was always this underlying COVID issue with [the plaintiff] where ․ something's not right here, you're not doing this, you're not doing that. There was always difficulty, like a challenge.”

The jury also heard testimony from the plaintiff that in his twenty-nine years at the police department, he saw that “[w]hen there is a captain's spot available, those spots are filled immediately, within seven to ten days of that spot becoming open ․ except twice.” The plaintiff described one instance in which the leading candidate for the vacant role of captain was a person of color, and the spot went unfilled for five to six months until the candidate dropped out of the number one spot and a new candidate, who was not a person of color, was promoted the next day. The second instance was his own experience, in which another officer was promoted to captain after five to six months, shortly after the expiration of the list on which the plaintiff was a top candidate.

The jury could have reasonably concluded that there was a causal connection between the plaintiff's request for accommodations and the department's failure to promote the plaintiff, who had the highest test score at that time and had no previous history of discipline, particularly where Clapprood took the unusual step of leaving the position open for several months before hiring someone else.

d. Insufficiency under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A). The defendant argues that the evidence failed to demonstrate coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A). This argument is waived because it was not presented in the defendant's motions for directed verdict or for JNOV. See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006) (issue not raised or argued below cannot be raised for first time on appeal). In any case, the argument is without force because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4).

2. Damages. The defendant argues that the jury's damage award is not supported by the evidence because the plaintiff took no protected action until January 2021, but the back wages award demonstrates that damages were based on the plaintiff's not being promoted in September 2020. We find this argument unavailing. As discussed above, the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence and the jury instructions agreed to by the defendant that the plaintiff's requests for accommodations in February and March 2020 were protected activities.

The defendant also argues that the emotional distress damages of $150,000 were unwarranted because the plaintiff's testimony regarding emotional distress “revealed little out of the ordinary and was largely based on his subjective feelings about events that actually caused him no tangible harm.” We disagree.

The jury heard evidence that the department's treatment of the plaintiff made him very depressed and unable to sleep and caused him “a lot of anxiety.” He testified that he became ostracized at work and sought counseling. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the award of $150,000 “is not inconsistent with the dramatic impact these events had upon [the plaintiff's] life.” See DaPrato v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 482 Mass. 375, 377 n.2 (2019).

The defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence to award punitive damages, and that even if punitive damages were warranted, the amount awarded by the jury was excessive. We disagree. “Punitive damages are warranted where the conduct is so offensive that it justifies punishment and not merely compensation.” Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 110 (2009). Punitive damages may be awarded “for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others” (citation omitted). Id. at 107. In awarding punitive damages, “the fact finder should determine that the award is needed to deter such behavior toward the class of which plaintiff is a member, or that the defendant's behavior is so egregious that it warrants public condemnation and punishment.” Id. at 111. We sustain a jury award of punitive damages “if it could reasonably have [been] arrived at ․ from any ․ evidence ․ presented and is not so grossly excessive as to violate constitutional standards of due process” (quotations and citations omitted). See DaPrato, 482 Mass. at 392. In determining whether a punitive damage award is excessive, we consider the following factors: “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio of the punitive damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff, and ․ the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct” (quotation and citation omitted). See Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 826-827 (1997).

We first examine the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. As discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that there was an adverse action (the decision not to promote the plaintiff) caused by the plaintiff's protected activity (his request for reasonable accommodation). The jury heard evidence that the plaintiff had a rare form of cancer and requested -- and received -- a reasonable accommodation based on concerns about his health but then suffered an adverse employment consequence when the department denied him a promotion to a captain vacancy. As discussed supra, the jury also heard evidence that the department's treatment of the plaintiff had a profoundly negative impact on his wellbeing. The jury could have found the manner in which the department treated a long-time employee, who had the highest test score and had no prior history of misconduct, to be egregious or recklessly indifferent. See DaPrato, 482 Mass. at 392. Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant's conduct warranted “condemnation and deterrence.” Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 759, 767, 769 (1997) (award of $100,000 in punitive damages did not exceed “norms of rationality” where defendant's conduct warranted condemnation and deterrence even though plaintiff may have suffered no actual damages or mitigated them to nothing).

In awarding punitive damages, the jury could also have considered that the retaliatory conduct was committed by the city's police commissioner,⁵ a public official “charged with the public duty to enforce the law” (citation omitted). See Ciccarelli v. School Dep't of Lowell, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 787, 796 (2007) (“[D]eliberate violations of G. L. c. 151B, by those charged with the public duty to enforce the law equally present a heightened degree of reprehensibility” [quotation and citation omitted]).

We further note that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages here -- around 1.3 to one -- was not excessive. A “close to one-to-one ratio ․ comports with due process requirements and the goals of deterrence.” Haddad, 455 Mass. at 109. See Ciccarelli, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 798 (upholding punitive damages with ratio of five to one with actual harm).

Accordingly, we conclude that the jury award of damages was justified by the evidence and not excessive as a matter of law.⁶

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his claim under the whistleblower statute, G. L. c. 149, § 185, prior to trial.

2.   Clapprood began serving as acting commissioner in February 2019 until she was appointed commissioner in October 2019, and she served as commissioner until she retired in 2024. In spring of 2023, her title changed from commissioner to superintendent.

3.   We note that these instructions are consistent with the First Circuit's decisional law. See Moore v. Industrial Demolition LLC, 138 F.4th 17, 33 & n.17 (1st Cir. 2025) (requesting accommodation is protected activity sufficient to support retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, at least where plaintiff had reasonable and good faith belief of entitlement to accommodation or reasonably opposed employer's denial thereof).

4.   The defendant agreed to the language on the jury verdict slip. The jury checked “yes” to question two: “Did you find that Reginald Miller was a qualified handicapped person capable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation?” They also answered “yes” to question five on the verdict slip: “Did the City of Springfield retaliate against Reginald Miller for engaging in protected conduct in violation of G. L. c. 151B?”

5.   The commissioner testified that she had discretion in choosing between top candidates, that she was one of three decisionmakers in selecting a captain, and that ultimately “the buck's going to stop with [her].”

6.   The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in connection with this appeal is allowed. As the prevailing party in a claim of aggrievement “by a practice made unlawful under [G. L. c. 151B],” see G. L. c. 151B, § 9, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of “reasonable” appellate attorney's fees, see Haddad, 455 Mass. at 1024. This case presents no “special circumstances [that] would render such an award unjust.” G. L. c. 151B, § 9. In accordance with the procedure set forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), the plaintiff may file an application for appellate attorney's fees within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision, along with supporting documentation, after which the defendant shall have fourteen days within which to respond.