ALEJANDRA MARGARITA REINA CHRAIBI v. ALI CHRAIBI (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The former husband, Ali Chraibi (husband), appeals from a judgment of divorce nisi entered in the Probate and Family Court on October 2, 2023. The husband challenges the division of the marital estate claiming that the judge erred by including assets he acquired after the parties separated. He also argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented the former wife, Alejandra Margarita Reina-Chraibi (wife) from claiming that the marital partnership continued up to the time of the divorce trial. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts found by the judge, reserving some facts for later discussion.¹ The parties were married on October 31, 2005. The parties’ child (child) was born on November 30, 2005. The parties last lived together in or about November 2006. In 2007, while the wife and child were visiting the husband, the parties attempted to obtain a copy of their marriage license in Boston City Hall and were informed that there was no certificate on file. The husband mistakenly believed that the marriage was void because the license had not been filed properly. However, as it turned out, the parties subsequently learned that the marriage was valid.

On April 2, 2018, the wife filed a complaint for divorce pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 1B, on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. The wife requested, inter alia, joint custody of the minor child, child support from the husband, and conveyance of the home purchased by the husband in 2012 (home).

At a court hearing in January 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation addressing, inter alia, child support, medical expenses, and health and life insurance, which the judge incorporated into a temporary order issued the same day. On June 28, 2019, the judge entered a new temporary order incorporating the parties’ stipulation addressing parenting time during the upcoming summer. A two-day trial commenced on September 15, 2022. On September 16, 2022, the parties entered into a partial agreement for judgment, wherein the wife would have sole legal and physical custody of the child.

In an order dated September 29, 2023, the judge found that the wife was entitled to a division of the husband's individually-held assets. The judge awarded the wife approximately 22.5 percent of the total marital estate and ordered the husband to pay the wife a lump sum of $75,000 representing her interest in the home plus $15,000 transferred from the husband's 401(k) account.²

Discussion. 1. Division of assets. The husband first argues that the judge abused her discretion by misapplying G. L. c. 208, § 34, in dividing the assets because the “marital partnership” ended in November 2006, neither party had assets at that time, and there had been no contributions to the marital partnership since 2006. We are not persuaded.³

A judge has broad discretion in making an equitable division of marital assets. See Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 631 (2000). If a judge's findings demonstrate a consideration of all relevant G. L. c. 208, § 34 factors, “and the reasons for the judge's conclusion are apparent and flow rationally from the findings and rulings, a judge's determination on the equitable division of marital property will not be disturbed.” Id. “We will not reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it is plainly wrong and excessive” (quotation and citation omitted). Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014).

“General Laws c. 208, § 34, allows a judge to ‘assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.’ ” Williams, 431 Mass. at 625. “According broad discretion to the judge's division of property pursuant to the § 34 factors is necessary in order that the courts can handle the myriad of different fact situations which surround divorces and arrive at a fair financial settlement in each case” (quotation and citation omitted). Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371 (2011). There is no “rule fixing any of [the dates when marital property is identified]” and “the development of the law in this respect is best left to a case-by-case analysis.” Daugherty v. Daugherty, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 740-741 (2001), quoting Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 370 n.9 (1985). In dividing marital assets, a judge may consider not only “the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates,” but also “the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit.” G. L. c. 208, § 34.

Although the parties started living separately in November 2006 when the wife and the child moved to Arizona and the parties believed that their marriage was invalid,⁴ the record nevertheless supports the judge's finding that their belief was mistaken and that their marriage was in fact valid for a length of “149 full months.” See Ross v. Ross, 385 Mass. 30, 35 (1982) (“[A] couple is not divorced until the judgment becomes absolute”). Moreover, the husband testified at trial that he knew he was still “technically married” to the wife.

Importantly, the judge here found that the wife's “major contribution” to the marriage was “her singular devotion to and exclusive parenting of the parties’ minor child to her own financial and occupational detriment.” “[T]he care and maintenance of a child by a spouse even while separated is a contribution to the marital partnership.” Wheeler v. Wheeler, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 745 (1996).

The judge found that early in the parties’ relationship, the wife worked and supported the husband until her “high-risk pregnancy required her to maintain bedrest” and that the wife returned to work just ten days after giving birth and “resumed her role as the primary wage earner, while [the] [h]usband continued to collect his unemployment.” The wife put aside her aspirations to attend law school when she found out she was pregnant and continued working as a nanny, which allowed her the flexibility to bring the child as an infant to work and to be present to meet the child's needs when not in school. The judge found that since the child's birth, the wife dedicated herself to raising the child and was solely responsible for advocating for the child to receive greater educational support for the numerous academic struggles which the child began experiencing in first grade. See Wheeler, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 745 (wife's providing most of emotional care and nurturing for child during difficult adolescence was major contribution to marital partnership and should have been considered by judge).

The husband's reliance on Daugherty, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 738, is misplaced. In Daugherty, this court held that “the date of the parties’ separation [was] the proper time for identifying the marital property to be divided because the uncontroverted evidence ․ indicates that the marital partnership effectively ended at that time.” Id. at 741. As the husband concedes, the facts here are distinguishable because the wife in Daugherty did not provide any financial support or care to the children after the separation that would constitute further contribution to the marital partnership. See id. at 739-740. In consideration of the wife's continuing contributions here, the judge's decision to identify marital property based on the full length of the parties’ legal marriage was reasonable and is entitled to our deference. See Obara v. Ghoreishi, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 555 (2023) (“While a judge has discretion to choose a [date for valuing marital assets] that precedes the date of division in certain circumstances, the valuation date is generally tied to the date on which the parties ceased their joint efforts in contributing to the marital enterprise” [citations omitted]).

The husband's additional claim that the judge improperly relied on “perceived support inequities to justify asset division” and “use[d] § 34 as a vehicle to secure ․ child support or future support” has no support in the record. In dividing the marital estate, the judge properly considered “the present and future needs of the dependent children of the marriage,” which is a “mandatory factor” under § 34 (citations omitted). Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52, 55-56 (1998). No marital property was impermissibly assigned to the child here. See id. at 57 (section 34 does not empower a judge to make an “outright assignment of marital assets to children”). The judge's consideration of how the husband “financially benefitted” from his historically low child support obligation merely served to underscore the significance of the wife's contributions to the marital partnership.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude there was ample support for the judge's conclusion that “[g]iven [the] [w]ife's sacrifices and her significant contributions as the emotional, physically present, and almost exclusive parent of [the child], all of which cannot be quantified, fairness and equity dictate that [she] is entitled to a division of [the] [h]usband's individually held assets.” Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion. See Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 246 (“The judge's findings are supported by the evidence, and the allocation of liabilities was not plainly wrong or excessive”).

2. Judicial estoppel. The husband contends that judicial estoppel barred the wife from asserting that she was still married to him after she “deliberately misrepresented her marital status” by stating she was not married in a bankruptcy petition filed in Federal court in August 2011. We disagree. We review a judge's application of judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion. See Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640 (2005). “Judicial estoppel ․ precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding that is contrary to a position it had previously asserted in another proceeding” (citation omitted). Id. at 639-640. Judicial estoppel need not apply when a party's prior position was “based on inadvertence or mistake” or where “the position adopted in the first suit was clearly wrong yet had been advanced in good faith by the party now sought to be estopped” (citations omitted). Id. at 642.

Here, the judge specifically found that the wife believed that the parties’ marriage was invalid, did not “purposefully misrepresent[ ] her status to the Bankruptcy Court,” and was not “preclude[d] ․ from ․ seeking her rights” under the divorce action.

Without citing to any legal authority, the husband contends that the wife's sworn filings in the Bankruptcy Court stating that she was divorced and her tax filings representing herself as “[s]ingle” or “[h]ead of [h]ousehold” are “irreconcilable with a claim of a continuous marriage” and “confirm that ․ the marital partnership had ended, ․ no joint financial life existed, and ․ the statutory basis for a § 34 property division was extinguished years before” the wife filed a complaint for divorce in 2018. The husband also argues that the judge erred by not applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel because “[a] subjective belief cannot override a sworn representation under oath”; “[t]he filing is binding”; and “[e]stoppel applies regardless of hindsight or claimed confusion.” The husband again cites no legal support for any of these arguments. The husband's failure to present proper appellate arguments inhibits our review of these arguments. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the judge in ruling that the wife was not precluded from proceeding with the divorce action. See Otis, 443 Mass. at 642 (“judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, calling for the exercise of discretion in its application to particular facts”).⁵

Judgment of divorce nisi dated September 29, 2023, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless shown to be clearly erroneous” (citation omitted). Rosen v. Rosen, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 692 (2016). See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 52(a). Although the husband labels some of his arguments as challenges to the judge's factual findings, in fact these arguments are essentially challenges to the judge's discretionary decision making, discussed infra, regarding the date to use for purposes of identifying marital property and the applicability of judicial estoppel. We discern no clear errors in the judge's findings of fact.

2.   The judge also awarded the wife $13,180 in attorney's fees.

3.   The wife argues that the appeal should be dismissed with prejudice because the husband's appeal failed to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure for several reasons. We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the husband's appeal.

4.   The judge did not find credible the wife's belief that “she was still married to [the] [h]usband during the years after being told there was no record of the marriage.” She further found that, “[s]uch belief, true or not, is not the basis for the relief granted.” For this reason, the husband's argument that the judge erroneously adopted the wife's “contradicted narrative [of an unbroken marriage]” is without merit.

5.   We deny the wife's request for appellate legal fees.