PRI GLEN GROVE LLC v. ELAINE LAFFAN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Elaine Laffan (tenant), appeals from a judgment of possession and issuance of execution entered in this summary process action initiated by her landlord, PRI Glen Grove, LLC (PRI). A judge in the Housing Court entered judgment for PRI in 2024 after finding that the tenant violated an agreement entered into by the parties and approved by another judge in 2021. The tenant does not dispute that she violated the agreement, but contends that the judge erred in rejecting her reasonable accommodation defense, which she was entitled to assert as a disabled tenant who receives Federal housing assistance.¹ Although parties must generally follow such court-approved agreements, see Dacey v. Burgess, 491 Mass. 311, 314 (2023); Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 856 (2019), application of the reasonable accommodation framework was necessary here because the tenant asserted that changes in her medical condition prevented her from complying with certain terms in the agreement. Because the judge may have placed undue weight on the tenant's failure to produce medical documentation in finding that she did not demonstrate the required nexus between her requested accommodation and her disability, and because the judge's findings do not allow for meaningful review of his determination that the tenant's requested accommodation was not reasonable, we vacate the judgment of possession and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. We offer no opinion on whether the tenant's medical condition actually changed after the agreement or whether her requested accommodation of noncompliance with its terms was reasonable in the circumstances.²

Background. Assisted by a Federal housing subsidy, the tenant rents an apartment in Wellesley owned by PRI (subject property). In June 2021, PRI served the tenant with a notice to quit that cited violations of her occupancy agreement. PRI filed a summary process complaint in August 2021, and on November 8, 2021, the parties entered into an agreement (agreement) to resolve the matter. Under the agreement, PRI was entitled to file a motion for the entry of judgment and issuance of execution if the tenant failed to comply with its terms, including the requirements that the tenant communicate with PRI only through “a professional third party” except in an emergency and timely submit her subsidy recertification documents. The agreement was signed by a Housing Court judge and entered on the court's docket.

In December 2023, PRI moved to enforce the agreement and issue execution for possession. It alleged that the tenant had violated the agreement by sending PRI's property manager numerous e-mail messages and failing to respond to multiple written notices to schedule her annual recertification appointment. In opposing the motion, the tenant asserted a reasonable accommodation defense requesting relief from the terms of the agreement.

At a hearing, PRI called one witness, the property manager of the subject property, to testify. The property manager testified that she had received “derogatory, very stressful and long and winded” e-mail messages from the tenant since the agreement was signed.³ She issued a warning letter to the tenant in September 2023 to “cease and desist” sending the e-mail messages, but the e-mail messages continued. The property manager further testified that the tenant did not respond to the notices of recertification sent in April, May, and June 2023 and, as a result, the property manager notified the tenant that her subsidy would be terminated based on her failure to recertify. Although the tenant returned her signed recertification on December 10, 2023, she made written changes to it that were not “acceptable” to PRI.

The tenant testified that she had an “unpredictable disability” with “new symptoms all the time” that resulted in her inability to abide by the terms of the agreement. Her multiple sclerosis and other medical conditions affected her “emotion” and “cognition,” which caused her to send the e-mail messages to the property manager regarding her recertification and requesting various accommodations. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1733 (28th ed. 2006) (defining multiple sclerosis as “disorder of the central nervous system” in which symptoms, including “mood alterations,” characteristically occur in “exacerbations and remissions”). The tenant testified that, during the time she was asked to recertify her subsidy, she suffered from a “flare” and “major attack” of her multiple sclerosis. She stated that PRI “wanted me to sign [the recertification] while I was bed-ridden,” and although she realized that it was “important” to do so, “[t]he thing is, I was sick.” The tenant explained that this is “all about reasonable accommodation” and proposed that with “mediation on a regular basis, quarterly ․ things can be resolved.” The judge asked if the tenant had “any medical documents that you'd like me to take a look at,” to which she responded that she “didn't bring any ․ [b]ut they exist.”

In a written order, the judge found that the tenant violated the agreement, denied her request for reasonable accommodation, and allowed PRI's motion to enforce the agreement. On March 8, 2024, judgment for possession entered for PRI with execution to issue. After the tenant filed a notice of appeal, PRI moved to dismiss, arguing that the tenant waived her right to appeal or, alternatively, that it was untimely. Following a hearing, the judge denied PRI's motion. PRI then moved for reconsideration and to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute, which the judge also denied.

Discussion. 1. Jurisdiction. At the outset, we reject PRI's contention that we lack jurisdiction because the 2021 agreement states that “[t]he Parties waive all appeals.” Even though the parties may have waived their rights of appeal as to claims and defenses they had in relation to the underlying summary process action, the tenant did not waive her right to raise a defense of reasonable accommodation to her alleged breach of that agreement, or to appeal from a subsequent court ruling allowing PRI's motion for entry of judgment and issuance of execution. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Y.A., 482 Mass. 240, 248 & n.21 (2019).

We are equally unpersuaded by PRI's argument that the tenant's appeal was untimely because, per the agreement, if the tenant “is found in material violation of [the] Agreement, [PRI] shall be entitled to the entry of judgment dated as of the date of [the] Agreement.” The judge properly refused to extinguish the tenant's right to appeal by amending the date of entry of judgment in PRI's favor from March 8, 2024, to November 8, 2021. By its terms, the agreement did not require the judge to amend the date of entry of judgment. Nor could it. “[A] judge may not use his or her authority to issue an order nunc pro tunc so as to contravene a statutory mandate or a mandate established by court rule.” Commonwealth v. Yasin, 483 Mass. 343, 354 (2019). An appeal from a judgment in a summary process case must be taken within ten days after entry of the judgment. See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (a). The date of entry is the date on which the judgment is entered on the docket -- not the date the judgment is rendered or which appears on the face of the judgment, much less the date that one or both parties believe should be retroactively assigned to it. See Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 571-572 (1993). As the judge recognized, he did not have discretion to alter or void the ten-day appeal period as set forth by statute. See Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Mondi, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 282 (2020), citing Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 504-505 (1997). Accordingly, the tenant's appeal, noticed on March 18, 2024, is timely.

2. Denial of tenant's request for reasonable accommodation. The tenant does not contest that she violated the agreement by (1) initiating and engaging in written communication with PRI and its management office, rather than through a professional third party, in nonemergency situations, and (2) failing to submit all required documents and provide all required signatures and verifications for her 2023 recertification in a timely manner.⁴ We do not agree with the tenant's unbounded assertion that “[t]he fact that her requested accommodation involved noncompliance with the terms of the 2021 Agreement did not matter.” As a general rule, agreements entered into by parties to resolve a summary process action in the Housing Court must be complied with. “Where the parties reach a settlement by their own accord or by way of the mediator's help, and it is approved by a judge of the Housing Court, the settlement becomes a binding court order.” Dacey, 491 Mass. at 315, citing Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856. Allowing a party to subsequently challenge such an agreement after it has been approved by a judge would render it “nugatory” and “eviscerate the efficacy” of any settlement or mediation process that led to it (citation omitted). Dacey, supra at 316.

Nevertheless, the tenant here does not challenge the validity of the agreement itself, but rather contends that the judge erred in denying her the reasonable accommodation she requested -- relief from some of the agreement's terms. Although the agreement provided that its execution “satisfies all reasonable accommodation requests through this date,” the tenant stated in her opposition to PRI's motion that her “symptoms have progressed” and testified that significant changes to her medical condition prevented her from complying with certain terms. On the record before us, we are satisfied that the tenant raised a new request for reasonable accommodation and therefore the judge was required to apply the reasonable accommodation framework. Cf. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 846-847 (2009) (tenant raised request for reasonable accommodation by testifying about his disability, change in circumstances, and need for accommodation). We turn to that analysis.

a. Reasonable accommodation framework. “As a predicate to obtaining a reasonable accommodation in federally financed public housing, a disabled tenant must, if [the] landlord is not already aware, [1] inform the landlord that [the tenant] has a disability and [2] must request some accommodation.” Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 844. Such a request may also be raised at trial as a defense against eviction. See id. at 847. The tenant did so here by asserting the defense in her opposition “as a reason why an execution for possession should not issue,” testifying that the agreement did not account for her “unpredictable disability and new symptoms,” and asking the judge to allow her to depart from the agreement's terms and deny PRI's motion to enforce it.

In evaluating a request for reasonable accommodation, a judge must consider whether (1) the tenant is disabled, (2) there is a nexus between the disability and the requested accommodation, and (3) the requested accommodation is reasonable. See Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 843-844, 848-849. In determining whether such elements are met, a judge is entitled to assess the credibility of the evidence offered. See Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 (2005).

b. Disability. Both the Fair Housing Act and G. L. c. 151B prohibit discrimination in housing based on “handicap” or disability. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 306. A disability is defined as “(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [a] person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. at 306-307, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). See G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17) (same language).⁵ Here, there is no dispute that PRI was generally aware of the tenant's disability as the result of the agreement, her opposition to PRI's motion, and testimony at the hearing. See Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 845. As discussed, however, the agreement provided that its execution “satisfie[d] all reasonable accommodation requests through” the date it was signed. Thus, to satisfy this element of the reasonable accommodation framework in the unique circumstances here, the tenant had to show that a change in her condition warranted her new reasonable accommodation request.

c. Nexus between disability and requested accommodation. The tenant also had to show “an identifiable relationship, or nexus, between the requested accommodation and the individual's disability.” Joint Statement of the Department of Housing & Urban Development & the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act at 6 (May 17, 2004) (Joint Statement).⁶ Such a “causal link” helps ensure that the requested accommodation resolves the “misconduct that is the subject of the eviction,” Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 848, and allows the tenant “to comply with the terms of their lease.” Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 310. Where a nexus has been established, “a reasonable accommodation is required.” Bridgewaters, supra.

The tenant contends that the judge erred in requiring her to provide medical documentation to demonstrate the required nexus between her requested accommodation and her changed medical condition. In his decision, the judge stated that the tenant “did not provide any medical documentation to support her claim that her Multiple Sclerosis and/or previously having Covid-19, caused her to violate the Agreement.” Even though it is appropriate in some circumstances to “obtain information that is necessary to evaluate if a requested reasonable accommodation may be necessary because of a disability,” Joint Statement at 12, and a tenant may benefit strongly by offering medical evidence of the nexus between the disability and the accommodation sought, only “information necessary to apprise [a housing provider] of the disability and the desire and possible need for an accommodation” is generally required. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014).⁷ Such information can come from the individual's own testimony or, for example, “[a] doctor or other medical professional, a peer support group, a non-medical service agency, or a reliable third party who is in a position to know about the individual's disability.” Joint Statement at 13-14. See Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 846-847. “In most cases, an individual's medical records or detailed information about the nature of a person's disability is not necessary.” Joint Statement at 14.⁸

At the hearing, the tenant was explicit about the relationship between the new symptoms she was experiencing and her noncompliance with the agreement. She testified that her noncompliance occurred when she was experiencing “an attack of” multiple sclerosis and a “flare” and that PRI wanted her to sign her recertification “while [she] was bed-ridden.” Her condition affected her “cognition,” and she believed that she had already “signed the form.” As for her e-mail messages to the property manager, the tenant explained that multiple sclerosis “is not a simple disease” and that it “affects so many different symptoms,” including her “emotion.” Finally, the tenant submitted correspondence from her previous attorney outlining the impact her multiple sclerosis has on her and assured the judge that medical documents “exist” even though she did not have them with her.

Although it is possible that the judge may have decided not to credit the tenant's testimony on how her changed condition prevented her from complying with the agreement, he made no credibility finding to which we can defer now. See Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 306.⁹ In the absence of such a finding, we conclude that the tenant's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the judge to find a nexus between her disability and requested accommodation, even in the absence of medical documentation. See Castillo Condominium Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 821 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2016) (individual may “supply key testimony verifying his own disability status”). See also Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 846-847 (need for reasonable accommodation established by disabled tenant's testimony). Because the judge may have denied the tenant's reasonable accommodation defense solely because of her failure to produce medical documentation, remand is required for clarification and, if necessary, reconsideration of this issue.

d. Reasonableness. A court must also evaluate whether the requested accommodation is reasonable. See Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 307. “A tenant who has alleged discrimination based on a landlord's failure reasonably to accommodate a [disability] has the burden of proving that the proposed accommodation is reasonable.” Id. See City Wide Assocs. v. Penfield, 409 Mass. 140, 143 (1991) (“As with any other discrimination claim, the burden is on the tenant to prove a prima facie case of discrimination”). “Placing the burden on a tenant to acknowledge a disability and the role it may play in a purported lease violation [relieves] a [housing provider] ․ of that difficult task.” Shkolnik, supra at 313. The tenant's contention that the judge erred in placing the initial burden of proof on her to show that her request was reasonable is incorrect.¹⁰

After the tenant makes an initial showing, the burden shifts to the housing provider to demonstrate that the request is not reasonable because it would “impose an undue hardship or burden.”¹¹ Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 307, quoting Peabody Props. v. Sherman, 418 Mass. 603, 608 (1994). See City Wide Assocs., 409 Mass. at 143 (“The burden of production [but not the ultimate burden of persuasion] then shifts to the [housing provider] to prove that the challenged act was not discriminatory”). “The mandate for reasonable, but not onerous, accommodation” must strike a balance between the rights of the disabled tenant and the legitimate interests of the housing provider. Shkolnik, supra.

The judge's findings do not allow for meaningful review of his determination that the tenant's requested accommodation was not reasonable. Whether an accommodation is reasonable “must be determined on an individualized basis depending on the particular circumstances presented.” Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 849. In this context, reasonableness “is not susceptible of precise measurement.” City Wide Assocs., 409 Mass. at 144. The inquiry “is fact specific and will be resolved on a case-by-case basis.” Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 307.

The tenant requested relief from the agreement and proposed that with “mediation on a regular basis, quarterly, ․ things can be resolved.” The judge's decision did not mention that proposal or assess its reasonableness. Instead, his findings focused on whether the tenant was in breach of the agreement -- an uncontested fact. Although we agree that the tenant's noncompliance was a relevant factor to consider, her circumstances and explanation why, in light of her changed medical condition, she could not comply with the agreement, also had to be considered in evaluating whether her request was reasonable. See Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 849; Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 307.

Similarly, the judge gave only limited consideration to whether PRI met its burden to prove that the tenant's request imposed “an undue hardship or burden” (citation omitted). Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 307. The judge found that the “[d]efendant's email communications adversely impacted [PRI's] ability to manage the premises.” Because some adverse impact may be necessary to accommodate the rights of a disabled tenant, that finding is inadequate to allow meaningful review of his determination that the tenant's requested accommodation was not reasonable. See Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 849. See also City Wide Assocs., 409 Mass. at 143 (affirming determination that tenant's proposed accommodation was reasonable where judge “expressly took into account” multiple relevant considerations).¹² Additional findings are required on the extent of hardship or burden experienced by PRI in order to determine the merits of the tenant's reasonable accommodation defense.

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Housing Court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.¹³

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As support for her reasonable accommodation defense, the tenant relies on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (6), (7A); and art. 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.

2.   We acknowledge the letter of amicus curiae filed by Legal Key Partnership for Health and Justice.

3.   Twenty-seven “sample” e-mail messages were admitted to evidence.

4.   The tenant asserts that she “reserves the right to contest the court's breach findings should the matter be remanded.” We note, however, that parties are generally barred from advancing issues they could have but did not raise in an earlier appeal from a judgment. See Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 442 Mass. 1041, 1042-1043 (2004).

5.   Until recently, chapter 151B used the outdated terms “handicap” and “handicapped person.” See Geezil v. White Cliffs Condominium Four Ass'n, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 103 n.3 (2024). The Legislature has changed the word “handicap” in G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17), and elsewhere in the General Laws, to “disability.” See St. 2026, c. 102, § 265 (effective June 12, 2026).

6.   “[E]ven [t]hough the Joint Statement is a policy statement, rather than an authoritative interpretation of FHA ․, it is nonetheless entitled to respect to the extent it has the power to persuade” (quotations and citation omitted). Castillo Condominium Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 821 F.3d 92, 99 n.6 (1st Cir. 2016). The statement provides “technical assistance regarding the rights and obligations of persons with disabilities and housing providers under the Act relating to reasonable accommodations.” Joint Statement at 1-2. We conclude that the provisions of the Joint Statement discussed herein correctly reflect the legislative intent underlying enactment of the fair housing and antidiscrimination statutes at issue. See Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 847-848; Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 309 n.14.

7.   Where a person's disability is “obvious, or otherwise known” and the need for the requested accommodation is “also readily apparent or known,” additional information about the requester's disability may not be requested. Joint Statement at 12. If the need for the accommodation is “not readily apparent or known,” “only information that is necessary to evaluate the disability-related need” may be requested. Id. at 13. On the other hand, if a disability is not obvious, “disability-related information that (1) is necessary to verify that the person meets the [Fair Housing] Act's definition of disability ․, (2) describes the needed accommodation, and (3) shows the relationship between the person's disability and the need for the requested accommodation” may be requested.” Id.

8.   Because reasonable accommodation laws exist “to address the ‘pervasive unequal treatment’ of individuals with disabilities,” Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 847, quoting McDonough, petitioner, 457 Mass. 512, 514 (2010), the burden placed on an individual seeking a reasonable accommodation is less demanding than that required to demonstrate legal incapacity. See Dacey, 491 Mass. at 319.

9.   We normally accord “the utmost deference” to the credibility determinations of a judge who “heard the testimony of the parties ․ [and] observed their demeanor.” Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006), quoting Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 929 (1999). PRI does not contend that we should infer a finding of noncredibility from the judge's statement about the tenant's failure to provide medical documentation or from any other part of the record.

10.   The tenant's reliance on Bridgewaters to argue otherwise is misplaced because that decision concerned the burden that applies when a landlord relies on the direct threat exception in seeking to evict a tenant, see 24 C.F.R. § 9.131 (2008), not when, as here, a tenant requests a reasonable accommodation. In Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 834, the landlord, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), sought to evict a disabled tenant after he violated his lease by committing a crime that threated the health and safety of another resident. Pursuant to Federal regulation and BHA's own policy, although a landlord must generally make reasonable accommodations for tenants with disabilities, the landlord may evict a tenant who poses “a significant risk to the health or safety of others” if, after “mak[ing] an individualized assessment,” it determines that the risk cannot be eliminated or minimized by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures. 24 C.F.R. § 9.131(b)-(c). See Bridgewaters, supra at 838-842. Applying that framework, the court concluded that the housing provider “bears the burden of showing that no accommodation is reasonable.” Bridgewaters, supra at 843. Likewise, in Glendale Assocs., LP v. Harris, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 455-456, 464 (2020), this court applied Bridgewaters’s burden allocation where the tenant participated in the BHA-administered Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program and the landlord sought to evict him under G. L. c. 139, § 19, for allegedly posing a threat to others.

11.   Various factors may be considered, “such as the cost of the requested accommodation, the financial resources of the provider, the benefits that the accommodation would provide to the requester, and the availability of alternative accommodations that would effectively meet the requester's disability-related needs.” Joint Statement at 7.

12.   To be clear, the judge was entitled to consider the impact of the tenant's e-mail messages and conduct to the extent that they were obscene, offensive, or threatening to the property manager. See Roe v. Sugar River Mills Assocs., 820 F. Supp. 636, 637 (D.N.H. 1993). Reasonable accommodations law does not require a housing provider “to ignore the impact of lease-violating behavior ․ in the name of making an accommodation.” Shkolnik, 443 Mass. at 313. Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f), a tenant who poses a direct threat to others is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation if the housing provider shows either “the failure of an accommodation instituted at the request of the tenant, or demonstrate[s] that no reasonable accommodation will acceptably minimize the risk the tenant poses.” Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. at 842.

13.   On remand, the judge may take additional evidence in his discretion.