ADOPTION OF RONAN v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother of Ronan, whom we shall call Melody (a pseudonym) because she did not turn eighteen until after trial commenced, appeals from a decree issued by a judge of the Juvenile Court finding Melody unfit and terminating her parental rights to her son. See G. L. c. 119, § 26; G. L. c. 210, § 3. On appeal, Melody argues that (1) the judge erred in concluding that her unfitness was not temporary, (2) the Department of Children and Families (department) failed to provide reasonable support to address her mental health needs, and (3) the department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with Ronan. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

Background. Melody was born in April of 2006. The department first became involved with Melody's family in 2016, based on concerns regarding the maternal grandmother's (grandmother) substance use and attempted suicide. In 2018, the department removed Melody from the grandmother's care following the grandmother's second attempted suicide. After a brief period staying with her legal father in Puerto Rico,² Melody was returned to the grandmother's care in May of 2019.

On July 30, 2019, the department received two separate reports pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), alleging sexual abuse of Melody by a man identified as Markell Fullwood, after Melody arrived in the emergency room with a positive pregnancy test and reported she had been raped. The department's subsequent investigation found support for the allegations contained in the 51A reports, concluding that Fullwood (who was incarcerated on unrelated charges at the time of the investigation) sexually assaulted Melody while she was under the supervision of a family friend, leading to the pregnancy.

Ronan was born in March of 2020, when Melody was thirteen years old. In May of 2020, Melody's in-home therapy service provider reported that Melody relied heavily on the grandmother's support in caring for Ronan. At that time, the provider also reported that Melody was unable to provide basic information about Ronan, and that Melody was experiencing symptoms of anxiety like paranoia around leaving the house. Melody and Ronan continued to live in the grandmother's home until October of 2020, when both Ronan and Melody were removed based on allegations of neglect (1) of Melody and Ronan by the grandmother, and (2) of Ronan by Melody. Specifically, 51A reports filed in October of 2020 alleged that the grandmother's boyfriend, who was often in the presence of Melody and Ronan, was classified as a level three sex offender. The reports also noted that the grandmother's boyfriend had been involved in caring for Ronan, including picking him up and dropping him off from day care, and that Ronan arrived at day care “filthy dirty” wearing unwashed clothes. On November 2, 2020, the department filed care and protection petitions naming Melody and Ronan. The department was granted temporary custody of each child, and Ronan and Melody were placed together in a foster home.

In January of 2021, a court-appointed investigator reported that Melody had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder, for which she was taking medication. In June of 2021, the department received another 51A report, containing allegations that a man other than Fullwood had also sexually assaulted Melody and was believed to be responsible for the pregnancy with Ronan. Additionally, the report alleged that this newly-identified person, “Mr. Delarosa,” was a friend of the grandmother's boyfriend, and that the grandmother was aware of Delarosa's abuse of Melody. The first permanency hearing was held on September 16, 2021, during which the expressed goals remained for Melody and Ronan to reunify with the grandmother. At that time, Melody was engaged in intensive care coordination, in-home therapy, temporary therapeutic service, temporary monitoring, as well as outpatient therapy and psychiatric services.

Beginning in December of 2021, Melody's mental health declined precipitously. From December 2021 to March 2022, Melody was admitted to the hospital on five separate occasions, four of which were due to suicidal ideation. On June 23, 2022, the department changed Ronan's permanency goal to adoption. Following her hospitalizations, Melody transitioned to an inpatient facility and was therefore unable to engage in many of the services recommended by the department. Ronan was diagnosed with autism during this period. In September of 2022, Melody was hospitalized again for suicidal ideation.

Melody's mental health began to stabilize around July of 2023. At that time, the department did not pursue reuniting Melody with Ronan because his foster placement, who had also been Melody's foster placement until the hospitalizations, expressed uncertainty about their ability to care for both children and that they no longer wanted Melody to be placed with them. Notwithstanding this separation, Melody began attending Ronan's applied behavior analysis (ABA) sessions in his foster placement, where she saw the services being provided to Ronan. In October of 2023, another foster care review was held, whereupon the review team concluded that Melody had participated in the department's action plan tasks and had demonstrated behavioral changes. The review team found that Melody was proactively learning about Ronan's autism diagnosis, and that she was medication compliant, attending school regularly, and able to understand the work she needed to do to make continued progress toward supporting Ronan's needs.

In August of 2023, Melody was reunified with the grandmother, with whom she remained with no disruptions until the care and protection case naming her was dismissed on the department's motion, on March 1, 2024. In February of 2024, Ronan transitioned to a preadoptive placement.³ Melody was informed that Ronan did not want any contact with his former foster parent. Around this time, Melody's visits with Ronan changed locations and environments from a local restaurant to a public park. For the first outdoor visit, Melody failed to adequately prepare for or anticipate Ronan's needs, bringing only a snack. Melody brought adequate provisions to future visits, however, after advisement by the department's social worker. During a visit in or around late July or early August of 2024, Melody arrived at the park with Ronan's former foster parent. In violation of the department's policy, and notwithstanding Melody's awareness that the department had decided not to permit Ronan's former foster parent to attend visits, Melody did not notify the department beforehand that the former foster parent would be present. As a result of the former foster parent's presence at the visit, Ronan became dysregulated and stated that he no longer desired to attend visits with Melody. During another visit with Ronan, the same former foster parent placed a video call to Melody and Melody answered, which caused Ronan to become upset.

Following these visits, Ronan reportedly expressed anxiousness about attending future visits with Melody. The preadoptive parents reported that Ronan wet his bed following visits with Melody, and that he experienced night terrors and an increase in tantrum behaviors. Ronan otherwise behaved very affectionately with his preadoptive parents, appearing “happy,” “energetic,” and “bonded” with them.

A trial on the merits of the department's care and protection petition naming Ronan commenced on March 1, 2024, and continued for six nonconsecutive dates, culminating on October 29, 2024. On the first day of trial, Melody was seventeen years old, and, as noted above, remained in the grandmother's home along with her brother, sister, and the sister's two children.⁴ During Melody's testimony, she stated that she was looking for employment, and that her plan was to continue living in the grandmother's home until she could find and sustain housing for herself and Ronan. Melody also testified that she was “trying right now to get [her] license” and, until she did, would be dependent on the grandmother to transport Ronan to his medical appointments, ABA sessions, and other services.⁵ The attorney for the department -- having “ma[d]e it clear that although I am asking these questions, none of what happened to you is your fault” -- then asked Melody about the “relationship” with Delarosa leading up to the pregnancy. Melody stated that she saw Delarosa “like my uncle,” who began “saying sweet things towards me. So I started like falling in love towards him and returning myself to him.”

On the third trial date, Dr. Karen Clark, a qualified expert in evaluating parental capacity, testified regarding a parental fitness assessment she conducted with Melody from December of 2023 to February of 2024. Based on her interviews with Melody, a review of the department's documentation of Melody's and Ronan's cases, the results of several testing tools, and observations of Melody with Ronan over the course of three separate visits, Clark concluded that Melody had “demonstrated an understanding of [Ronan's] unique emotional needs as well as the basics of parenting -- prioritizing health and safety; consistency of care; establishing rules; ability to set limits; showing unconditional affection; [and] ability to intuit a child's emotional needs.” On cross-examination, however, Clark noted that Melody did not answer eleven out of thirty-two questions on the assessment. Clark explained that the tool was not designed for child parents and Melody did not feel she was sufficiently parenting Ronan to properly answer the questions. In those instances where Melody was not quite sure how to respond to the question, Clark advised her to “just leave it blank.” Ultimately, the judge credited Clark's testimony as it pertained to Melody's “[hard] work[ ] to learn skills and utilize supports,” but did not credit Clark's ultimate determination that Melody's “parenting ability [was] sufficient to meet [Ronan's] needs.”

At the conclusion of the trial, the judge determined that Melody was currently unfit to care for Ronan, and that her unfitness was likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Acknowledging that Melody had displayed a “noteworthy” and “earnest desire” to parent Ronan, the judge specifically considered Melody's mental health history and weighed it against Ronan's desire for permanency, in the same context with Ronan's need for structure and stability to manage symptoms of his diagnosis. Ultimately, the judge concluded that “[d]espite her best efforts, the evidence convinces the court that [Melody] would struggle to anticipate and meet [Ronan's] many particularized needs while also attending to her own mental health.” The judge also considered Ronan's bond with the preadoptive parents and the progress he had demonstrated in that home in determining that termination of Melody's rights was in Ronan's best interests. Melody now appeals.

Discussion. 1. Termination of Melody's rights. “In deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be served by terminating the legal relation between parent and child.” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Recognizing that the termination of parental rights is an “extreme step, a judge must decide both whether the parent is currently unfit and whether, on the basis of credible evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of trial may be only temporary” (quotations and citation omitted). Id. “Because childhood is fleeting, a parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period.” Id. at 60.

“We review the judge's findings with substantial deference, recognizing her discretion to evaluate a witness's credibility and to weigh the evidence,” Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 515 (2005), “and reverse only where the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59.

On appeal, Melody does not challenge the judge's conclusion that she was unfit at the time of the decree -- a conclusion for which, in any event, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law. Rather, Melody asserts that the judge erred in concluding that Melody's unfitness was “likely to continue into the indefinite future.” Specifically, Melody contends that the judge erred by (1) ignoring Clark's conclusions related to Melody's fitness, and (2) accepting the department's interpretation of the “relationship” leading to the pregnancy with Ronan, thereby rendering the conclusion that Melody's unfitness was not temporary an error of law. Having carefully reviewed the record, “[w]e see no basis for disturbing the judge's view of the evidence.” Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 n.3 (1997).

To begin, we disagree with Melody's contention that the judge failed to “meaningfully engage” with Clark's evaluation in determining Melody's fitness. This argument is belied by the fact that the judge's findings were laden with references to Clark's assessment of Melody, including Clark's conclusions that Melody did not display “any disordered thoughts or dysregulated behavior” and “was clear, goal-oriented, and very open about her mental health struggles.” Furthermore, the judge noted that Clark “did not find that [Melody]’s reliance on maternal grandmother negatively impacted her ability to parent [Ronan].” As discussed above, the judge ultimately credited Clark's testimony that Melody had expended effort to develop parenting skills and utilize available supports.

Conversely, the judge also referenced Clark's observations that Melody “[did] not always identify[ ] as a parent due to her limited history of parenting her child” and “preferred to use minimization of potential external stressors and avoidance as her primary coping mechanisms.”⁶ Moreover, as referenced supra, the judge noted that during Melody's assessment, she “would leave questions blank rather than give herself a score that she did not feel accurately reflected her [parenting capacity], including not answering in a more positive way if false.” Based on these findings, to which we give substantial deference, the judge acted well within her discretion in declining to credit Clark's ultimate determination regarding Melody's fitness. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 224-225 (1998) (no abuse of discretion where judge partially credits expert's testimony while rejecting expert's ultimate conclusion).

Ultimately, Melody's argument amounts to little more than disagreement with the judge's weighing of evidence, to which we give substantial deference. See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. at 886 n.3; Adoption of Lisette, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 295 (2018) (“The judge is not required to view the evidence from the parent's perspective”). Although portions of Clark's testimony -- as well as other findings contained in the judge's decision - - reflected appreciation for Melody's efforts and development in meeting Ronan's needs, the record amply supports the judge's conclusion that Melody's inability to recognize and meet Ronan's needs, while also attending to her own needs, was not temporary and was likely to continue into the foreseeable future. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59 (“judge's conclusion that a parent's unfitness is temporary must ․ not [rest] on a ‘faint hope’ ” [citation omitted]). Specifically, the judge's conclusion rested largely on the inadequacy of, and dangers posed by, Melody's plan to depend on the grandmother for Ronan's care and housing. Adoption of Virgil, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 303 (2018) (judge may consider parent's proposed living arrangement in determining fitness). Melody's inability to independently manage her own care -- which is understandable given the tragic circumstances -- supports the finding of unfitness because extensive services are required for Ronan's care, but neither Melody nor the grandmother demonstrated ability to maintain provider information, coordinate appointments, and arrange for transportation. See Adoption of Abigail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 196 (1986) (parent's inability to manage her own needs has prognostic value in assessing capacity to manage child's more complex needs).

We also disagree with Melody's contention that her perception of the abuse by Delarosa was irrelevant to determining her fitness. As noted above, even though Melody had matured quite a bit by the time of trial, she still described the events as “falling in love” at age twelve with an adult man she saw as an uncle. She still described the sex leading to pregnancy as “returning [her]self to him” rather than as rape, which is how she described Fullwood's conduct. Based on this testimony, the judge's finding that Melody “appeared to be conflicted” about whether the sex with Delarosa “was consensual or a sexual assault” was not clearly erroneous. This finding in no way suggests that the judge construed Melody to be describing sex grounded in consent.⁷ Rather, the judge considered Melody's views about the conduct as evidence that, at the time of the trial, Melody could not recognize and appropriately respond to exploitative behavior and thus would not be able to protect herself and Ronan. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the judge's finding.

We pause here to acknowledge that Melody clearly loves Ronan, and that the circumstances supporting the judge's conclusions are not Melody's fault. Given the totality of the circumstances, including that the grandmother was unable to protect Melody such that Melody gave birth at age thirteen following repeated sexual assaults by men in caregiving positions, we are sympathetic. At the time trial began, Melody was only seventeen years old. Considering that she was a child, her dependence on her own mother, notwithstanding the assistance her mother was able to give was inadequate, and her demonstrating immaturity are not unexpected, nor are they moral failings, or, as the judge recognized, failings of effort. Nonetheless, the best interests of Ronan are the touchstone here, and there was no error of law in the judge's determination that Melody's unfitness was likely to continue indefinitely into the future, nor any abuse of discretion in her finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of Ronan.

2. Reasonable efforts. Next, Melody argues, for the first time on appeal, that the department failed to make reasonable efforts to (1) assist Melody in addressing her mental health needs, and (2) reunify Melody and Ronan. Because Melody did not raise either of these claims at any point in the proceedings, we consider them waived. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020) (“[A] parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner ․ either when the parenting plan is adopted, when [she] receives those services, or shortly thereafter” [citations omitted]).

In any event, even if these arguments were preserved, which they were not, we discern no error in the judge's determination that the department made reasonable efforts. See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 242 (“A judge's determination that the department made reasonable efforts will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous”). Although the department “is required to make reasonable efforts to strengthen and encourage the integrity of the family before proceeding with an action designed to sever family ties ․, heroic or extraordinary measures, however desirable they may at least abstractly be, are not required.” Adoption of Lenore, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 278 (2002).

Here, with respect to Melody's mental health needs, Melody received therapeutic support and treatment for her psychogenic, nonepileptic seizures, and engaged in therapeutic services-including in-home services -- pursuant to the department's efforts throughout the pendency of the case. Regarding the department's reasonable efforts to reunify Melody with Ronan, the record reflects the department's efforts to provide Melody with services designed to assist her in becoming fit, including intensive care coordination and visits. These efforts were targeted to address both the mother's and Ronan's needs.

In conclusion, the judge's findings that Ronan was in need of care and protection, and the decision to commit Ronan to the permanent custody of the preadoptive parents, were sound. The decree terminating Melody's parental rights and dispensing with the need for her consent to Ronan's adoption is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Melody later reported that, while living with her father in Puerto Rico, she was sexually abused by her paternal grandfather.

3.   Ronan first met with the preadoptive parents in October of 2023, after which he and the preadoptive parents underwent a months-long transition process.

4.   Given that Melody was to turn eighteen years old during the course of the trial, and that Melody had reunified with the grandmother in August of 2023, the department dismissed its care and protection petition naming Melody.

5.   The judge noted that, in addition to assisting Melody care for Ronan, the grandmother was responsible for caring for Melody's brother, who carries a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

6.   The judge noted that Clark did not find Melody “was inappropriately avoidant or that she was using these coping mechanisms to an unhealthy degree.”

7.   The judge's findings are consistent in characterizing Delarosa's conduct as sexual assault.