ANNA SMITH v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND RECREATION (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Anna M. Smith, injured her arm when she slipped and fell on a dilapidated bridge while hiking in Pearl Hill State Park (park). She brought this action against the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), alleging that her injury was caused by DCR's negligent maintenance of its property. She appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of DCR, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by concluding that the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C (statute), shielded DCR from liability for her injury. We affirm.

Background. The material facts are not in dispute. The park is a 1,000 acre state park located in Townsend, Massachusetts. It is owned by the Commonwealth and managed by DCR. The park is open to the public for recreational use such as swimming, cross-country skiing, fishing, and biking, and includes two designated campgrounds. In order to stay in a campground, campers must make a reservation and pay a fee, but they may use the park grounds freely without incurring any additional charges.¹

Sometime in 2021, Smith and her boyfriend reserved a campsite for the weekend of September 3, 2021.² They paid a total of $38.50 for two nights and received a confirmation message via e-mail. The e-mail message stated: “RESERVATIONS REQUIRED. NO WALK-IN CAMPING ALLOWED,” and included information regarding additional charges, such as for the purchase of firewood, and rules for use of the campground. In addition to camping, DCR's website advertised various activities including hiking, which the website listed as an activity available “Within Park.”

Smith arrived at the park on September 3, 2021, and camped overnight at the designated campsite. The following day Smith left the campsite at approximately 1:30 P.M. to hike the park's trails with her friends. The group hiked one of the trails for roughly half an hour and were approximately one mile away from Smith's campsite when they encountered a bridge which was in total disrepair. Smith attempted to cross the bridge, slipped, and seriously injured her left arm. The injury required extensive treatment, including surgery, and Smith incurred $19,423.92 in medical expenses.

As previously noted, Smith sued DCR for negligence. DCR moved for summary judgment claiming that because Smith paid no fee for the activity in which she was engaged at the time she was injured, i.e., hiking, the Commonwealth was not liable for her injury pursuant to G. L. c. 21, § 17C, which provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any person having an interest in land ․ who lawfully permits the public to use such land for recreational ․ purposes without imposing a charge or fee therefor ․ shall not be liable for personal injuries ․ sustained by such members of the public ․ in the absence of wil[l]ful, wanton, or reckless conduct by such person.”

In reaching her conclusion that the statute applied and barred liability, the judge rejected Smith's contention that the fee she paid to reserve a campsite necessarily included a charge for the recreational use of the entire park.³ Instead, the judge agreed with DCR that Smith had only paid a fee for the use of the campsite and not for other activities which are open to the public free of charge. Accordingly, the judge concluded that the statute applied and entered summary judgment in DCR's favor.

Discussion. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Our review is de novo and we must determine whether all material facts and questions of law are resolved” (quotation and citations omitted). Patterson v. Christ Church in the City of Boston, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 159 (2014). “Negligence cases are not frequently resolved by summary judgment, but a judge may decide the issue as matter of law ․ where the defendant offers a statutory exemption from liability as an affirmative defense” (quotation and citation omitted). Id. Smith contends, as she did below, that the statute does not bar her claim because the campsite reservation fee she paid encompassed the general use of the park and all of its recreational activities. Although our review is de novo, we reject this argument for the same reasons articulated by the judge.

The recreational use statute “grants an exemption from liability for ordinary negligence where a defendant has an interest in land, the plaintiff was injured when engaged in a recreational activity on that land, and the defendant did not impos[e] a charge or fee for the injured plaintiff's use of the land” (quotation and citation omitted). Patterson, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 160. “In other words, the issue is whether the landowner charges a fee for the particular use to which the plaintiff puts the land.” Marcus v. Newton, 462, Mass 148, 154-155 (2012).

Here, the fee Smith paid gave her access to a campsite, but Smith was not injured at that campsite or while she was camping. Rather, she was injured on a hiking trail that was one mile away and open to the public free of charge. As “[Smith] herself had not been charged a fee to [hike], ‘she was no different from any other member of the public’ ” who could hike within the park. Gerante v. 202 Sports Complex, LLC, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 459 (2019), quoting Whooley v. Commonwealth, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 909, 910 (2003).

Furthermore, contrary to Smith's claim, the circumstances presented here are not like those present in Amaral v. Seekonk Grand Prix Corp., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 2, 5 (2016), in which we concluded that the statute did not bar liability and vacated the entry of summary judgment in favor of the landowner. In that case, the plaintiff accompanied her two sons to a commercial recreational facility that offered go-cart racing (among other activities) for a fee. See id. at 2. There was no fee to enter the facility or watch the racing. See id. The plaintiff purchased tickets for her sons to use the go-carts and was watching them from behind a chain link fence when another child drove a go-cart through the fence and struck her. See id. We concluded that the statute did not preclude liability because the plaintiff's particular use of the land for which she paid a fee was to accompany and supervise her children, not solely to watch her children engage in a recreational activity. See id. at 4. We determined that, essentially, the plaintiff's presence at the go-cart track “effectively was required.” Gerante, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 461.

By contrast, Smith's use of the hiking trail was a choice that made her “a member of the public recreating without charge” and not a paying customer. Gerante, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 461. See Patterson, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 161-162 (recreational use statute applied to plaintiff tourists who paid no fee to visit historic church). See also Seich v. Canton, 426 Mass. 84, 86 (1997) (recreational use statute applied where plaintiff paid no fee to facility's owner in exchange for her use of premises as spectator of sporting event); Whooley, 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 910 (same). Consequently, we conclude that the statute bars liability on the part of DCR for Smith's injuries.⁴

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the park is open to the public free of charge, according to DCR's website, a copy of which is part of the record on summary judgment, DCR charges a fee for parking from Memorial Day to Labor Day. Smith relies on the payment of a parking fee to support her argument that DCR is not entitled to immunity under the statute. As the judge noted, the record does not contain any direct evidence that Smith or her boyfriend paid a parking fee. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Smith, as we must, there is evidence that she drove to the park and had a vehicle at the campsite. Therefore, we can reasonably infer that Smith paid a parking fee. That said, in the absence of any evidence regarding the language, if any, on the parking ticket itself, we make no assumptions, as Smith requests, that the parking fee encompassed anything more than permission to park a vehicle. Moreover, the recreation (hiking) and subsequent injury occurred in an area that was free and open to the public without charge, and we note that visitors to the park could enter the park on foot without paying any parking fee. Thus, even if the parking fee were considered, it would not change the application of the statute in the circumstances presented.

2.   Smith's boyfriend made the reservation, but it is unclear who paid the fee for the campsite. Nothing turns on whether Smith or her boyfriend made the payment.

3.   Smith does not contest that DCR has an interest in the park, nor does she argue that DCR's allegedly deficient maintenance of the hiking trail rises to the level of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Furthermore, it is undisputed that hiking constitutes a recreational use within the park.

4.   Given our conclusion, we need not address Smith's argument that the judge's alleged misapplication of the statute precludes summary judgment.